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The Algerian Populism Rhetoric

“The growth of populism theories locally and their relationship to the disintegration of Bouteflika’s regime”

A Comprehensive National Study

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Language and Culture.

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Dedications

God Almighty said: "Argue with them in a way that is best." Holy Qur'an.

Aisha, may God be pleased with her, the Messenger of God, The peace upon him, said: "God loves, whoever among you does a job, to master it." Narrated by Al-Tabarani in Al-Awsat.

To the apostles of knowledge and beacons of thought, to whoever competing for the good of humanity, I say: "The end of my research is in fact only the beginning of other researches. Thus, I will never allow myself to compare this beginning simple to your harvest season... However, what must be emphasized for me is that the gradual progression towards success is one of the reasons for achieving success".

To the soul of my father and my firstborn brother... I dedicate this work.

Soufiane Sifi

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All praise is due to Allah, that is enough, may blessings and peace be upon whomever He chose, our master Muhammad, the best of God's creation, and whoever is guided, than:

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Abstract

This thesis aims to study and analyze populism discourse in Algeria, focusing on its social and political effects. Where populism discourse uses simple language and an approach that targets public feelings, relies on harsh criticism of the political elite and state institutions, which has contributed to the exacerbation of social and political conditions. This study used a descriptive analytical methodology, it included a review of previous literature, an analysis of political and media discourses, in addition to conducting interviews with specialized professors. The study found that Algerian populist discourse is characterized by its focus on national identity, its selection of the political elite, and its provision of quick solutions to complex problems. Among the factors that contributed to its spread are the deteriorating economic conditions, political corruption, and social and political crises. This negatively affected social cohesion and public policies, which increased polarization and division within society. To confront this phenomenon, the study recommends enhancing education and critical thinking, improving the role of the media in providing reliable information and combating fake news.

Keywords: Algerian populist discourse; Abdelaziz Bouteflika; Popular protests; corruption; the Algerian movement.

List of Abbreviations

APS : Algeria Press Service

SPSS : Statistical Package for Social Sciences

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General Introduction

Populism has been defined as a conceptual approach, it is a term that came to represent “the people” as a sacred force opposing and rejecting the “elite,” which is usually characterized by corruption. This is the general perception of this concept, but populists have more than one definition of “the people,” basing it on class, ethnic, and national foundations. Everyone who follows the path of the populist finds them opposed to the “elite” describes it as a group that includes political, economic, cultural and media institutions, or what is currently known as the national state, which is characterized by homogeneity. The aim of these groups is to serve their personal interests, and the interests of other groups - such as large corporations, foreign countries, or immigrants - at the expense of the interests of “the people.” Or so the populists describe their situation.

Therefore, populism in its general concept, according to specialists in this field: It is a term that refers to a group of political positions that emphasize the idea of “the people” often compares this group to the “elite.” Later, in the nineteenth century, this term developed and became used to refer to many politicians parties, and movements opposed to the ruling authority, despite the vagueness of this term at the time. Which led some researchers to reject it completely.

Populism, or what is known as social movements, or according to the modern political concept, it is a social upheavals usually led by influential or dominant figures who present themselves as “the voice of the people and their official spokesman.” This is theoretically, In this regard, the National Secretary of the Political Bureau in charge of foreign relations in the Algerian Labor Party says, states in his dialogue in support of this dissertation “*With all discretion, it is a speech aimed solely at gathering votes rather than solving their issues*” (Judi 2024). As for the practical aspect, populism is often compared to other ideologies, such as Nationalism, Liberalism, Socialism, and so on... This behavior led to the emergence of the so-called political right and left, whose tasks include exhausting power through their constant endeavor to pull the rug under the feet of the ruling class, justifying that by participating of people in political decision-making.

While Its historical roots goes back to the era of Algerian popular resistance in the eighteenth century. Later, in the 1950s, the term’s popularity increased among Algerian religious, sociologists and political theorists. It appeared for the first time during the days of the Great Patriotic War, when the term was closely related to the people and the front. As the researcher

in political sciences at the University of Khenchela says in an interview included in the memorandum, *“...with regard to Algeria, I believe that it accompanied certain eras in a certain political context resulting from the country’s history, the liberation war and the major economic and political crises...”* (Yahiaoui 2023), Post-independence, the term was associated with the “National Liberation Front” party, which has an agrarian socialist approach. At the end of the twentieth century, this term became associated with active political parties with a liberal orientation. In the twenty-first century, the term has gained popularity in political discourse and has become very widely used, especially during the first and second decades of the twenty-first century, the reformer began to refer directly to the Algerian left-wing and right-wing groups outside power, in addition to those groups that are characterized by centrism, that is, those groups that do not believe in the existing parties. In this context, Vice Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Khenchela says in his interview in favor of the memorandum, *“As for its origins, it is often linked to the people and the lower social classes, it considers itself opposed to the elites and the ruling regime”* (Achouri 2023). In the same context, Dr. Ammar Sigha, a researcher in Algerian security and strategic affairs, adds in his interview in favor of the memorandum, *“Of course, Mr. Soufiane, regarding populism or the philosophy of populist discourse in Algerian discourse, has roots, I mean, historical backgrounds linked to specific time periods. Perhaps its first beginning dates back to the end of Ottoman rule. The day after that, the so-called inauguration of notables and tribal notables that date back to the Eyalet and Almalaet (Regencies) in the Ottoman era took place due to the absence of social media as it exists now, of course, the rhetoric was a populist speech, with popular markets, public squares, even mosques being a field and arenas for promoting this speech. Especially since it depends mainly on transmitting topics related to political, social, economic and cultural issues to the general public and the people in particular, in contexts with close connections to the signs of democratic revival in Europe and in the Western system, also given the beginning that means the existence of a relevant relationship between The ruler and the ruled in that time period”* (Sigha 2024).

Some of these populists actually arrived and were able to assume positions in liberal democracies, but they disrupted the course of existing institutions. In other word, these populists became responsible for the democratic setbacks that appeared after they came to power, or what is called “democratic decline” or “removal of democracy.” - Because they obstructed independent institutions such as the media and the judiciary, which they see as hostile to “the will of the people”.

❖ Statement of the problem:

In the light of this simple introduction, the main problem that the research addresses is formulated as follows:

How does the Algerian populism rhetoric developed, and what were the results established by this development in light of the growth of local populism theories during the Bouteflika era.

❖ Sub-questions:

To address this problem, we decided to raise a number of sub-questions as follows:

1. What are the social, economic and cultural factors that strengthened Algerian populist discourse?
2. How did the government dealt with the populist tide after the reforms? In addition, what are the means and procedures on which it based its policy?
3. The prospects for this rising populist growth, and what is the extent of its effectiveness in the future in light of the political transformations that Algeria has experienced and is currently experiencing?

❖ Objectives of the study:

This research aims to understand the political changes that give us a deep explanation of how populist discourse and its relationship to the disintegration of the political system and changes in governance in Algeria. These political changes reveal dynamics that in turn lead to shedding light on the forces and factors by which Algerian populist discourse is affected, in addition to analyzing The social factor as a basic pillar of every populist movement to understand the impact of this discourse on Algerian society and how it was able to shape the opinions, then behaviors of the Algerian individual. This research also aims to illuminate the future by providing a real basis for setting future policy directions and understanding the challenges that Algeria may face by studying these dynamics. As it is no secret to anyone, the aim of every research is to enrich academic literature through research in the field of political and social sciences as well as regional studies, because our topic can -why not- reveal multiple dimensions of the political, social and cultural influence of populist discourse, and its prominent role in formulating the course of politics and governance in Algeria.

❖ For theoretical approaches.

Like others, we relied in this research on theoretical approaches that could be used to study the growth of Algerian populist discourse and its relationship to the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime, including the following:

1. The theory of sociology and political sociology that is based on the social, cultural and economic factors of society, which determined and charted the course of the internal conflict of Bouteflika's political system, later led to the formulation and crystallization of social conflicts of a political nature in the concept that we saw in 2019.
2. The theory of Algerian political leadership, specifically the Algerian leadership personality, which focused on the role of effective political leaders and how they use populist discourse as a tool to achieve their political goals by exploiting the tools of governance and power through interpreting the effects of populist discourse according to the vision of the political system and the ruling class. This led to the strengthening and shaping of public opinion through political messages broadcast by populist discourse to the public.
3. The theory of democracy and political interaction, which studies the impact of populist discourse on the citizen's thought and the extent of his participation in the democratic process, thus how the citizen's political opinion and behavior is shaped.

❖ Search limits:

- This study relied on a set of elements that were precisely defined in advance to give credibility to the research, which are:
- **Geographical boundaries:** The study was conducted in 58 Algerian states, meaning the study included all parts of the country, including urban and rural areas.
- **Time limits:**
 - ✓ Study period: The study focused on the period of President Bouteflika's rule from 1999 to 2019.
 - ✓ Application of the study: This study was applied during the second semester of the academic year (2023/2024).
- **Institutions and stakeholders:** The study included many Algerian political figures, professors from various Algerian universities, lecturers, Parties heads, various economic

and health sectors, in addition to all segments of Algerian society with their various political and social orientations.

- **Theoretical and applied aspects:** This study combined the theoretical and applied aspects in a balanced manner.
- **Techniques used:** included text analysis, data analysis, media techniques, dialogues and interviews.
- **Study terms:** To reach this study, key terms were set to facilitate access to this research, which are as follows: the growth of Algerian populist discourse, the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime, the influence of populist discourse, power and national identity, the Algerian movement.

❖ **Research importance :**

The importance of this research is that it is a semi-integrated study on a new topic in the English language, as it addresses the course of populism discourse in Algeria from 1962 until 2019 in general. In particular, this research focused on a very sensitive period in the history of Algeria as of 1999 to 2019. Thus, it added value in terms of being considered a modest reference that may be added to our library and an attempt to enrich scientific knowledge, especially in the aspect of analytical discourse in Algeria.

❖ **Search difficulties:**

The difficulties that I encountered during the completion of this research do not differ in reality from those familiar to all researchers, the most important of them can be mentioned as follows:

- Lack of references in the English language, especially those concerned with populism discourse in Algeria.
- Large bureaucracy and imaginary obstacles while we tried to contact some influential figures in power and others refused to give any special information about the role of the growing populist discourse in shaping political life in Algeria during the era of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.
- Lack of exposure to research topics and previous studies related to the topic of populist discourse in the English language, whether it is related to master's theses or even

doctoral degrees, which led us to discuss in some detail all the changes that the popular trend witnessed from the years 1962 to 1999.

❖ **Research Methodology:**

This research somewhat provides an answer to many of the questions that have been asked on more than one occasion, this is intended to reach the desired goals of this study. The descriptive approach is considered the master of the situation, this is to give a comprehensive picture of the state of populism in Algeria over more than sixty years of independence. This research is also not devoid of the analytical approach that relied on analyzing previous hypotheses and drawing conclusions.

❖ **Search divisions:**

In our study, we have relied on dividing the research into three chapters through which the problems raised can be answered, in a way that makes it easier for the knowledgeable and the researcher alike to understand and know what our research aims to achieve.

- **The first chapter:** was devoted to the theoretical aspect, in which we presented some concepts related to populist discourse in terms of its importance, role, and factors for its emergence. We also touched on some concepts related to populist politics in terms of its definition, problems, and relationship with the people.
- **Chapter Two:** The first part was devoted to the applied aspect, in which we presented the path of populism in Algeria for the period before the reforms, by giving an overview of the state of populism before the Bouteflika regime, mentioning the most important achievements, finally we try to address the extent of populism's success in dismantling and changing the system.
- **Chapter Three:** The second and final part of the applied aspect of the research is devoted to the path of populist politics in Algeria in the period after the reforms, with the aim of knowing all the efforts harnessed to develop the state to confront the great deficit it experienced during the period of Bouteflika's regime, in the end an attempt by us to evaluate the path of this experience, This is what you will find in the folds of this research with more details and a kind of systematic precision.

Soufiane Sifi

Chapter One

A general introduction to the Algerian populism
discourse.

Introduction

The follower to the path of the growth of populism theories within Algeria will find that it began with an idea and a discourse. No doubt about it. Therefore, the masses are the basic pillar and driver of this idea, i.e. the idea of addressing the public's ability to be led by the attractiveness of the idea and the charisma of the leader, which falls within the scope of understanding populism and how it works. Although the concept of a collective mind has been widely rejected as a metaphysical abstraction, But there is an almost certain idea among social psychologists based on the principle that groups involve internal dynamism, as these groups display unique characteristics as a product of the network of relationships between individuals within them. From this perspective, it can be said that populism is, firstly, a complex social phenomenon, and secondly, it is characterized by multiple dimensions and pillars, which has made it difficult to define academically. Therefore, there have been many approaches and diverse approaches and visions in anticipating its trends, but it has remained and will remain one of the changing factors in the world of politics.

As mentioned above, experts in political science and sociology confirm that it is very difficult to define what is meant by the term "populism" because it is a term loaded with different, and sometimes contradictory, connotations. Here they are divided into two prominent categories. The first category believes that this term includes all political discourse directed at the popular classes in a country, as this discourse is based on criticizing the political system, its existing institutions, its elites, its media, and everything that revolves around it. Here the idea of absolute opposition emerges between these people, as they reject the idea of societal diversity, and believe only in the absolute opposition between the people and the elites, focusing thus on the role of the masses based on political exploitation of the feelings of anger among the general public. Especially in times of disasters, economic crises, and political unrest. In this context, Al-Moncef Al-Ounas says: "*The national state that the Algerians had always dreamed of was not the expected miracle. It may have been even less than the popular ambition. The paradigm of this state, which was born from the Algerians' revolutions and sacrifices, was cheap and disappointing because of the extremely cruel and rude behavior it accompanied. Soon tyranny came again, from the revolution to the state!*" (Al-Moncef 1995, p. 8).

Based on the opinion of those who followed Algerian affairs, especially the period of the 1980s, they realized that the relationship between authority and society after independence and the era of President Chadli Bendjedid in particular was not based on the rationality of rights

and duties, as observers and researchers indicated, i.e. to the logic of equality, but what prevailed at that time was oppression in its various and ugliest forms. The long and rigid economic, social and political practice led to the exhaustion of the state apparatus, which led to the symbol of this state being shaken in the popular imagination, resulting from the depth of the gap between the revolutionary standards that it had adopted. The political discourse at that time and what is written in official documents, this is what led to the absence of any trace of the state, for which the Algerian citizen did not find any evidence on the ground except the name.

This clear absence of the state among the popular class is due to the interest of the ruling party in post-independence Algeria in managing its internal contradictions. And tightening its grip on state structures in order to continue the chain of benefits, resulting in a double wear and tear. Because it included at the same time the political and intellectual elites, and the wheels of the government apparatus, which negatively affected the legitimacy of the “national state,” as well as the public’s acceptance of its modernization projects. Together, these elements helped lead to the popular explosion on October 5 and 6, 1988. The return of the conflict between the state and civil society in Algeria, this loud explosion was a sure sign of the extent of the accumulated repression.

The first topic: A general overview of the Algerian populist discourse.

The first requirement:

Concepts about populism

Populism is generally understood as a political tendency based on the sanctification of “the people.” It believes in the conflict between the people and the elites, and that the people are right and the ruling elites are wrong. It believes in the centrality of the people’s role in political practice, it thrives by exploiting feelings of anger among the general public, especially in times of disaster. Economic crises and political unrest. But due to the diversity of the historical, social, political and economic contexts in which it existed, as a result of the diversity of connotations of the concept of “the people” changing from one populism to another, what is meant here is from one authority to another, Since its emergence as a term, populism has not settled on a fixed definition. Hence, we, as researchers, have the right also to have a unique view that is different from what currently exists, as we see that populism in Algeria is completely different from populism in the rest of the other countries. Indeed, we are certain that Algerian populism cannot be compared to its counterparts in the world similar to the populism

of “Jamal Abdu Nasser” in Egypt, or comparing it to Muammar Gaddafi’s “mass” vision in Libya, or placing it as a concept parallel to Hitler’s Nazism in Germany and European countries, or equating it with Stalin’s Soviet populism, as we cannot compare it to Mao Zedong’s cultural “revolution” in the People’s Republic of China. We must be very careful, as populism in Algeria is something else entirely. It is the product of years of systematic oppression that preceded even the years of independence. We are talking about the sap of two hundred years rooted in history, so it is difficult to determine a fixed definition of what populism is in Algeria.

1. Definitions of populism:

In this context, they said:

- ❖ The leader of the Workers’ Party also stated that the establishment of the Second Republic “*does not mean breaking with independence, but rather falls within the fulfillment of the goals of the liberation revolution to return the word to the people so that they can determine the form and content of the institutions that will represent them.*” (Louisa 2014)
- ❖ Wendy Nichols, University of Cambridge: “What distinguishes the word populism from others is that it represents a real local and global phenomenon at the same time, at a time when leaders and peoples around the world are grappling with issues of immigration and trade, with growing nationalism, and dissatisfaction with the deteriorating economic situation.” Populism is, in general, a superficial stream of thought. A movement with a mobilizing ideological orientation, an ideology that exploits cognitive weakness and psychological fragility, an ideology that has the ability to spread; Because it does not require mental effort or cognitive effort, it is an effective weapon in political battles and ideological disputes, and it has the ability to dismantle social unity and destabilize effective political action.
- ❖ Mona Khwais says, “*Populism declined in Europe after World War II, only to flourish in most Third World countries, which needed emotional discourse in order to mobilize the masses in battles for the homeland and independence from the colonizer.*” (Khwais 2012)

- ❖ *“The Algerians will not allow adventurers who aim -through Machiavellian strategies and through social media networks - to dismantle Algerian society and destroy the nation.” (Louiza 2014).*
- ❖ Giovanni Battista Grimaldi: *“There is a difficulty in defining the meaning of populism, because it is not a concept but a term, which is not used to define as much as it is used to denounce.*
- ❖ *”Olivier Vidal, an expert on political ideas at the Institute of Political Sciences in Grenoble said that the difficulty in defining the meaning of the word lies in that it "Not understood."*
- ❖ On the other hand, Robert's Little Dictionary, 2013 edition, defined populism as *"a political discourse directed at the popular classes, based on criticism of the regime, its officials, and the elites"*.
- ❖ *“The logic of populism in general is whoever does not support us and agree with us is not among the people” Marc Fleurbaey*
- ❖ Turkish President also responded to his critics in one of his speeches, saying: *“We are the people. Who are you?” (Erdogan)*
- ❖ As for the Libyan leader, addressed the movement opposing him, saying, *“Who are you”?* (Gaddafi 2011).
- ❖ The director of Critic magazine wrote that this *“word is everywhere, but without a definition.” This university professor told AFP, “Today also, it is still difficult to define this term,” because it raises “controversy” and “means very different phenomena.” (Philippe 2012)*

Based on the definitions mentioned above, it can be said that the term has not received sufficient attention compared to other political science terms, which has hindered giving it a specific and clear definition. Most of the definitions circulating today are vague, so the concept of populism, until this moment, has not found a precise definition that defines it. What is

common is just general definitions. What we are looking for is a positive definition, not a negative definition that is marred by confusion with definitions of other phenomena.

2. The meaning of populism:

Populism in its simplest form, far from what goes on behind the scenes of politics or even in academic halls, “is the belief based on the necessity of government policies being subject to the will of the masses rather than the ruling authority.” Some say that democracy is the highest and finest form of populism. In this context, the former Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi says: “Democracy is popular rule, not popular expression.” But in Algeria today, the term populism has become used by both the right-wing and left-wing opposition, as it was used during the liberation revolution against colonialism and the elite loyal to it. Between this and that, the term populism has been used by the elite against each other to gain power, as was the case with the late President Houari Boumediene in what is known as the revolutionary correction on March 19, 1965, then the events of October 1988, after which the concept of populism developed in Algeria to reach the level of armed violence starting in the year 1992. Populist discourses conflict with the elite that exploits the masses, trivializes their dreams, wastes their rights, and ignores their legitimate demands. Hence, it can be said that populism in its common meaning is the necessity of opposing elitism, aristocracy, and “plutocracy” (i.e. the rule of the wealthy). What happened in Khenchela in 2019 is the best evidence of this, as the head of the Municipal People’s Assembly, Mr. Kamal Hachouf, threatened the masses supporting the presidential candidate at the time to gather in the municipal square, this was the spark for the emergence of populism and its formation from Khenchela, despite the latter’s apology and the dismissal to which he was subjected.

3. Types of populism.

Everyone, whether politicians, activists, or even revolutionaries, raised the slogan of populism, and everyone attributed populism to himself, some of them saw themselves as laying the foundations of populism and its types, but in general, these are the most important types of Algerian populism as seen by political theorists:

- ❖ **Peasant populism:** This type refers to the late Algerian President Houari Boumediene’s adoption of the issues of peasants and their allies in the trade unions. It actually happened that the president stood in solidarity with them, especially in the 1970s, when Boumediene opposed the laws and policies prevailing at the time, in which he saw

exploitation of peasants and workers for the benefit of the bosses of power. In this regard, President Boumediene's wife says, "*Boumediene told me once that when an official comes to me with a complaint, I do not listen to him, because he will complain about his own problems, but when a farmer tells me about his problems, I listen to him carefully, because the problems of that farmer are the problems of whole people*". (Mrs. Boumedien)

- ❖ **Democratic populism:** which aims to involve the largest possible number of the population in the democratic process through referendums and voter registration in electoral rules. In this context, the President says, "*We are proud of our democracy. There is no master in this country, and the master is the people*".(Boumedien 1970)
- ❖ **Military populism:** or what is known as the peasant revolution, it has a direct relationship with local development, to achieve the work of this project, the Office of the High Commission for National Service, which was installed on several points in this project, dealt with the work of units consisting of young soldiers under technical training, which aims to allow these Implementing the programs assigned to them. Indeed, national service youth were used to complete the Green Dam, where seven (7) billion trees were planted, in addition to completing the African Unity Road.
- ❖ **Socialist populism:** It is a populism that represents the leftist movement that supports communism and opposes capitalism. However, this term was specifically used to describe socialist parties after multipartism in 1989.
- ❖ **Technocratic populism:** "Technocratic populism reduces the state to a start-up, with a small number of stakeholders, a closed or restricted public sphere, a weak institutional environment, and people's indifference to politics".

In this context, it is worth noting other types of populism, as there are what are called:

- ❖ **Populist movement:** It is a spontaneous or intentional political movement that depends on the support of the people, it is not the result of an independent organizational authority; it enjoys the support of various segments outside the ruling authority, i.e. the

people who hold an ideology opposed to the status quo,” the 2019 Algeria movement against the authority of President Bouteflika.

- ❖ **Populism as a method:** On the surface, it is a political method that involves a close bond between political leaders and their followers, but in its essence, it is a twisted method based on personal interest, relying on seeking and exploiting opportunities to seize power, as “Bouchachi Mustafa”, “Zoubida Assoul”, “Karim Tabou” and others attempted to do; who lost national conscience in a terrible moment that the country is going through.
- ❖ **Ideological populism:** It is every group, sect, or movement based on the following foundations: “Virtue lies in the simple people, who constitute the absolute majority, in their collective traditions.” It is the ideology that attempts to mobilize a homogeneous group against the elite, or those who pose a threat to the people’s rights, values, and identity, his prosperity and voice. The evidence of this is the entrenchment of the “Algerian People’s National Army” against the ruling authority led by President “Abdelaziz Bouteflika 2019”.
- ❖ **Populism as a strategy:** “It is a twisted political method resorted to by those unpopular leaders to exercise authority based on the direct, non-institutional support of a large number of unorganized followers”. This is what happened in Algeria, where President Bouteflika passed the “draft constitution” to Parliament after he resorted to raising the salaries of representatives, and other temptations, in a first in Algeria’s history.
- ❖ **Populism in political culture:** It is an orientation that believes that government policy should represent the desires of the people, that people are only free when the law conforms to their will.

The inherent differences between the Algerian right and left wings in this regard are that the populism of the Algerian left is like the “Workers’ Party,” which on its face opposes the ruling authority, the authority of the rich, biggest companies, capitalism, and even religious authority. In this regard, the head of the Workers’ Party says “*The Algerian people do not allow deviations and blackmail, whether internally or externally,*” (Louiza 2014), While right-wing populism, led by Islamic parties, especially those like the Hams Movement, Ennahdha Party,

Justice and Development Movement, and others, which represents the ordinary and simple man steadfast in the face of the ruling intellectual elite, in addition to their opposition to the owners of the leftist culture, whether capitalists, socialists, liberals, or others.

In this regard, the Algerian parliamentarian for the Justice and Development Party says, addressing former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia: *“These are your methods of dealing with this oppressed people, sometimes through enticement and other times through intimidation. But he has realized the falsity of your promises and numbers, he no longer believes you, today, he is demanding your departure in order to relieve you and he will find relief from your wrong policy, which he is tired of, this is before he removes you.”* (Bin Khallaf 2019). But the clear confusion and blurring between right and left Algerian wings, and the submission of some on both sides to the temptations of power led by President Bouteflika, made the Algerian populist discourse characterized by a kind of ambiguity, spontaneity, and instability, meaning that it is a populist discourse that emerged without organized foundations for it. Despite this fluctuation in the process of the emergence of populist discourse in Algeria, it has grown and advanced over the decades until it has become a habit that brings together all Algerians whenever something bad happens to the country, the events of 2019 are only the best evidence of the long history of populism in this land.

❖ **The second requirement: The reasons for the emergence of populism in Algeria**

The reasons are intertwined and varied, but there are two main reasons for the emergence of populism in Algeria:

1. The colonial historical cause resulting from Algeria’s exposure to a series of different colonial movements from the Romans, Turks, and others to the French invaders, which created in the Algerian people a hateful view that grew throughout those eras, crystallizing later in the form of popular resistance that Algeria experienced during its long history.

2. The second reason is social and political

At the same time, as the social reason is related to marginalization and the state of despair that the people reached in the post-independence period, i.e. it is mainly related to grievances resulting from the transformation and deviation of the course of society among itself, as the

middle class declined, and the weak class grew. Wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small few. These social imbalances led to the escalation of populist anger, the reason is due to the government's inability to fulfill its obligations towards the people and the state together, as for the political reason, it is related to the lack of trust that emerged between the ruling authority and the people as a result of imbalances that occurred at the level of political representation and participation politics in itself.

Looking at the historical context, we find that the emergence of populism in Algeria was a natural extension of the mistreatment to which the people were subjected, and the real crises that resulted as a result of a foreign authority taking over the management of its country's affairs.

Looking at the social context, we find that the people's loss of the factor of trust between them and the existing political system that has been in power in Algeria after independence has led to an increase in the growth and escalation of populist thought among the people due to the failure of successive governments to respond to their desires.

As for the political context, it is worth saying that the people's feeling of being abandoned by political actors automatically led to the growth and interaction of populist ideas and their spread among society as an alternative option for the elite... Here is the major catastrophe that the ruling authority has overcome - either intentionally or unintentionally -

It is that in such cases of abandonment, the people interpret grievances according to their own populist mental map, which usually ends with the people's consensus on the conclusion that the ruling elite is "corrupt" whose goal is to achieve private interests at the expense of the higher interests of the nation, and therefore must be eradicated from its roots before it invades, this is what actually happened in Algeria.

These ideas, which the authorities see as strategies hostile to them, are in fact ideas generated and emerging. Rather, they exist in the people's thoughts, they are among their basic demands that they continue to demand every time they take to the street. In other words, they are the ideas and dreams of Algerian populism that over the years of independence, it has gained nothing but the slogan that the state itself carries: "By the people, for the people."

It is absolutely not possible to imagine the lines of conflict or the separation between what is called "populism and power" within Algerian society in an objective and correct manner, this clear ambiguity between "who is populist and who is authoritarian" generated political pressures for us that continued peacefully, to be known later as Algerian populism. Peaceful political pressures actually allowed for an effective translation of societal pluralism into the

Algerian political system. But Algerian pluralism is not a fixed whole, this is a fact that must be remembered, it is the product of the growth and development of social movements among Algerian citizens over decades of independence, in which they see themselves as free, as an equal individuals, who differ in their interests and goals, but agree in the unity of their country.

The follower to the Algerian issues is well aware that the reasons for the emergence of populism can be summarized as follows:

- The historical position of successive colonial movements against the people of Algeria, which was later crystallized in inhumane actions against conservative national movements and parties such as: the Algerian Muslim Scholars Association, the People's Party, and others. The Algerian political analyst in security and strategic affairs says in favor of the memorandum, *"This gradually occurred even after the so-called emergence of the national movement in the 1920s, when political discourses, as well as political platforms, began to spread and in political mobilization to create a political environment, to create a political and elite class capable of leading the political front in Algeria."* (Sigha 2024)
- The crisis of political representation that Algeria experienced in the sixties and seventies of the last century, where political life was reduced to one party that represented everyone with their various political orientations and stripes. This created a state of tension among the elite with an ideological orientation contrary to the vision of one-party policy.
- Trust in parties declined after the events of the Black Decade, as a result of the people's awareness of the evasions of political parties and their leaders, and this is what made the percentage of belonging to these parties continue to decline.
- The so-called "protest parties" appeared at the beginning of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's rule for the first time in the history of Algeria, as a result of the complex political scene that preceded his presidency. Later, it became clear to the people that the leaders of these parties were nothing but a group of opportunists lurking for a power nothing more. At least, their goal is to serve their personal interests at the expense of the interests of their parties and the country.

These parties took populism as their slogan, but it became clear to the people that they were political groups whose goal was to serve their interests. Later on, it became clear that these spokespersons for these parties were groups working in the name of these political parties to

achieve their goals in the name of the party itself, here the people discovered the truth about the shading to which they had fallen victim. i.e. a complete absence of the truth of the ideology related to the general policy of building the state, which led to the transformation of the course of the conflict between the parties and the authority into a conflict between the people on the one hand, the political parties on the other hand and the ruling authority, i.e. a three-party conflict with “the people, the political parties and the authority” that the world has almost never witnessed.

That is, the people are now facing their political opponents belonging to parties outside the ruling authority who are lurking in the ruling regime on the one hand, in confrontation with the ruling authority itself on the other hand, this is what led to the strong emergence of the phenomenon of populism in Algeria, because this people has simply become a victim of both parties. Whether a ruling authority or political parties, some of which declared loyalty to the corrupt authority without shame, while others dug in with the opposition, waiting for the opportunity to replace the authority.

On the other hand, the rise of populism in Algeria after independence was the result of two main reasons:

- The coup against the young democracy in the 1990s following the cancellation of the results of the legislative elections, which at that time led to the Islamists winning a majority of seats in the first pluralistic parliament in Algeria.
- The populist movement escalated further after the farces that Algeria witnessed during the rule of President Bouteflika, as the majority of the people began to believe in the alliance of opposition parties with the authority, which led to the fall of the people’s rights and a decline in the social level in general, this is what crystallized in the 2019 movement against the authority. This is what we will discuss in some detail in the second chapter of this research.

3. Before the movement, or what is known as the period of death of ideology... long live loyalty.

The President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had been reached the power in 1999 after withdrawing of all candidates from the pre-presidential elections that had been announced by former President Liamine Zeroual that time under the slogan of “*The transfer of power to consolidate the principles of democracy*”, the latter worked to consolidate what the Algerian people had never known before ,where did he goes to establish a new type of populism that was

later known as technocratic populism, which specialists defined it by saying: “*Technocratic populism reduces the state to an emerging company, with a small number of stakeholders, a closed or restricted public sphere, a weak institutional environment, and indifference from People in politics*”. This is what some saw as this type of populism in itself is a form of ideology, but the majority did not agree at all with this opinion. In their view, it is an intentional and drawn-up strategy by President Bouteflika’s regime to delegitimize political institutions, traditional political parties, and civil society to create Indifference politics among the people, through a series of grants and buying of debts that affected all state institutions, by relying on the public treasury to silence opposition voices and contain them. This is what the president and his authority succeeded in doing for 20 years of chaotic, non-"technocratic" populist rule, which is in itself a systematic approach to significantly transform the general policy of the state into a policy of amassing and dividing spoils among specific individuals or closed groups, later known as “The Gang.” Instead of serving citizens without any ideological, regional, or ethnic biases. The result was inequality, spread of corruption, nepotism and bribery, which dropped the country’s ranking in the global anti-corruption ranking to rank 104. This is an indicator that does not bode well. Whether in terms of prospects for democracy, stability, or social justice. It can be said, very briefly and precisely, that Bouteflika’s regime before the movement was based on a populist, technocratic style in its political appearance, and a populist renter chaotic style in its economic and social appearance, i.e. it is a regime that is based and feeds on the erosion of ideology in contemporary times. This is what made populism in Algeria during the Bouteflika period from 1999-2019 take on a face that populism in the world had never witnessed or experienced before, this uniqueness in the type of populism made politicians describe this period in Algeria’s history as a period of death of the ideological style, the growth of the trust style based on the principle of loyalty the blind, i.e. the principle does not exist at all.

Before the movement, Algeria had already begun to witness a decline in ideological identification in line with trends around the world. However, Algerians' ideological deflation was somewhat delayed, as voters initially viewed Bouteflika as a savior, this is in their complex search for political solutions after they had exhausted their other options in the time before Bouteflika, when “blood” was the main theme of Algerian life - This trust and loyalty among the Algerians came from the perspective that President Bouteflika grew up under the wing of the late president, the masses beloved, Mr. Houari Boumediene, that is what instilled confidence among the people and killed their ideology.

4. The peaceful popular movement or uprising

Some newspapers reported that the movement preceded the date of February 19th, according to them the origin of the movement belong to 14th of February, then, it spread on the 16th of the same month, as evidenced by the exit of citizens in Kharratha, then the real day of the outbreak came on February 19th. However, the Mayor of Khenchela denied convincingly, he reported this news, in his interview in favor of the memorandum, saying: *“According to Al-Bilad newspaper, the people of Khenchela thronged on February 14th, this is a fault news, the people of Khenchela they never thronged in Khenchela, especially on February 14th, we did not record any thronged, as we did not record any other thronged during the entire year. The people of khenchela thronged on the day when I shared the challenge post... The challenge came against the backdrop of hanging the picture, but the hanging, it was an act that I did not do alone. However, it is a coordinated action with the state authorities, unfortunately they sacrificed the mayor.”* (Hachouf 2024)

As for its causes, they are due to the suffering, the President of the Popular Council adds in his intervention in favor of the memorandum: *“For your information, there was great pressure at the beginning of the movement on February 19th, this is due to many reasons, including that the people in Khenchela were suffering, there were many problems, social problems. Housing problems, disrespect, marginalization, etc. Indeed, the people are reeling under pressure. Knowing also that there is another possible possibility, perhaps there were hidden hands, for me, “It is a coup,” since the I was the beloved mayor for the residents of Khenchela, even the crowds, almost of them were not from the city of Khenchela, they are the neighboring municipalities residents, so I say: There are undercurrent (hidden hands) that it sought to overthrow the regime.”* (Hachouf 2024).

It is Tuesday, February 19, 2019, “or Black Day, or Black February.” The most difficult and longest day in the history of Bouteflika’s authority and his rule, which was nearly twenty years old. It is the day the authority fell into disgrace due to its misjudgment of matters. He provoked the Bouteflika regime, known at the time to the general Algerians as the “Atiqa regime.” - referring to the family regime that was leading Algeria at the time - this regime provoked the citizens in the wrong place and at the wrong time... so the countryside's, towns, villages and cities of Khenchela province, located 500 kilometers Northern east of Algeria, rose up that day without fear or hesitation, in this regard, the Mayor or the President of the Municipal People’s Assembly of the municipality of Khenchela at the time said:

“Therefore, the movement actually took place on February 19th, precisely from Freedom Square in the municipality of Khenchela, when Mr. Naqqaz visited Khenchela town, where he challenged in a video clip that “he will visit any place he wants, whether in Khenchela. Batna or Setif... Accordingly, I acted as per the instructions of the officials in the Khenchela province, where I hung the picture of the president together with a flag of the republic over the municipal headquarter, then I tweeted on my official Facebook page. I did not mean the young man at the time, but rather Mr. Naqqaz... It was a spelling error. I wrote: “Whoever among you is a man, come closer to the municipality.” instead of “If you are a man, come closer to the municipality” The meaning is “He who has the dignity of manhood should approach the municipality headquarter.” The correct phrase is “If you are a man, approach the municipality.” This mistake for me as a person it brings the independence of Algeria, according to me, I say that the movement began on February 19th” (Hachouf 2024).

The youth of the state of Khenchela thronged in Freedom Square in front of the main headquarter of the municipality of Khenchela in a public and direct challenge to the local and national authorities against the backdrop of the photo’s suspension. Same time in response to the mayor’s provocation, slogans and chants rose, “Unhinge the photo, leave to flag.” Then the picture of the former president, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was dropped



Figure 1 - A picture of President Bouteflika being dropped and torn down at the Khenchela municipal headquarters. -News agencies

and torn up, the President of the Municipal People’s Assembly of Khenchela added at the time: *“The people of Khenchela thronged on the day I shared the challenge post...the challenge came against the background of hanging of picture. However, a picture hanging it was an act that I*

did not do alone, but rather, it is a coordinated action with the province authorities, unfortunately, they sacrificed the mayor.” (Hachouf 2024). Thus, they broke the barrier of fear as they broke the wall of silence among millions of Algerians for years, this was the spark that lit the fuse of the peaceful popular uprising, where the national flag remained raised and high, carrying the symbols of national unity and protecting it. In this context, the mayor of Khenchela at the time said in his interview in favor of the memorandum, speaking about the reasons for the movement:

“Naturally, there is poverty, marginalization, corruption, etc. in the province of Khenchela, such as the intransigence of officials, even though I am one of the mayors who were elected for three consecutive terms, the people always supported me. However, the people were waiting for the opportunity to express what is inside them until the promised day comes when I tweeted on my Facebook page. This speech is a possibility that came to save Algeria, meaning the word “Tazi” which means “approach” came to save Algeria. Because Khenchela is known to everyone for firing the first bullet against French colonialism on the first of November 1954. The revolution started from Khenchela, as the movement started from Khenchela too. History repeats itself, knowing that I am one of the descendants of the family of the Martyr “Abbas Lagharour.” I am very close to this family. Therefore, I usually address people on my Facebook and TikTok pages, saying: The revolution began with the martyr Abbas Laghrour, while the movement was commenced by Kamal Hachouf. However, there remain many reasons, but at that time there is great marginalization, disrespect and corruption... Personally, I was followed by officials because I had charisma, so the governor of the province and the executive board were opposed to my candidacy for the municipal elections, so they put case against me, in light of which I was summoned by the justice system in many cases... Personally, I made this tweet as a result of the pressure, humiliation, and marginalization that I was suffering from... Personally, perhaps this is a great possibility, I am like the young people who got angry and went out on the march. (Hachouf 2024)

In response to a question about whether this movement was being planned or if there was someone behind it, the President of the Municipal People’s Assembly replied, saying: *“Of course, the idea is not innocent because all citizens knows that their problem is not Mr. Mayor, because the Mayor of Khenchela, Mr. Kamal Hachouf at that time was very close to the citizens.. The idea is not innocent because the work that I did was not an individual action, rather it came based on coordination with the province authorities headed by Mr. the Governor,*

the Head of Security, and all the officials were aware of that, the evidence of this that the idea is not innocent is that the officials in the province of Khenchela those who lived through the movement still holding positions, they are promoted successively, so for me I say: the idea is not innocent, remains subject to many possibilities, including that it was organized and planned” (Hachouf 2024).

He added, *"With regard to my professional career and in answer to your question, which says, 'Do you regret the decision to end your duties as mayor?' They were waiting for the opportunity to complete my duties, knowing that I had been prosecuted in approximately 15 or 16 cases, and the state authorities at that time could not terminate my duties, nor even prevent me from running, even though the judiciary had issued a ruling of two months in force. However, the state authorities could not make the decision to end my duties or prevent me from running, because the street, Al-Khanshali, had a strong support for me. They were avoiding the anger of the street. They feared the people because I was very close to them. In addition, I have a strong relationship with the political parties. I had lunches and dinners with these parties, such as the National Liberation Front, the National Democratic Assemble Party... I can say that history will be fair me one day, it will acknowledge that I am one of those who saved Algeria, despite the presence of many parties saying the opposite, but for me, I say that I am one of the saviors of Algeria” (Hachouf 2024).*

However, he began not to care about what he was exposed to as a person and an official. He says: *“I say, all praise due to Allah, who made me the reason for the end of corruption and the undermining of the gang’s rule. I still tweet on social media sites all the time, I also deal with the citizens of Khenchela. Currently, the Khencheli citizen, is very regretful, not because he commenced the movement. No, he regrets the loss of the mayor, because the government at that time sought to eliminate the movement, so the first thing it did was sacrifice the mayor only, but the movement spread to include all the provinces” (Hachouf 2024)*

As for the real day that should be commemorated as a national day of the movement, according to him, it is a February 19th, not a February 22. He says: *“Naturally, February 22 has become a national day of the movement. However, what is supposed to be, February 19th is a national day of the movement, because dropping a picture of the President of the Republic, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, at that time was not an easiest matter, but the picture was dropped in Khenchela” (Hachouf 2024)... He added, “People must know that the movement began on February 19th, its main reason was the word “Tazi” meaning “Approach” which contained*

something planned, something spontaneous, some corruption, disrespect, and marginalization" (Hachouf 2024).

The former mayor of the municipality of Khenchela concluded his intervention in favor of the memorandum by saying: *"Personally - I the unique Mayor of the municipal popular council who was elected for three consecutive terms - despite all the circumstances and pressures that were exerted by the executive board of the province of Khenchela, and the Governor of the province of Khenchela too... I challenged the Governor of the province on many occasions, I was actually the Mayor. I actually proved that I the Mayor. I exercised my duties properly, walked alone and I never subjected to the orders of the Governor or even to the Vice Governor. When the opportunity arose for the executive board of Khenchela, they sacrificed me by issuing a Termination memorandum"* (Hachouf 2024).

After the Khenchela saga, the mask of fear fell among Algerians in all regions and provinces. Young people spontaneously engaged in politics, but this time on the basis of issues with a local and regional dimension, not according to the logic of comprehensive ideologies. Their interest in public affairs was distributed among the various initiatives that created overlap among its members, these initiatives crystallized in the relentless pursuit of serving specific issues such as poverty, regionalism, corruption, disrespect, etc...

Some of these members were ideologically committed, but each was distinguished by its own ideology, while others were not ideological at all, some were members of existing movements or parties, and others were unaffiliated, they all shared the desire to overthrow the prevailing regime headed by "Crippled President" Abdelaziz Bouteflika, but their reasons differed. Likewise, their goals for the future were different in the cases in which the demonstrators set such goals, this was later carried by the slogans raised in marches throughout the Algerian territory.

The spark has spread throughout the country in a very rapid manner, in a precedent that has confused the ruling authority itself, from east to west and from north to south, in the desert, in the plateaus and the coast, the Algerian spirit has been resurrected again, the people rose up, after being controlled by spontaneous populist thought... Mr. President of the Municipal People's Council (Mayor) adds in his intervention in favor of the memorandum: *"Because the government at that time sought to eliminate the movement, the first thing it did*

was sacrifice the mayor only, but the movement spread to include all the provinces. (Hachouf 2024). At this particular time, some political circles entered the line, mainly represented by the ruling and opportunist parties and some unscrupulous figures. It used to survive on crumbs in a desperate attempt to control and direct the spontaneous popular marches that roamed the territory, becoming limited only to Saturday every week, in this regard, the director of Akhbar Al-Watan newspaper said in an intervention specific to the memorandum, “*Different political, ethnic, and intellectual groups tried to control the movement and its goals, this can be seen in the shift of the slogans raised after the first four weeks*” (Twaiqer 2024).

However, the people decided on the historical moment, setting Friday every week immediately after “Friday prayer” as the time to go out to the street... It is the blessed day of February 22, 2019. Populism, with its collective intelligence, has charted the path of continued peace in Algeria resisting and rejecting all the labels that were copied and prepared previously in the scenes, laboratories, and political circles at the time, such as the Smile



Figure 2 - A picture of the 2019 movement denouncing the attempt to steal its cause by some parties. -News agencies

Revolution; white revolution; The soft revolution etc... It was agreed upon to choose the name “the movement” it continued to do so. This bypassed all desperate attempts by some political parties to seize the people’s gains, this was clearly reflected in the slogans raised by the demonstrators in the streets, as shown in Figure 2 above

5. Populist Leadership

Populism in Algeria has never been right-wing or left-wing, as some people think, we must pay attention to this matter so that we do not fall into the forbidden and miscalculate,

especially for those who are not from Algeria. The fact that the right and left movements are very weak, especially during the period of President Bouteflika, as we pointed out in our research above, i.e. there is opposition, but it is informal and negligible, what is true is that populism in reality was opposed to the existing regular institution, which was based on alliances between it and the parties. The populists have selectively targeted the authority and the elites loyal to it, i.e. the ability of populist movements to attract followers effectively, maintain a direct relationship with the followers and exploit the weaknesses of the existing authority, this populism is unique in its political form, so it is not a competition for the fragile opposition against the authority. Because the opposition, including active citizens, is no longer seen as a legitimate political opponent but rather as an enemy of ordinary people.

Algerian populism was based on a social contract emanating from it, i.e. from citizens, in clear disregard for institutions and individuals who initiate accountability, such as parties and civil associations, as it reduced the complexity of representation, that is, the representation of people through elected institutions, i.e. there is no charismatic leader who calls for fighting political authority in the name of the people and denounces intruders - in a broader sense, including parties - at the same time this charismatic leader is keen to communicate directly with the people... Rather, Algerian populism is completely different from this prevailing thesis in the world. Rather, it was the citizens who spontaneously denounced political authority. This is what made spontaneous populism appear in Algeria as an alternative to technocratic populism, also as an alternative to the ideology of democratic pluralism of a liberal nature that the elite called for in the 1980s. In other words, "spontaneous populism" in Algeria appeared when the traditional party system lost all its cards in the field, in addition to the inability of the rest of the main parties emerging from the 1989 Constitution to respond effectively to the new challenges.

Therefore, spontaneous populism in Algeria came on the ruins of those bets that the opposition and the authority lost together in achieving the people's demands.

The common language to which the populists in Algeria resorted was a unique language in terms of style by addressing the consciences and feelings of the people. Therefore, populism is distinguished from the "elite" because they resort to establishing close relationships with "the people" instead of the elite and the authority together i.e. there is no relationship linking populism with the opposition loyal to the authority or even that opposed to it, they have no

relationship with the ruling authority i.e. populism in Algeria is a movement that is contrary to these and those. Analysts described this movement as “a movement completely different from those usual in the arena with a political style characterized by an appeal to the ‘people’ against the ‘elite’, the ‘opposition’ and the ‘authority’ which usually perpetuates ‘bad morals, creates crises, collapses and threatens’

- ❖ **Second topic: The roots of Algerian populism and its growth stages.**
- ❖ **The third requirement: the principles of Algerian populism.**

The Algerian populist conception of democracy is based on three characteristics: The first of these characteristics is giving priority to direct democracy, meaning priority is given to “popular rule, not popular expression,” by calling in particular for the intensification of referendums that are initiated by the people. Secondly, defending a project with clear definitions and frameworks to establish true popular democracy, criticizing the undemocratic nature of elected and non-elected bodies, in addition to the performance of the courts alike. The third characteristic is Algerian populism’s praise of immediate and spontaneous popular expression.

1. Historical principles of Algerian populism:

Does Algerian populism have a history? The answer is simple "Yes"; we can begin with the history of the word "populism", as it appeared as a result of compelling circumstances that the Algerian nation went through before the emergence of the current state, as the matter initially relates to Algerian populism in the period - 1832-1847 - which was embodied in a movement of resisters and young people descended from the popular classes, they rejected as they criticized the country's Western-style modernization projects, they considered it a threat to society's values, so they launched a project to "unite with the people", which was mainly represented by "resistance to Emir Abdelkader Al-Jazairi." The followers of this movement sees that the traditions of agricultural society and village gatherings the basis from which they could start to build a new society, where the Algerian state first appeared in the city of “Maaskar” in western of Algeria: “Abdelkader Al-Jazairi most likely believed that the peasants, the simple people, and the common people would constitute a hostile force, unlike the one the west expected from the people at the time?” This statement did not come out of nowhere as much as it came from an analysis of the prevailing collective environment in that period. “The matter mainly concerned what we can call the ‘populism of loyalty to notables’ which mobilized the popular masses at that time before French colonialism sought to break it later.” But this movement left a remarkable effect; Some of the poles of popular resistance after “Emir

Abdelkader Al-Jazairi” took their first steps based on the populist thought that formed the state of Emir Abdelkader, similar to the resistance of Ahmed Bai in “Constantin 1837”, the resistance of Zaa'tichah and other revolutionary movements that relied on the thought populism in its stages of struggle. In this respect, the political researcher and expert in security and strategic affairs says in his answer to this question: *“Naturally, I say so, even down to the first beginnings of French colonialism in 1830 the beginning of popular resistance, how the leaders of popular resistance and popular revolutions were created from populist discourse as a mechanism and tool for recruitment, as well as even awareness of the resistance process.”* *Against French colonialism, due to the limited education, as well as the educational levels of the Algerian people, populist rhetoric was adopted for mobilization, recruitment, and even to spread the spirit of resistance among the Algerian people”* (Sigha 2024).

2. The theoretical principles of Algerian populism

Later, it came to Algerian populism, which was formed in the post-independence period, where it came into existence officially in the events of October 1988 due to the economic crisis of 1986 and the one-party policy that turned into a policy aimed at serving the people instead of building the state of Algeria witnessed a real movement that ended with the adoption of pluralism partisanship in 1989. Four years later, in 1992, Algeria experienced a terrible social explosion known as the Black Decade, in which two hundred and fifty thousand were killed due to political demands, the most prominent of which were the cancellation of the election results and the refusal to establish an Islamic state under the leadership of the Islamic Salvation Front party, this stage ended with the dismissal of President “Chadli Ben Jadid” abolishing the republican system and replacing it with the High Council of State, which ended with the assassination of its president, “Mohamed Boudiaf”. Economic losses were estimated at about forty billion dollars at the time. In 2011, Algeria, during the reign of President Bouteflika, witnessed massive protests, the most prominent of which were social, political, and economic. Their real causes were due to the rise in the prices of basic materials of widespread consumption, such as sugar and table oil, in addition to the government’s policy. However, these protests ended with the announcement of a set of reforms that ended with the amendment of the Constitution.

3. Algerian populism over 200 years

Resistance of Emir Abdelkader 1832-1847 in Western Algeria.

- Reasons : French colonialism. The French-style modernization of the country was rejected
- Results: The establishment of the modern Algerian state

Resistance of Ahmed Al-Bai to Constantine 1837-1848

- Reasons: The expansion of French colonialism.
- Results: Resistance fails and the area falls.

• Boumazza Revolt 1845-1847, Chlef, Hodna and Titari

Causes

- Reasons : French colonialism.
- Results: Resistance failure

Zaatasha Resistance 1848-1875 Most of the Algerian

Sahara

- Reasons: French colonialism
- Results: Resistance failure

The Cabil revolt of 1851-1854 by Lalla Fatma N'Soumer and Cherif Boughla

- Reasons: The expansion of French colonialism
- Results: Resistance fails and the area falls

The revolt of the sons of Sid Al-Sheikh 1864-1880, Al-Beid and its environs

- Reasons: French colonialism
- Results: Resistance failure

Al-Maqrani Revolution 1871-1872 Bordj Bou Arreridj and its environs

- Reasons of French colonialism
- Results: Failed popular resistance

First Auras Revolution 1879

- Reasons for the expansion of French colonialism
- Results failure of the resistance and the fall of the area

The revolt of Sheikh Bou'amama 1881-1883, Ain Sefra and its environs

- Reason: The expansion of French colonialism
- Results : Resistance fails and the area falls

Tuareg resistance 1881-1919

- Reasons : The expansion of French colonialism
- Results : Resistance fails and the area falls

Second Auras Revolution 1916-1917

- Reasons : The oppressive colonial policy
- Results: Resistance failure.

Events of October 1988 (Social and economic demands)

- Reasons: Economic crisis
One-party politics
- Results: Approval of political and media pluralism in the 1989 Constitution.

2011 protests (Social, economic and political demands)

- Reasons: High prices of sugar and oil
Government economic policies
- Results: Political and economic reforms
Amend the constitution.

The Black Decade - the 1990s
Political demands, most notably the establishment of an Islamic state (Islamic Salvation Front)

- Reasons : Islamic Salvation Front terrorism
Canceling the electoral process
- Results
• Multiparty local, legislative and presidential elections
• Resignation of President Chadli Bendjedid
• The formation of the Supreme Council of State in 1992 and the assassination of its president, Mohamed Boudiaf
250,000 dead & more than \$40 billion in economic losses

Freedom square- Khenchela

Demonstrations of 2019
Against Bouteflika's candidacy
Political demands

Rejecting the candidacy of ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika for a fifth term

Fourth topic: The growth of Algerian populist discourse during the era of President Bouteflika.

1. Shifts in Algerian discourse from politics to populism to the crisis of democratic transition.

There is no doubt that studying the transformations of Algerian political discourse has strategic dimensions that are difficult for us in this research to address, but in this study we will address the developments of Algerian populism during the era of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, there is no doubt that it is a strange phenomenon in the first place, which developed as a result of those mistakes that Algerian democracy has known, what is certain is that it is a speech that actually threatened existing democracy because it rejected the possibility of legitimate opposition, if it was employed in the political process. In this context, the researcher and professor of political sciences at the University of Algiers 3 says in his answer to the study's question, "... *Whoever becomes ill loses the ability to lead his people...*" (Bouhouch 2024).

Therefore, it contradicts the diversity that contemporary Algerian society aspires to, distinguishing between the elites and the rest of the people. In the opinion of the head of the Labor Party, Ms. Louisa Hanoune, the path of Algerian populist discourse has become at a crossroads, and defining the goals of this discourse must be up to the people alone:

"The revolution (the movement) belongs to the people. There is no President General Manager of the revolution, no leader or official spokesperson, to save the revolution must be by confronting the attempt to distort it and striving for a convergence between political, economic and social issues. This is why it must be led by labor union and student syndicates, which are the forces that can protect the revolution from deviation." (Louisa 2021).

The National Liberation Front Party and the parties loyal to the authorities have dominated the political scene for decades, benefiting from the frameworks and elites that were framing it and fighting from within it, they have actually succeeded in establishing carefully studied programs and projects with strategic dimensions to make these parties aware that a conscious and educated people are capable of engaging in crystallizing providing a political and societal alternative to what existed during the days of colonialism. Thus, building a new society that transcends backwardness. However, these forces, led by President Bouteflika, were unable to formulate a real, purposeful and ambitious popular political discourse, stemming from the culture of society itself and capable of forming a tangible and convincing political alternative to popular Algerian public opinion.

As a result, the emotional vacuum existing between power and the people, Algeria entered another stage of political disorientation, in which the regime used some people as an alternative option to the political parties and administrative elites. Here, Algeria actually witnessed a retreat from the democratic methodology under the pretext of representing the “silent majority.” Where the number of members of Parliament increased to 462 seats, what is known as the policy of filling the “political vacuum” and mobilizing actors under the heading of the most “competent” people was followed.

Also, traditional elites, technocrats, liberals, and other stragglers dominated the political scene, during this period, Algeria witnessed a set of economic, social and political transformations that the traditional elites could not keep up with, which led to real tension that shifted from the approach of rhetoric to the approach of protests against the miserable economic and social conditions...Widespread protests demanded political change and the fight against corruption (the events of 2011), this is what prompted the authority of President Bouteflika to try to work to keep pace with popular anger by changing political discourse and calling for a new political class capable of absorbing popular anger and being closer to the people, presenting their concerns and addressing them in their language, especially with regard to political reform issues, that is, dealing with parties and others in the hope of winning a tactical truce until the storm passes. Especially since most of the elites are shunned by the street, as the rest of the weak parties are unable to play the role of mediation between the state and society due to their weak roots in social structures, it suffers from popular alienation due to the basic law of the parties themselves, absence of deliberation and democracy within these parties.

The political discourse of President Bouteflika’s regime, especially in the last years of his rule, suggested the emergence of a new, old concept entitled “Loving power and staying in it.” influenced the Algerian political discourse in general. The aim of President Bouteflika and those with him was to work to thwart the principle of rotation of power by controlling the decisions of some parties, and to disrupt others by bringing in leaders of their own size, buying off debts, as well as supporting parties in exchange for restrictions on others, it was a real prelude to the growth and escalation of populist theory as an alternative concept to the failure of government programs and plans in addition to the decline of previously achieved national gains. Thus, Instead of moving towards democracy, Algeria recorded a real decline as it began to suffer from the tendencies of parties and elites relied upon to support power and the person of the president who is unable to move. The Algerian researcher from the University of Algiers

3 adds in his intervention in favor of the memorandum, *“But the use of evasion and pressure from those around the president, their pursuit of their interests, led the president to make the wrong decision to remain in power”* (Bouhouch 2024)

As a result, the Algerian populist discourse can be summarized in that it has a character and specificity that is completely different from those populist discourses that the world has known, the evidence for this if the Algerian people followed the Western populism method, the country would enter into an endless civil war due to the mentality of the Algerian official which directly linked to the seat of government, rather than being linked to the future of the country, it is opposite to the Western official; this will have serious effects on the democratic structure, especially with regard to the attack on the institutions that oversee the management of public affairs. However, populism in Algeria remains an essential and ongoing part of the struggle towards democratic construction.

2. Populism from term to concept.

a. Populism as a term

In fact, the term populism in Algeria is still ambiguous, there is no doubt, but it has connotations that sometimes reach the point of contradiction, as evidenced by the fact that Algerian populism is a hybrid process that sometimes borders on triviality. Through this study, we found that populism, according to specialists, is an opportunistic process, where the Algerian Political researcher at the University of Algiers 3 says, *“What is meant by demagogic populism is lying and hypocrisy...”* (Bouhouch 2024), this is for politicians who do not possess populist charisma, therefore they are looking for direct popular support through public speeches in which they challenge the ruling institutions. These so-called leaders present themselves as representatives of ordinary citizens, or the so-called forgotten classes, that what led to real confusion and ambiguity at the beginning of the 2019 movement that almost destroyed it. We must admit that there are many existing situations that do not deserve criticism. But we must say that the most important thing about Algerian populism in particular is its deep-rooted hostility to pluralism and its claim that it alone represents the true people. That is what the events translated into reality, and we came upon it during this study.

The Algerian populism logic in general is based on a very hybrid principle that says, ‘Whoever does not support and agree with us is not from the people, it is the catastrophe. It is the Algerian mentality.

President Houari Boumediene was undisputedly one of the most populist presidents of Algeria, as evidenced by the fact that he knew how to appeal to the majority of the people, by exploiting populist ideas and re-presenting them to build the state, as he says: “*Are all the men who took responsibility committed? If we say yes, then we are wrong*” (Boumediene 1973). He also had a great ability to unite and mobilize the people in his favor, as he said “*The issue is an issue of men, and the problem presented in Algeria is a problem of men*”. (Boumediene 1973).

Academically, there is no Algerian figure who has addressed populism in an in-depth manner that befits it as a term, concept, and movement until the lines of this research were written. Rather, the majority of those we spoke to from the elite, whether university professors or politicians, had difficulty defining the meaning of populism according to the Algerian version, because it is not a concept in itself, but rather a term. It has never been used to define as much as it is a general concept - according to them - where it has been used to denounce. This makes the difficulties of defining the term related in one aspect to arriving at a positive definition of populism. While populism in Latin America refers to leftist movements. In Europe, it represents the extreme right. In Algeria, populism is neither left-wing nor right-wing as much as it is a mixture of political opportunists from the left and right. This is one of the biggest obstacles that we faced in this research, because as researchers we were faced with a reality, which is that Algerian populism is a mysterious study in itself, even though we lived through the movement, but the result that we reached after a lot of effort is that there is a common Algerian culture shared by society, there is another culture separate approach pursued by the dominant class in society. Between the two cultures, another popular culture emerged that was neither communal nor elitist, which was actually mobilized and stuffed with false and contradictory concepts.

We asked many questions to understand this phenomenon, including: What is populism in Algeria? Is it a real, ancient intellectual discourse that was subject to development as a result of compelling circumstances that occurred in the life of society? Or is it a new speech? Is it an ideological discourse? Regional? Politician? Or is it a new art aims to unite and mobilize people? Does the Algerian people facing populism or several populisms? Did this populism pose a threat to the young democracy in Algeria during the movement in 2019? Do those who occupied the streets every Friday really represent populism in the Algerian political arena? Or are they merely movements that took advantage of the crisis of representative democracy to extract more demands and thus more positions? Does this populism have a media

and cultural reputation? This and more, to be found with enough detail in the second chapter of this research, as these questions are a real call for further study and depth into the phenomenon of Algerian populism.

B. Populism as a concept

To become a concept, populism must have a precise and clear definition that regulates, scrutinizes it and determines its academic framework so that it becomes an alternative project, the evidence of the validity of what we say is that Algerian populism actually conflicts

“Algerian populism” is too small to become a concept. It lacks a lot to be like that”.

with religion, modernity, liberalism, authority, democracy, and elites, despite the fact that all of these terms have definitions that qualify them to become concepts. Also, Algerian populism is not an alternative to the abandoned socialist theory that Algeria knew. Simply, Algerian populism is a non-political movement that seeks to arouse people’s instincts and sharpen them, in preparation for controlling them, then controlling them and trivializing their real demands, especially since these populists are drowning more and more every day in social and political crises. That is what we observed in the movement in 2019, where we found them ranting in their speeches about the processes of injustice in the true representation of the people, about the complicity and corruption of the elites. On the other hand, throughout the duration of the movement, we did not hear even a single criticism directed against the capitalist state with all its systems based on hegemony.

According to the Algerian academics and politicians with whom we spoke, populist theory as a term will undoubtedly remain in circulation, it will not disappear from Algerian political thought.

However, if it rises to become a political concept, through which historical events are analyzed and evaluated, or includes a program in which the interests of the people are represented, even if it is achieved, its

“The term populism has not yet risen to include the cultural diversity that Algeria as a society mocks”.

use will be wrong. What is true is that populism must be linked to the crisis of capitalism in its cultural, political and economic aspects, same time, we should not link populism to the disastrous results of globalization. Rather, we must separate them until the truth of populism becomes clear that it actually represents the people, only here does it appear that there is an exaggeration that populism has actually blinded the mind to interpreting the cultural and social phenomena that Algeria has experienced.

There are those who described former Algerian President Chadli Ben Jedeed as the most populist president in Algeria, this description came as a result of emotion, not as the result of a real, realistic analysis, as evidenced by the fact that the era of President Chadli witnessed stormy social and economic crises in 1986 and 1988, which ended with his resignation in the crisis of 1992, this description came as a result of the complete absence of using the Marxist concept, especially in analysis, in addition to the absence of using other concepts, such as organizational sociology and the rest of the theories of the modern human sciences, to understand the crises taking place in the country?

What must be said in this regard is that this term will continue to be used, unless it is involved in extremism and identity wars such as race and religion. Moreover, this concept does not and will not expand to include Algerian cultural diversity, because it is incapable of doing so, its inability comes from the principle of this concept in itself! Is not populism against elites, democracy, and politics in general? We believe with certainty that this concept will inevitably fall one day, on condition, which is that these elites, parties, and ruling authorities launch new projects in which they reject the historical trend they were following, and submit completely to the will and interests of the people, that is what made us plead before you and say: "Algerian populism" is a term that has not yet risen to include Algerian cultural diversity, so it is a term, to become a concept, this is a matter that depends on passing a difficult and long exam in order to defend its eligibility before the elites, academics, and before them the people. Therefore, it does not currently deserve to be so.

3. Algerian populist discourse between the language of the street and the pressure of politicians.

It is easy to convince the common people who do not follow Algerian political history, including the Algerians themselves who live inside Algeria, especially after what has been termed - very recently - the "post-truth" era, which symbolizes the period of the decline of President Bouteflika's rule. In short, especially those who participated in the movement "like I, personally." they are fully aware that the Algerian populist discourse in 2019 was characterized by extreme simplification of complex issues. Since it was originally directed directly to the ordinary, simple man in the street, it was also characterized by the predominance of the emotional aspect, as this populist discourse was directly based on the feelings of anger among the general public. This discourse was also based on the existence of a state of polarization among "the people" who entrenched themselves in the street in the form of a

“movement” with all its concerns, regionalism, and exclusion. Another party called the Bouteflika regime, which was the target of the anger and hatred of the people, as the main and direct cause of the problems that Algeria suffered from.

In the same year 2019, we witnessed the migration of Algerian politicians from the left wing and the right wing towards the street, i.e. towards the populist movement, their goal was immediately understood by the activists, as the demonstrators were aware that these people - they are nothing but a handful of opportunists - want to sustain their reference from the concept of “the people.” or so it was frequented by older activists - identifying themselves as supporters of the movement and opponents of President Bouteflika's regime.

Politically, these groups coming from the movement belong to the liberal wing in Algerian political life. In short, some of them represent a form of “civilian nationalism.” In other word, those who call for the slogan “Civilian, not military”, according to the Algerian streets accent, which is based on the belief in the equality of all Algerians, in their rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, according to what they advocate. But they failed to penetrate the ranks of the movement. However, the movement also witnessed an attempt by Islamists to join it through some movements with an Islamic political orientation adopting the principle

Of changing power by peaceful means. Where did the head of the Movement of Peace Society, Mr. Abdel-Razzaq Makri, tweet on his Twitter account, saying, “*Our authentic movement embraces all trends and affiliations, the presence of everyone in it is what prevents its deviation*” (Makri 2019)



Figure 4: A picture taken from the account of the head of the movement on the X platform

In order for the populists to ensure victory and empowerment for their discourse, they were looking for a victim who would be verbally flogged after every mass thronged held in this or

Figure 5 : One of the marches in Khenchela against the rule of President Bouteflika in 2019



that city every Friday. This is what was actually present in the Algerian street, as evidenced by the fact that every new Friday, the demonstrators chanted the name of a new, unwanted figure who belonged to or supported President Bouteflika. Here one of the biggest problems associated with the emergence and spread of the populist movement in Algeria appears, as it relates to the slide towards regionalism and bias. Through this movement, we discovered that populism is an inherent part of Algerian life, but it is not organized and does not have foundations to rely on, same time, it was not a racist movement.

As for what made populism a political phenomenon in Algeria, simply due to the fact that its opponents are politicians and some of those who belong to the military establishment, who resort to intellectual plans to suppress it, subjecting it to sharp criticism at first, then diminishing its value before the people, to attach various despicable qualities to it. They consider it a barbaric, demagogic theory whose goal is to provoke and agitate the people by tickling their feelings such as inciting religious tensions that actually produced hatred, suspicion, and racism among the Algerian people, which they employed in their electoral policy that turned security into a general popular concern that made it the top concern for a decade; this is what is called in Algeria the black decade.

The irony, however, is that these populist defenders of the values and needs of the hard-working majority, they have not yet realized whether the populism they are defending is a

linguistic phenomenon that was inevitable by the political circumstances of the country? Or is it a political phenomenon that resulted from this populism, which the Algerian elites considered a vague concept, as political and social scientists differed in how to define it? Whether it is a doctrine, a tactic, a political strategy, a marketing ploy, or some combination of the above, this made this study confusing more than once, on the contrary, it reached the point of final cancellation, since this contradiction in itself has become a significant obstacle to the research.

4. Algerian populism is a conflict imposed by individuals or a conflict imposed by the era.

▪ Conflict imposed by individuals

If populism in Algeria is summarized in the characteristics of some individuals, on the contrary, there are those who argue that it is an acquired characteristic of the era. In other word, is populism an individual trait or an acquired one? From this existing controversy, it can be said that individuality is something that is difficult to describe and depict, since individuality is a sensory thing, this is what the Algerian reality has translated to us, as the Algerian political, economic, cultural and even moral issues maintain such great figures who are characterized by populism and whose name remains firmly established in the minds of the Algerian people. For example, the President Houari Boumedien, says: *“We are proud of democracy in that there is no master in this country, the people are the master. We are proud all of this today, we are proud of it tomorrow, and we are proud of it overmorrow”* (Boumedien 1973), economically, the man knew how to support the morale of the simple and weak classes in society. In this regard, the president says in simple language:

“We tried to take care of the farmer, we did not tell him that we are masters over you, nor are we princes over you. We did not say that we are princes over this people. We said that we emerged from the midst of this people, we know their problems. We know the difficulties he suffers from, and we know his feelings, and for this reason we are the sons of this people, we are in the service of this people, nothing more, nothing less” (Boumedien 1973).

As for culture, the president said:

“In all of Algeria there is no oversight, I mean administrative oversight, that is, we do not have an administration as we have it today. However, the simple activist was leaving the borders of the fourth province, from “Al-Wanchris,” carrying a bag of money to deliver it to the city of “M'ghniyah.” Without missing a single penny, it was a bag of money. This was an

important aspect. It represented strength, it represented purity, and it represented the integrity that generated trust among the Mujahideen (Veterans) as a group whose fate was considered one among the people, then, the real observer and deterrent was the conscience of every individual” (Boumediene 1973)

Morally, he was a real reference for the people, with the simplicity of his language and movements. He was the thought of the people that they thought about. He was like an interpreter of the people's feelings, implications and their crucial issues. He knew how to penetrate the people's soul, he knew how to inhabit it. He knows when, how and where to mobilize the masses to achieve the political, economic and social goals of the state despite its recent independence. He knew how to kill the defeatist spirit among the people, despite the difficult circumstances that Algeria was experiencing at the time. In this regard, the President says: *“The spirit of defeat should never exist among our ranks. It is a kind of challenge. The Algerian revolution, in any case, cannot stand idly by, cannot remain silent, cannot lower its head, cannot be humiliated, never will be, otherwise it will be its end”* (Boumédiene 1973).

The president adds:

“The thing we offered was only a duty, perhaps we did not perform the duty as we should have... Because yesterday we led men into battle who died, I will never forget them, as we realize that those who died had fully performed their duty” (Boumédiene 1973). In this regard, the German philosopher says: *“It may be possible to feel the shades of their individuality, and to understand the various elements that combined to formulate their natures”* (Wilhelm Humboldt 1848-1915), since the human soul is usually identified in the beginning according to the opinion of intuition.

▪ **Conflict imposed by era.**

As for those who argue that Algerian populism is acquired by the era, they must first acknowledge that the era is a specific unit and limited in time, that it is an existing and independent structure in itself. It has characteristics and features that distinguish it and determine its nucleus that drives it, this is what is known in academic circles as the concept of history in general. It is part of the human sciences. Therefore, we try to have a full knowledge concerning Algerian populism to determine its features and the foundations that led to its emergence based on those facts and postulates that revolve in people's minds. So that we do not forget, as researchers, that populism in Algeria is a group of populisms with different

ideologies, but they all meet under one umbrella. Therefore, we must be aware that any era is not devoid of populism, this is what invalidated the laws that prevailed in ancient times, since the laws of reason are what govern and establish life, not age. This reason made populism a clear and ambiguous concept at the same time for its users.

It is true that the Algerian majority agrees that populism is a secretion of the cultural stock and collective popular memory, the ability and boldness of this people to act and use vocabulary and meanings, citing the narrative populism that claims to depict the reality of the common life of the Algerian people. This has actually crystallized on the lips of some television activists, especially television channels that broadcast overseas, such as Al-Magharibia, for example, this is not a justification that forces us to accept this “realism”. The evidence for this is that the common is not always the counterpart of the real, we will present to you real examples that were closely related to the marches that took place in the city of Khenchela, for example, where no march was devoid of obscene or morally inappropriate language. Or those limited to private communication that populist politicians, writers, and activists like Tabbou, Mustafa Bouchachi, Amira Bouraoui resort to... on their tongues or in their electronic texts and statements, which not only describes the concerns and reality of the people as much as it translates their desire into a more intense emotional reality. Mobilizing the public and distracting it from its crucial issues, this is what made the language of the Algerian populists, if not most of them, far from realism, the majority of populists do not hesitate to use obscene words. It was as if he intentionally used a word that was popularly reprehensible, but it was familiar to the Algerian street in general, this is what we actually experienced.

It is true that these populisms derived to a large extent their individuality, their era, and their language from the Algerian social environment, but the influence of this environment does not reach its owners beyond the perspective of transcending the moral level of society itself. We also do not think that this environment will allow for such hybrid and base interpretations to explain the country’s situation, or to fix what the authorities have corrupted. We must acknowledge those slanderous formulas that have been circulated, and we must also acknowledge that these words have the actual ability to inspire and believable despite their slander, as we must acknowledge that its source is attributed to the words of most people circulating in the street as well, so it is absolutely not correct to use the hybrid colloquial language in official positions related to people’s lives and their continuity.

There are those who argue without evidence about the academy of populist thesis. However, after examining the context of the word itself, we found that it is useful to resort to the Algerian populist dictionary, which contains in its intellectual folds words that populists have long repeated in the street, such as *“The situation is as you see it in front of you”* i.e. *“that it is realistic”* and *«Change is good”* i.e. *«It is useful.”* Therefore, we refuse to confuse this with that, if we did, we would actually remove the word from its linguistic context, as it is governed by the “status of pronunciation” not by the academic status. By this, we mean that it is the sum of all the indicators that make the Algerian populist discourse a linguistic act performed by an individual subject that extracts the language directly from its speaker and reuses it jointly. This is evidenced by the fact that it was on the tongues before it became regular in speech, this is what made the Algerian populist discourse during the era of President Bouteflika characterized by a positive presentation at times, but the majority of it was characterized by an obscene negative presentation.

The attention must be paid to the elements of the discourse circulating during the days of the movement, it is an unfamiliar statement for the street and the Algerian people. Therefore, the populist proposal cannot be included in the category of academic proposal, since the talk being circulated is populist, not the other way around. It is the proposal of the street, not the proposal of the elite. “Popular speech” is less correct and precise than “eloquent, educated speech,” as it is usually spoken by the common people who have not been blessed with a wealth of knowledge. Therefore, it is easier for them to attract discourse compared to their educated peers... The Algerian populist discourse, in deed rather than in word, has taken on a special feature due to the use of “vulgar obscene” words as previously mentioned in this research, as it was issued by the public, this may be due to the Algerian personality, which is characterized by a highly emotional mentality, the highest characteristic of the Algerian in general is his firm belief in rudeness to undermine the opponent. Therefore, it is not strange for populists to use the “vile populist” words that are on the lips of people, even if they descend to the level of “vulgarity”.

5. The impact of populism on changing governance in Algeria.

The Algerian street during the days of the movement in 2019 attracted many people, especially those individuals whose primary interest was political, these people do not view populism as something that opposes the authority at the time or is merely a reaction to “the institution of the presidency and the parties loyal to it. Rather, they considered it a legitimate call from ordinary people to eliminate the colonialism and political influence of President Bouteflika and his aides. This is how the Algerian street viewed the events. As for those opportunists from the left, right, and liberal figures, they see the opposite of what the street sees. They view populism as a double-edged sword to overthrow power. On the other hand, to crush loyalist parties, especially after these serious violations committed by the authorities, which it threatened to do by crushing the demonstrations, “Ahmed Ouyahia’s Threat 2019”

Roughly, for a full year, populism became a dominant political style that mediated between constitutional rule in Algeria and family rule, which official military circles described at the time as “gang” rule. Roughly, it is the first time that the world has witnessed a model characterized by a kind of maturity that has constituted a real concern for constitutional representative democracy in Algeria. This movement brought together everyone related to Bouteflika in the regime’s institutions without discrimination, under the slogan “*Let them all leave.*” Populism as a movement did not aspire to reach power as much as its goal was to change power itself, this is an advantage that is counted in favor of Algerian populism over other populisms in the world that aim to seize power for its own benefit, when compared to representative democracy, you find that Algerian populism actually formed a new type of popular governance in which the people achieved, or a part of the people has superiority over the authority supported by loyalist parties.

However, the decision of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to adhere to power, by announcing the postponement of the elections that were scheduled for April 18th until the end of the work of the “National Symposium” that will be formed at that time and will, according to him, unite the various Algerian political spectrums and aim to establish reforms. The president said that the symposium “*will ensure that it completes its mission at the end of 2019, and that presidential elections will be held after that.*” (Bin Jamea 2019). The president actually paved the way for this through a series of measures, as Bouteflika removed his pampered prime minister, Ahmed Ouyahia, who was unpopular among the Algerians and



replaced by the Minister of Interior, Noureddine Bedoui, the former head of the Ain Tawila district in the state of Khenchela, the cradle of the movement.

Thus, the ailing president, who was 82 years old, extended his current term at the time without setting a date for new elections, despite his health condition and his complete absence from the political scene for years, which led to unprecedented popular protests against him, reflecting the extent of the deterioration to which his popularity had occurred over 20 years of judgment, where Bouteflika declared himself as an “Emperor” as he tried to establish a new history for Algeria that begins only from the year he took power in 1999, this was rejected by the Algerian peoples in general, as it was rejected by the former Algerian President Lamine Zeroual who said in this respect: *“I assumed the presidency of Algeria during the most difficult stage the country has been going through since independence”* (Zeroual 1999)... Only a hater can deny these words. The Algerian people still remember this sentence said by the resigned President of the Republic, Lamine Zeroual, in his last speech to the nation, during his handover of power to Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Here, Bouteflika has actually made a mistake in the direction and found himself as the figure most under political and popular trial, in the midst of a sudden popular movement that began on February 19, 2019, demanding him to leave the political arena.

No one expected Bouteflika's popularity to be decline and the political, economic and social failures and corruption of those close to him to be recorded in this way, just as no one expected the Algerian street's reaction to the announcement of Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth presidential term to be as captured by cameras in 2019. Including those travesties that reached the point of tearing down his pictures on the headquarters of government institutions

by young people born during his era. -Khenchela as a paradigm- It is truly shameful and sad at the same time. How could a man of his size, a *'war veteran and distinguished diplomatic figure'* who was so popular in 1999, be insulted in such a violent manner? As he was described as *"a savior, an inspiration, and a divine messenger"*

"What really destroyed the president was instead of building a welfare society, the opposite happened the state collapsed and corruption spread. Public money was plundered, the crisis of trust between citizens and state institutions surfaced. What is more dangerous than that is the theft of the president's powers after his illness".

who was honored on more than one occasion by his supporters.

The language of numbers alone clearly defined the reality of Bouteflika's popularity surge, through the Algerian street recording a wave of protests in which almost all components of society participated, including teachers, doctors, lawyers, unemployed youth, and those wounded in the army... The authorities revealed that the total of these protests reached one thousand and one hundred protests during the year 2018 (Al Jazeera News, 2019). There are other indicators, as the numbers that Bouteflika obtained in the last two presidential elections confirm a sharp decline in his popularity. In 2009, he received 12 million votes, but this number decreased significantly in the presidential elections that took place in April 2014, when he received eight million votes. While the number of abstentions doubled from six million voters in 2009 to 11 million voters in the 2014 elections (Al Jazeera News, 2019). Because the majority of Algerians are not convinced of the feasibility of the elections and do not accept Bouteflika's health condition. He had fallen ill in April 2013, requiring him to stay for 81 days in Val de Grasse Hospital in Paris.



Figure 7: The President while being transported to the hospital.
News agencies

Successive failures in achieving the aspirations of the people, who kept a beautiful picture of Bouteflika during the days when he was dealing as a Minister of Foreign Affairs during the era of President Houari Boumediene, after reaching the power, he was unable to transform Algeria into a strong country despite the abundance of wealth. On the contrary, he worked to achieve totalitarian rule, where political institutions were undermined and transformed into subordinates of the monopolizing executive authority, this is what blew up the street, The events then continued very quickly, followed by collapses in the president's circle until they reached the military establishment, where the Algerian army announced its desire to distance itself from the president and those around him, where the Algerian Chief of Staff said, "*The Algerians have expressed a noble goals*" (Gaïd Salah 2019). Later, the army disavowed the institution of the presidency, as the military institution pledged to stand with the people and the nation: "*The army is always, in accordance with its tasks, the fortress of the people and the nation in all circumstances*" (Gaïd Salah 2019). Calling for "*Being responsible in order to find solutions as soon as possible*" (Gaïd Salah 2019).



Figure 8: A group photo including the most prominent leaders of the Algerian army during the Bouteflika era, 2019

It is not at all true to say that the presidential team and the active circles in power did not notice the signs of an approaching popular explosion and the dissatisfaction with the ambiguity of Bouteflika's health situation and his absence from the scene. Because what was concerned in this case was the state with all its components, it was intentional. The Algerians felt insulted, their dignity was insulted, these successive insults led to a movement that destroyed the symbolic image of the president, toppled what remained of Bouteflika's popularity, and torpedoed his entire political path. Bouteflika failed to achieve a political achievement to establish a correct democratic path, the president also failed to revive the Algerian economy and distance it from oil dominance. What is more, the "Dear" of Algeria failed to improve the living conditions of the Algerians. Compared to the security, social and political stability it provides Bouteflika and financial comfort. The president also failed to create major balances between what was spent on political and administrative reform projects and infrastructure. He spent a thousand billion dollars, in exchange for an economic return equal to zero.

Conclusion

Observers have described the year 2019 as “the year of Algerian political populism par excellence” due to the growth of its theory in various political stages in Algeria, citing the rise in the voices of “populism” movements in the recent electoral elections despite the weak voter turnout, starting with the presidential elections, passing through the parliamentary elections, ending with the local elections. The wave of political rise of the “populist” movement raised the fears of those who adhere to democracy and the rule of law and those who reject every policy built on discriminatory foundations, they saw in it a political phenomenon that could determine the features of the future of the young democracy in Algeria.

While researchers saw that “populism” - advanced in the electoral elections - for many reasons, most notably the opposition to issues such as: contempt, corruption, bribery, nepotism, and financial austerity policies that weakened government spending on social services adopted by the “Sellal and Ouyahia” governments, the emergence of The crisis of defending national identity, in addition to a decline in the level of human rights.

Economists attribute the current rise in “populism” to the slowdown in Algerian economic growth rates, the worsening inequality in income and wealth, economic insecurity, and the increasing waves of immigration towards Europe.



Chapter Two

Algerian populism and political intellectual
conflicts

Introduction

Populism is a stage of social vacuum and disorientation in which society becomes politically separated from the sick authority, this confusion produces a new political leadership that disparages democracy and institutions, which works to criticize politics as a concept and practice to express the stifling crisis, for example what happened in Khenchela. The demonstrators in 2019 chanted against the authority, But those who tried to position themselves as spokespersons for the movement were repeating meaningless words such as: "the country is subject to the will of blessing", we are here "to fight all kinds of corruptions." Knowing that these rants do not have an alternative program or plans, nor even this "blessing" that they talking about. This is how the Algerian populist politician spoke, not only in Khenchela, but throughout Algeria, addressing the people, who were demanding solutions to their stifling crises. In this regard the National Secretary at the Secretariat of the Political Bureau of the Labor Party, in charge of foreign relations, says, "*Populism is a speech that tends to popular demands, but when a decision is made it is contrary to popular requirements*" (Jaloul 2024).

The Algerian populist hates political intelligence, so he distanced himself from the rest of the political spectrum in society. "Tabou" saw himself as a leftist above the leftists themselves, "Mustafa Bouchachi" saw himself as religious above the Islamists, and "Zubaida Assoul" considered herself more patriotic than the nationalists. While Dr. Amira Bouraoui considered the defeats and setbacks of the new leaders a complete success, a law professor at Bashir University says in favor of the dissertation: "*The populists found an opportunity to promote their ideas through the media, which made them promote shady ideas that did not carry any credibility*" (Al-Arbawi 2024), However, what is worse is that President Bouteflika believes himself to be a rare populist who remains in power. Also he believe that political transformations will not succeed in removing him from his position, or perhaps that is how the scene was portrayed for him. The most dangerous thing about the person of Bouteflika is his claim to populist leadership, this is what annoyed those around him, so they began to interpret things in his way and style, the evidence is that the masses did not hold Bouteflika accountable for his economic and political corruption for twenty years.

Hostility is a prominent feature of the Algerian populist character over the sixty-one years of independence, the media is not a major reason for creating Algerian populists. Rather, populism in 2019 was created by social media, later adopted by the media. the director of Akhbar Al Watan newspaper said in his interview for the memorandum, "*...this contribution moved after the beginning to social media, which pulled the rug from traditional media for*

considerations related to the authority's ability to control it" (Twaïquer 2014). Therefore, you find the populist an enemy of journalists and their embarrassing questions, when the Algerian media and judiciary tried to put the "fake movement leaders" on trial before the people, the matter seemed from their point of view to be a trial for the people, because they actually believed they were representing them. In this regard, the law professor adds: *"This prompts us to look into this phenomenon in order to address it and try to set restrictions and regulations for its practice"* (Al-Arbawi 2024)

Populism in Algeria in 2019 did not aim to eliminate institutions and politics, as was the case with the Algerian experience in 1992, for example. This is not an analogy of Algerian populism to Western populism or a comparison with it, the success of change initiatives after the spread of the populist wave depends on the factor of time. The damage caused by populist rhetoric is enormous, especially since the Algerian populist politician uses democracy to root out other political opponents. The difference between Algerian populism in the 1990s and Algerian populism in 2019 is that Chadli Ben Jeddé's populism was characterized by foolishness and recklessness to the point of using weapons, while the populists under Bouteflika in 2019 were not as foolish as the public believes, as much as they were instigators against Algeria, they took advantage of the people's strength because they rejected the status quo, so they conspired against the country in the name of populism, this is what made them failed populists.

The first topic: The profound transformations of populism in Algeria.

First requirement:

1. Towards establishing the concept of the populist phenomenon in Algeria.

For more than 40 years, Algerian populism has presented itself as an alternative to democracy, claiming that it can embody the will of the people better than the ruling authority supported by the socialists before 1989, later the liberals and others, this is with regard to introducing democratic reforms to the Algerian constitution. The professor of constitutional law at the University of Tlemcen says in

The spread of corruption and failure in the distribution of public services were the most important reasons for the rise of populist theory in Algeria

his intervention in favor of the memorandum: *"Populism during the era of President Bouteflika was one of the means to bring the people closer to power in order to vote for the party with the*

greatest populism to win power” (Moaden 2024), Under the semi-populist rule, Algeria has become a more non-neutral state than before. The biased choices of the populists have actually been constitutionalized, this is what is explicitly included in the 2020 Constitution. With censorship being imposed on public media more than before, in light of the continued presence of opposition journalism and political opposition, Abdul madjid Tabboun, the candidate for the Algerian presidential elections on November 19, 2019 from the Algerian province of Bashari, said, “...if you elected me as President of the Republic, I will change the current constitution to codify what the popular movement came up with, avoid individual rule, and move beyond the economy based on the exclusion of one party at the expense of Another party.” (Tabboun 2019).

What is clear about the new Algerian populism is that it does not seek to eliminate democracy, as the old populism did and tried to implement in the 1990s. But it rejects democratic pluralism, the professor of constitutional law adds: “For a party to lose populism means losing seats in the elections by losing votes and vice versa” (Moaden 2024), because it claims to represent all segments of the people. Thus, Algerian populism is a condition that political understanding has not yet comprehended in light of a fragile democracy. But its current revival that it has witnessed is a mirror image of the young democracy in Algeria. Populism has explicitly in its own way expressed the limitations of Algerian formal liberal thought. It also expressed the difficulties of social integration under President Bouteflika's rule and summarized the reality of the ruling, which confirmed the actual absence of legitimacy for years. In this context, the Algerian parliament member said in an intervention specific to the memorandum, “... However, in view of previous experiences and the lessons learned, it has become necessary to reconsider the political discourse of the authority...” (Sharshar 2024).

Algerian populism is neither an ideology nor a doctrine in the strict sense of the word because it does not provide a comprehensive view that addresses the economic and political situation of society. Rather, it was a festival that reduced the calculations of the people and the calculations of the authority into a movement that ignited the street.

2. Is Algerian populism a movement that threatens democracy?

What is meant to be said is: Is there a relationship between populism and democracy in Algeria? This study has already indicated in the previous chapter that those who follow Algerian issues will find that there is indeed a relationship between them, but it is a very complex relationship this is due to the physiological structure of the Algerian people. The Algerian people's deep structure is based on the principle of permanent suspicion when it comes to authority, so, at

every electoral event, this people questions the democratic experience that has crystallized in all constitutions since 1989. This people also rejects the principle of dialogue, as evidenced by what happened in October 1988 then in 1992. So what can be pointed out is that the new features of Algerian populism, since its emergence, have followed a clear and single line based on the reverse direction of politics in the country, since the principles of Algerian populism believe in the immediate implementation of promises. Political promise without any delay, without taking into account and justifying the time period that a political promise usually takes to become a reality, in other word, closer to mind, “the order should be implemented immediately” as the Algerian popular proverb says, In this context, the representative of the Algerian Parliament (2021-2026) of the National Building Movement Party, says in his dialogue for the memorandum: *“The fact is that populism in Algeria is the product of practices that extended over a period of time at a specific time and circumstance. However, in view of previous experiences and lessons learned, it has become necessary to reconsider the political discourse of the authorities, with the existence of a state-sponsored societal and intellectual reform program for the Algerian citizen.”* (Sharshar 2024)

In the event that the promise is not implemented immediately, the language of doubt replaces certainty, here the door opens to provoke alienation among the people from those who practice politics. This is almost an accurate description of the reality of the populist mentality in Algeria. Why? Because the Algerian people are almost the only people who speak about everything without obstacles, they are a political people with a degree of “excellence.” This is a characteristic that accounts for Algerian populism compared to its counterparts in the world.

Therefore, it is a populism that is deep in its concept, combustible in its movements, feeds on incitement and rumors, which makes it a suspicious and controversial populism, those who mock it will pay the price! that is what prompted the Algerian Muslim Scholars Association, through the words of its president on 06/02/2019 in the “Noon Guest” program on Algerian Radio Channel 1, to call on the military establishment to reflect on the call of the scholars, and on the initiatives being put forward in the political arena, In this context, stressing the need to respond to the demands of the movement, as the doctor says in his interview with the memorandum, *“The association raises the slogan of reform”* (Qassoum 2024).

Algerian populism has another characteristic, which is that its relationship to elections is usually inverse! How? They are limited in number on polling day compared to the days of anger, for

example the 2008 elections compared to the 1999 elections, and the 2014 elections compared to the 2008 elections. Finally, what Algeria witnessed in the 2019 elections. That is what made it a formal populism linked to specific events and then disappearing completely after that. That is what we saw in the 2019 movement, here the secret that President Bouteflika's regime actually read, but unfortunately did not understand, which cost him his departure.

Algerian populism cannot be underestimated. In other words, the Algerian people cannot be underestimated, as they are known to have been hostile to politics since independence until today. This will remain the Algerian mentality from which populism is formed every time, not the other way around. Algerian populism is not a passing force, as everyone said in his analyses, nor is it a form of inevitable reaction to the Algerian political reality, nor is it merely an eccentric whim, due to the social and political unrest in the Algerian reality. It is a mixture of emotion and reality, driven and controlled by political challenges.

Another advantage of Algerian populism over others in the rest of the world is that there is no leader to rely on and defend...while populists in the rest of the world confirm that there is no populism without a leader. The professor of constitutional law at the University of Tlemcen says in favor of the memorandum *"The movement has many positives that were framed by political will before the elections"* (Moaden 2024), this is what made it populist and not to be underestimated, as it is open to all possibilities because it is unique in its form and content.

3. Right-wing and left-wing populism to gain power.

For populists, society consists of a people and an elite. Because the elite reaps wealth and subjugates the people, power must be taken from them so that the people have the say again. This proposal usually finds fertile ground when real competition for power and social inequality prevail in any society. But this concept is only partially true. The poor often do not go to the polls in the first place. This is what happened in Algeria in 2008, 2014, and finally 2019. If they go, they elect one of the leftist populist parties that promises them the redistribution of wealth. FLN Party for example, In this regard, the National Secretary of the Political Bureau Secretariat in charge of Foreign Relations says in his dialogue in favor of this graduation memorandum *"Participating or not in the elections is a political decision for each party, but this decision comes after studying the national, regional and international political situation. For the Labor Party, participation in the elections is not a strategy but rather a tactic. We can participate as we can boycott, such what happened in several elections."* (Jaloul 2024).

There is a widespread feeling among Algerian voters that traditional parties ignore their needs, desires and are neglected it together with the government. This feeling has been greatly reinforced by populist appeals, because they express this frustration and feeling of betrayal. Therefore, there is no direct link between social inequality and the rise of populism in the first place. Rather, it is the ability of populists to exploit the opportunity. In this regard, the National Secretary of the Algerian Workers' Party adds, *"The reality of the political crisis at that time did not reflect holding elections under good conditions in which the popular will was respected. The evidence is that citizens did not participate in them, and reluctance prevailed."* (Jaloul 2024).

What is striking is that the actual social and economic conditions are not the deciding factor, but rather the ability of populists to express popular demands, this is based on the decline of traditional parties and their inability to withstand developments. This often leads to a lack of response. So, in reality, the matter is rarely related to real deprivation. Most of the time, it is an indicator of the failure of traditional parties or their unwillingness to strongly express the interests of voters. At the same time, populists exploit this neglect to amplify fears and express threats that voters consider important. The National Secretary of the party adds, *"Although the party did not participate and had no seats, political activity did not end. We had our positions on all issues that concerned the country and the majority of workers, youth, women, etc..."* (Jaloul 2024).

This pragmatism of the populist right put the leftist movements in front of a challenge that made them lose the winning cards they were relying on in their speech to the working classes through their opposition to the capitalist system. Most of the parties affiliated with the left in Algeria fall under the larger movement, the social democratic, which adhere to the principles of democracy and equality, but these ideas have been tested for more than half a century of independence, it has been unable to absorb the profound changes that have occurred to its traditional social base (workers and the middle class) in the past decade, These classes began to lose their social status due to liberal policies, open borders, the preference for non-national considerations. These movements also downplayed the importance of the rise of populist movements within them, which began to disbelieve in traditional institutions and elites, while also taking into account the growing security concerns in society. That is why the traditional leftist principles of openness and globalization are no longer able to withstand. Accordingly, the Algerian parliamentarian says in his dialogue for the memorandum, *"In other words, moving from what is, to what should be, it is an inevitability not a choice, given the*

developments taking place in Algerian society and keeping pace with the challenges imposed by geopolitical conditions and the ongoing transformations in the international community” (Sharshar 2024).

The results of the recent parliamentary elections in Algeria, which led to the withdrawal of the Social Democrats and their surrender of their traditional seats in Parliament in favor of the emerging parties, were nothing but a true and only expression of the depth of the political crisis in Algeria. This is not a political loss for the party, but rather a democratic expression of rejection of reality with all its trends. In this regard, the National Secretary of the Secretariat of the Political Bureau in charge of Foreign Relations says in his dialogue in favor of this graduation memorandum, *“So we did not participate in the last elections because the political circumstances did not help that, it is not a concession on Seats”* (Jaloul 2024).

The second requirement:

1. Is Algerian populism an ideological thought or just an ordinary movement?

As mentioned in this research above, Algerian populism relies on a false theory that the people are against the elite. This is a kind of political distinction according to the Islamic law of society, which means that “good always defeats evil.” Here, Algerian populism has actually avoided entering into confrontation with the concept. The contradictory politician, as global ideologies do. According to the claim of the Algerian populists, the people are characterized by purity, as they have legitimacy, while the elites, without exception, are essentially corrupt. This is what made them populism with a fragile ideology.

Algerian populism cannot last long if a correct democratic system is built. The Algerian researcher and professor of political science at the University of Algiers³ adds in his interview for the memorandum, *“Democracy lives and survive in a clean environment”* (Bouhouch 2024). Therefore, Algerian populism revived under a rotting democratic system. It feeds on it, because this system is the only one that provided it with the appropriate climate to emerge and implement its plans. The researcher adds, *“...the environment is polluted neither science nor democracy can grow in it”* (Bouhouch 2024), therefore the surge in Algerian populism, especially in the 2019 movement, directly threatened the throne of democracy especially after it achieved successes and became recognized by the people as a voice that expresses on their behalf against the system of ruling institutions.

In this context, since the beginning of February 2014, the popular will has been able to activate the constitutional legitimacy and legality of state institutions. This is what gave populism a kind of legitimacy that enabled them to change the rules of political competition. The most important political principles that Algerian populism questioned before 2019 were those related to the value of efficiency in management. The populists targeted the job of the politician, and dropped the term professionalism from it. They cited as evidence the Algerian parliament, many of whose representatives were now practicing the professions of “barbers, butchers, and selling prickly pears...” Algerian populism had succeeded in antagonizing them as legislators and considered them mere parasites, the populists thought that such a feature supported their approach, they base their claim on the fact that they embody the spirit of the people, which gives them legitimacy that enables them to transcend existing state institutions such as justice and the army, through parliament and parties. Algerian populism has reduced everything in Algeria and given it to itself without anyone's permission, exploiting the will of the people and their ambition for justice and morals. As a result, Bouteflika's authority and the entire Algerian political system became worthless components - perhaps so the populists thought -. In this context, the National Secretary of the Secretariat of the Political Bureau, responsible for external relations in the Algerian Labor Party, says. *“Populism is a discourse that leans toward popular demands, but when a decision is made, it is contrary to popular demands”* (Jaloul 2024).

Algerian populism has grown in the womb of a sick democracy, which has pushed it to deviate from its usual path, the evidence for this is that representative democracy respects democratic law, which includes holding transparent and fair elections, to build a state of law in which independent justice is the true guarantor of holding free and open elections in which everyone, whether individuals, parties or political blocs, competes without unfairness. The professor of economics at the University of Djelfa, Algeria, says in an interview devoted to his graduation thesis, *“Secondly: popular participation and democratization of administration, meaning going to transparent and fair elections far from regionalism and factionalism, selecting qualified people for deserving positions, especially in municipal and province councils, democratizing administration, by which I mean electing managers and deans, away from political appointments and the direction of disrespectful forces, until we get rid of all the obstacles and administrative problems that hinder work”* (Shibout 2024).

However, the Algerian populist before 2019 did the opposite: he exaggerated his options at the expense of the democratic option. He criticized the confiscation of power by the elected

representatives, and claimed that he represented the people better than them. They relied on situations in which the behavior of authority became based on the principle of individual whims. This is what the Algerian regime actually experienced, where individuals, society and institutions became subject, on a permanent basis, to the unexpected and tyrannical intervention of the head of power represented by the person of President Bouteflika's brother, Mr. Said Bouteflika.

Therefore, pluralism suddenly became fragile and unstable. Likewise, granting powers to one person does not embody the will of the people and institutions. The professor of law at Bachar University says in favor of the memorandum: *"...it began to take on political and strategic dimensions in order to redistribute political power"* (Al-Arbawi 2024). This is what actually led to the creation of amendments constitutionalism strengthened Bouteflika's powers and extended his presidential terms, while weakening opposing authorities and buying off debts, as the first thing President Bouteflika's regime began with was the legislative apparatus. The professor of economics at the University of Djelfa adds, *"We must invest in the euphoria of the movement, through moving to the moral action derived from the movement, which I see in these points. Firstly: the necessity of moving from fighting vertical corruption to fighting horizontal corruption, this means moving towards fighting local and sectoral corruption until we get rid of all the fungi that are spreading in all sectors, especially the education and higher education sectors."* (Shibout 2024).

Algerian populism grew significantly and developed rapidly based on the social and moral crises that Algeria was experiencing, in addition to the collapse of the economy, the spread of scandals (the incident of Bel Abbas Mayor with his secretary), the spread of corruption, these circumstances accelerated the strong rise of populism, it became linked to problems that did not find a solution. The law professor at Bachar University says in his interview for the memorandum: *"Populism has become on the rise in light of economic transformations and tensions, which has made it a dangerous phenomenon in politics and society"* (Al-Arbawi 2024). In light of the continuation of the liberal capitalist system and the widening of social and regional disparities, the most important of which is the rise in the unemployment rate to 15.3% (Al Jazeera channel 2019), where the political researcher and professor of political sciences at the University of Algiers 3 says in favor of the memorandum, *"The populist discourse in its essence is the use of demagogy and extremist discourse to show his integrity and defense of the people's rights were violated according to his fragile program"* (Bouhouch 2024). The State's abandonment of its social role, in addition to its abandonment of financial support for services and the adoption of a policy of austerity, the spread of financial, administrative, commercial

and political corruption, the State also abandoned its supervisory role, led to the spread of phenomena of moral deviation in regular institutions, an increase in the poverty rate, a rise in costs of living, etc. All of these phenomena actually provided a suitable climate for the emergence of the ideology of populism. Where the professor says in his interview, *“Third: The necessity of fighting all the immoral diseases that are spreading in our society, from moral decadence, fraud, bribery...etc., so that we can create a sophisticated society filled with images of peaceful movement and cohesion that has emerged among the people.”* (Shibout 2024).

2. Populism between the growth of theory and practice.

As for organization, Algerian populism rejected the idea of organizing politically, even clearly avoided it (there is no leader to lead the movement). This contradicts what it promotes about itself, that it represents the entire people, thing that made it a vague populist movement, ideologically and organizationally, so that everyone could exist within its frameworks, without regard to the social disparity, class division, and conflict of interests that were prevalent in the Algerian street. In this regard, the professor of constitutional law at the University of Tlemcen says: *“As for the movement, it is a constitutional means in the sense of freedom of expression of opinion, it was the result of the corruption that Algeria experienced in all fields”* (Moaden, 2024).

On the part of the Algerian media, there is a modest attempt to draw the concept of populism that is in circulation in 2019, especially in daily journalistic use, where did the Algerian press distinguish between two categories of populism, The director of Akhbar Al-Watan newspaper says in his interview regarding the memorandum, *“The Algerian street was faced with populisms”* (Twaiqer 2024), but in an implicit and unclear way? Which known as a “Popular populisms” meaning the groups that did not participate in the movement in the first place but rather remained in the position of spectators, which increased their ambiguity, The director of Akhbar Al-Watan newspaper said in an intervention devoted to the memorandum, *“I believe, according to my observation of the aforementioned period, that the media contributed to the manufacture of populism through its vague and hesitant discourse at the beginning”* (Twaiqer 2024), As for what it referred to Journalism is clearly “political populism” Which divided into four models: the movement without a known leadership framed by those in control of the streets, conservative populism and its representatives from the Islamic parties, the populism of the Algerian politician Karim Tabbou, who refused to integrate with the existing regime and fueled the movement against the regime of President Bouteflika, as he boycotted the 2007 legislative and presidential elections. In 2009, he opposed the amendment to the constitution in 2008 that

opened the number of presidential terms, describing it as a farce (Sasa Post 2020). Likewise, the populism of the Bouteflika political system, or the so-called “ruling democracy” supported by loyalist parties.

Media professionals believe that the popular movement contributed to giving the press in the country boldness and wider margins of freedom that it had not enjoyed before. However, others believe that this freedom remains limited because the media system is part of the political system, it cannot be fully liberated unless the political system is liberated. The director of the Algerian newspaper Akhbar Al-Watan adds in his interview, “...before he turns to contributing to presenting a speech that is in line with the desire of the participants in the speech” (Twaïqer 2024).

The origin of the conflict began when conflicting ideologies grew from the beginning of the decline in President Bouteflika’s popularity in 2014 until the day of his resignation.

These ideologies focused on five basic principles:

- The first principle: which is the separation between “us” and “them or others.” For the movement, we embodied the symbol of “the people who decide,” or what was actually called “the people want to overthrow the president.” For the populists, this people is the crowds that are hostile to the ruling elite. i.e. those who oppose those who dominate the authorities
- The second principle: It is the proposal adopted by the populist theory about democracy that the Algerian street demanded, this theory is based on the adoption of direct democratic rule (the rule of the people, not the expression of the people), it is a direct vision of the type of government and sovereignty in Algeria after President Bouteflika, i.e. the exclusion of bodies. Intermediary institutions that are not directly elected, such as the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Court, and independent bodies, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, etc. This is perhaps due to the prevailing concept of populism in 2019, which was based on raising the value of populists.
- The third principle: The nature dealing of Algerian populism with representative democracy: The Algerian populists, in the growth of their theory against President Bouteflika from the events of 2011 until 2019, focused on Algerian culture, which basically rejects the role of political parties and considers them, more than rightly, to be bodies that are not shrouded in truth and believe in permanent conflicts to impose its dominance. Algerian populism is still governed by the language of emotion and myths,

so it usually relied on the symbolic perception of the people as a political method, by exploiting the principles of the people that say that “the people are one” and “Algeria is one,” so they glorified them. These principles, according to them, produce the charismatic leader who is supposed to be not only a “chosen or authorized leader,” but also one who makes the people present at the heart of every national entitlement. That is, the role of the people - according to them - is in fact embodied through the actions of this charismatic leader, similar to what President Boumediene was doing in mobilizing the masses. However, President Boumediene was not exploiting the principles of the people, but rather he was a simple individual among them, this is a paradox.

- The fourth principle: The president’s powers are greatly expanded. The populists refuse to grant the president broad powers, they claim that such powers limit the institutions’ exercise of their constitutional duties, also they believe that everything is shortened and collected in the hands of the president. This is what President Abdelaziz Bouteflika went for in all the constitutional entitlements and amendments that Algeria witnessed during his reign, by looking at all the authorities with their various traditional tasks, and considering them as jobs, thus making it easy to attach presidential instructions to them, i.e. all institutions and authorities are in the hands of the head of state, that is what put the sovereignty of the people and the future of the state at stake, according to the populists.
- The fifth principle: As is known to everyone, populism in 2019 focused on mobilizing supporters on the basis of emotional reactions with its rhetoric, not on the basis of the party program or political theory with an ideological reference rooted in political thought. Rather, it focused on a number of slogans that arouse the audience’s emotions and fuel their emotions. Algerian populism made extensive use of direct sayings in politics, such as “All of you should leave” and “The Army and the People are brothers” bypassing traditional methods of attracting and influencing the public. Here, it has transcended the intellectual coherence of political statements, because it is selective in its speech and random in its political actions.

These five principles produced two main intellectually competing groups in the Algerian political arena in 2019. Firstly, the movement, or what is called in the street as the “People’s Party,” which adopted the method of pressure. The professor of constitutional law at the University of Tlemcen defined it by saying, “*The movement is a constitutional means in the sense of freedom for the expression of opinion.*” (Moaden 2024), Secondly, the ruling regime

means the ruling Bouteflika authority and the elites loyal to it from the political parties, unions, media, civil associations, Zawaya Schools, intellectuals and academic institutions, the judiciary, etc., which adopted the method of escaping forward... the late Chief of Staff of the Algerian army, Ahmed Saleh, defined them by saying, *“The Gang”* (Gaid Salah 2024)

This is conclusive evidence that Algerian populism is a well-established ideological thought, as evidenced by the fact that it is classified among the most controversial concepts within the social sciences disciplines at the Faculty of Social and Humanitarian Sciences at Khenchela University. According to the research professors, the field of research in this field is considered confused and turbulent, due to the extreme ambiguity surrounding it, in addition to the difficulty in defining its concept. Not to mention the absence of a precise definition of the term “populism” according to the Algerian style. In this regard, the Vice Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Khenchela, says, *“Opinions about populism vary greatly between people and political analysts. Some people see populism as an expression of an important political orientation towards representing the people and meeting their interests, while others see it as a source of division and unstable political transformations”* (Ashouri 2023). While Yahyaoui Hadia, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, the former Vice director of the University of Khenchela, said that *“populism is a social phenomenon that concerns all countries of the world and does not concern one region or another. As for Algeria, I believe that it accompanied certain eras, in the context of a certain political result of the country’s history - the liberation war, the major economic and political crises - currently we notice a change in the scene, as the features of the populist model have changed, but it has not disappeared.”* (Yahyaoui 2023).

3. The positive and negative repercussions of populism on the Bouteflika regime.

No one was sure what Bouteflika's presidency would look like before 1999. But it is known that he was linked to the revolution, then became obsessed with politics after independence. The man served as Minister of Youth, then as a Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of President Houari Boumadian. He never had the ability to implementing his own vision, whether during the revolution, or even during the days when he served as minister. Now, after twenty years of his presidency, Bouteflika’s tendencies, directions, and priorities have become clear. So, the advantages and disadvantages of populism for the Bouteflika regime, some of them can be mentioned as follows:

First, the positives: economic populism, every time President Bouteflika was inaugurated during his four terms, he announced economic stimulus plans that amounted to trillions of dollars during his rule. The goal was “full employment,” meeting companies’ need to increase workers’ wages, renewing, modernizing, and expanding infrastructure, fighting... Unemployment...etc.

Although he abandoned the “Democratic Left” with his resignation from the National Liberation Front party, his approach was to bring the left closer together and push for more progressive ideas instead of distancing himself from this wing. He appointed most of his opponents to power, especially after the events of 2011 in an attempt to contain everyone under one umbrella, this is not a search for support as much as specialists consider it a kind of respect for the “democratic left”. This is evidenced by the fact that there are many ordinary "FLN" voters who support their party but are not opposed to left-wing democracy. It seems that Bouteflika realized this due to his political acumen. Therefore, he held respectable meetings, and knew how to manage and use a discourse that appealed to Algerian society, away from political parties, this is what prolonged his rule.

The strange irony of Bouteflika’s regime is that the positives he achieved turned into negatives that hastened his departure. His stimulus plans for economic growth, the trillions he spent on the economy, combating unemployment in the form of loans, and raising wages turned against him. From a production standpoint, there are no results on the field compared to what was achieved spent from the public treasury, In addition to the lack of urgency from the opposition, which became formal during his reign regarding the threat facing democracy in Algeria. During his reign, the state began to operate according to presidential instructions instead of drafting laws and approving them in Parliament. Everything became formal. This is what the Algerian street circulated in the 2019 movement.

The second section: The outcomes of the rise of populist theories on the Bouteflika regime

First requirement:

1. The growth of populist theory in Algeria

The professor of organizational sociology at the University of Khenchela says, “*Understanding populism is important because it plays a major role in global politics, it can affect the directions of governments and societies*” (Achouri 2023). To talk about this topic, we must know the geography of trends and contents of Algerian populism, as it is a phenomenon that cannot be

compared to other global populisms due to the pattern that characterizes the Algerian mentality. Therefore, it can be said that the arrival of Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the Golf Palace in 1999 was pivotal, and opened the way for many political leaders to publicly express their populist ideas (the events of 2011 are an example). Bouteflika openly expressed his strong concern about terrorism, the collapsed level of the state, the trade exchange movement between Algeria and the countries of the world, the resettlement of companies and the transfer of technology... These ideas have found advocates in many political parties, The popularity of the Algerian leftist parties also flourished, in addition to the conservative parties such as the Hamas movement led by Abu Jarra Soltani. This and other reasons generated what was called the growth and escalation of populist theoretical thought, which later turned into an obsession haunting Bouteflika and his political system, especially after his re-election for a second term, the law professor at the University Bachar, in favor of the memorandum said: *"...because it is constantly growing and has become the opposite of the elite, which has made it more widespread..."* (Al-Arbawi 2024).

This growth came as a result of the failure of the authorities and political parties to achieve their programmes, in addition to the evasive style that President Bouteflika followed in dealing with the people (the 2012 Setif speech is an example), which led to the widening of the deep gap between politicians and the popular masses, decline in the regime's capabilities to respond to popular demands. Inability to face economic challenges, The failure of economic reform policies, which caused high rates of inflation and unemployment, the spread of administrative corruption, which encouraged the spread of populist ideas among Algerians, which worked to deepen the gap between civil society and political society, the expansion of popular opposition to institutions, legislative and executive authorities. For example, of parties and legislative councils, the weakness of their political and service role, in addition to not adopting protectionist trade policies to confront economic crises.

Ideological thought has grown in Algeria, which has come to believe in the necessity of renewing the sick populist discourse that prevailed at the time, especially after those hybrid statements that began to be issued from time to time by the government staff itself, represented by the ministers themselves. This is a result of the political, economic, and cultural fluctuations and changes that Algeria experienced during the period of President Bouteflika, which helped the official emergence and growth of ideological thought. There are those who believe that not giving the opportunity to renew political elites and give rights to marginalized groups to express

their interests, while a third party believes that the expansion of populist trends is an inevitable result of globalization, climate change, immigration and the transition to the automated age of production, so the crisis and problems of populism cannot be overcome without finding solutions. The reasons and factors generating this populism, the law professor at Bachar University says in favor of the memorandum, *“This matter prompts us to identify and address this phenomenon”* (Al-Arbawi 2024)

The Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights is a non-governmental organization, founded in 1985 to protect society from government violations and neglect, in order to emphasize respect for freedoms and equality among Algerians. Later, the state supported the path of freedoms by establishing the National Council for Human Rights, a governmental organization working to achieve justice in rights among Algerians, but the new generation of populists, especially in 2019, claimed that they represent the people. They see the rights of the alleged minority as an obstacle to achieving the will of the majority. Instead of standing by human rights as principles to protect everyone, they gave preference to the declared interests of the majority. In this way, a deep contradiction arose between the Algerian populist movement, the democratic path, and human rights.

Due to the economic and security crises that Algeria experienced in the 1980s, 1990s and the beginning of the millennium, the protests deepened, the populist political discourse that adopted attacks on the principles of human rights and Algerian law flourished, the popularity of some right-wing politicians expanded. This is what whetted everyone's appetite, many writers and authors emerged who delved into the topic of populism. Here the Algerian novelist says in an interview for the memorandum: *“Populism in its principle is a political approach with realistic and acceptable goals. Democracy requires winning the largest number of votes by appeasing the segment of the common people and the middle class in order to reach power. But the practice of populism has become an absolutely incorrect phenomenon because exceeding the limit turns into Always the opposite. If partisan discourse exceeds the level of sanctification of the people through raised slogans and attacks on the authority that is unfair to the people, it will inevitably fall under the accusation of political hypocrisy”* (Mouhoub 2024).

To emphasize the importance, values of human rights and democracy, Algeria today must confront the decline in human rights, that is, defend the values of freedom, democracy, political, economic and social pluralism, build social alliances between different groups; To ensure common interests in defending human rights, the fundamental responsibility for the spread of democratic culture remains the responsibility of the people, to confront demagogic trends and

brokers' misinterpretations of the roots of the problems and challenges facing them. The writer and novelist adds: *"The truth is that it is not possible to trust a party that adopts a populist approach and praises the priority of the people in all its programs. Everyone knows, as the party knows, that it can implement what was stated in its populist speech, even if it is sincere, this also falls within the process of fooling the public and playing on the strings of emotions, in order to achieve power"* (Mouhoub 2024), the best solution remains for the people to strive to preserve acquired democratic truths and values that respect human rights and public freedoms, guarantee social justice. Here the role of civil society organizations is highlighted in using and employing available means, such as political parties and social organizations, to defend democracy, the principles of human rights, and the right of the Algerian people to choose the political and economic system that they deem appropriate for them.

There are professors of constitutional law - who refused to include his name in the research - who opposed the idea of a systematic restriction of democracy in Algeria during the period of President Bouteflika, saying, "Democracy was not subject to any restriction." However, if this proposition is correct, then what will be the answer to the fundamental question for which it this research came about "The growth of populist theories locally and their impact on the disintegration of President Bouteflika's regime?" Based on the 2019 movement and what most political analyzes related to the issue have said, democracy during the era of President Bouteflika has actually been subjected to systematic restriction by the major political parties and institutions. On the one hand, the Algerian Constitution explicitly stipulates the sanctity of individual freedom, the protection of rights, the unconstitutionality of any law that affects freedoms and private property, freedom of media and opinion. On the other hand, politics is practiced through intermediary institutions. Such as parties and parliaments, through professional politicians, which allowed the emergence of a class that is neither political nor popular, working as an intermediary between the citizen and the head of the executive authority locally, this was prevalent in the state of Khenchela, for example. These violations automatically led to the anger of broad social sectors, this created a local populist discourse at the café level, discussing these violations with a less organized and systematic thought, here the Algerian novelist says: *"Populist discourse has recently invaded the squares and filled the halls. There is hardly a statement by any politician that is devoid of appealing to the common class, beseeching it, trying to win it over in various ways to the point of vulgarity."* (Mouhoub 2024), common people rarely think like the elite, we must first agree on this point in order to reach the truth of what happened. These tensions came to the surface in parallel with the emergence of

the imbalance of the democratic pillar based on equality and the liberal pillar based on freedom. These imbalances led to the emergence of a major social imbalance represented in those gaps that led to... The growing political influence of certain groups or classes (Ouled Rachach, Al Mahmal, Babar... living samples from within the province), which led to a growing feeling of injustice and disappointment among the majority, in addition to the increasing separation of the political class from society. (Sudden disappearance of representatives of parliament and locally elected councils, Khenchela sample) this political class, according to the prevailing custom in Algeria, is supposed to represent the people to the various state institutions.

What is commonly known among Algerians is that democracy is a political system through which the members of some government institutions that rely on the principle of universal suffrage are renewed. However, what the people noticed was the transformation of these elected institutions into a role to achieve concrete goals without taking into account the minimum conditions of life for the rest of the population. This created factors upon which populism relied to emerge as an actual movement opposed to these institutions and their members. According to what we learned from the street and cafes, Algerian populism focused on three factors that undermine the goals of the existing regime:

- ✓ The first of these factors is its criticism of the elite in general, whether at the local executive level, or the central executive apparatus in the capital.
- ✓ The second factor is the introduction of a regional concept in dealing with recording the deviation of institutions from their legal path. This factor did not represent a threat to democracy as much as it represented a real danger to the Bouteflika regime as an authority. Because it has gone beyond the stage of criticism to the stage of protest, there are no specific restrictions that prevent the people from saying their word in the way they see fit to manage their country. This is the nature and composition of the Algerian people, no two disagree.
- ✓ The third of these factors, according to the opinion of the street and cafes, is always the individual thinking of President Bouteflika's regime, which is based on imposing a false, intangible reality on both the people and the elite, which contradicts the opinions and their diversity within Algerian society. Thus, populism has succeeded to some extent in simplifying what happens in the world of politics in the manner of cafés. In this context, the professor of organizational sociology at the Faculty of Social and Humanitarian Sciences at the University of Khenchela says, "*Populism's messages are often simple and clear, and are based on simplifying political issues*" (Achouri 2023).

Therefore, Algerian society is in dire need of spreading the values of difference and pluralism, rejecting the principles of disagreement and individualism. The nineties imposed on the Algerian people the values of tolerance and dialogue, the necessity of exchanging ideas, in order to overcome the principles of intolerance, extremism, and the culture of exclusion. The superficial culture of generalization and the tendency toward victory for prevailing thought must be fought. Populism in its general sense is a culture characterized by roughness in terms of the principle of action. Therefore, Algeria needs the language of democracy and respect for human rights, because populism goes against this trend and weaves its threads based on popular and deceptive opinions. In this context, the Algerian novelist adds in her dialogue for the memorandum,

“At the beginning of the movement of February 22, 2019, all parties blocs, whether loyal or those who preferred to side with the people, stood anticipating the events that would arise at the beginning of each new day, they did not dare to confront the authority for fear of military force, this is a fact that cannot be denied. Later, it took the path of successively siding with the opinion of the Algerian street, which remained steadfast in its struggle. All the speeches of the parties that claimed to embrace the opinion of the people, at least the tone that indicates complete bias towards the position of the Algerian street, came after the white thread became clear from the black thread. It is right after the position of the military authority became clear, this is the political hypocrisy that we talked about. Even political activists fell into the trap of populist discourses of enthusiasm and deviated from the path of the correct political struggle that bears fruit, this is the exact mistake” (Mouhoub 2024).

2. Populism is an alternative to democracy in Algeria and a path to coexistence.

“Your statement is questionable, all your numbers are questionable. We must agree on which people you and I are talking about, until we agree on one map, because I believe that we are not talking about the same people.” (Aza'uz 2019) These words did not come from a journalist columnist or activist or leftist, but rather by parliamentarian Basma Aza'uz, who belongs to the Future Front Party, who directed harsh criticism at Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia. In turn, the parliamentary representative of the Justice and Development Front Party, Lakhdar Ben Khallaf, attacked Ouyahia, saying:

“The Prime Minister did not come to present a government statement, but rather to conduct a pre-election campaign for the president. Otherwise, how did the country's black situation and the existing dangers that you expressed on many occasions suddenly turn into whiteness? How would red hell have turned into paradise and bliss had it not been for the campaign that is at hand?” (Ben Khallaf 2019) He added: “These are your methods of dealing with this oppressed people, sometimes through enticement and other times through intimidation. But he has realized the falsity of your promises and numbers, has begun to disbelieve you, today he is demanding your departure in order to relieve you to rest from your wrong policy that he is tired of, this is before he removes you.” (Bin Khallaf 2019).

These harsh criticisms came against the backdrop of the Algerian Prime Minister's statement that the demonstrations that swept the Algerian cities raised slogans demanding “political reforms,” while the central demand of the demonstrations was related to rejecting Bouteflika's candidacy for the fifth term. In this direction, the representative of the opposition Society Movement for Peace (HMS), Nasreddin Hamdadouch, said, Addressing Ouyahia: *“There is a big problem if you have a hearing impairment. The demonstrations demanded the rejection of the fifth term and did not demand reforms”* (Hamdadouch 2019), these representatives believe that the government of Ahmed Ouyahia is continuing its extremism, stubbornness and populism in dividing the country. For the first time, Ouyahia spoke about the constitutional right of Algerians to demonstrate peacefully. Recalling, in a speech he delivered before Parliament on the occasion of the presentation of the government's general policy statement, that “the Constitution guarantees the right to demonstrate” (Ouyahia 2019). Referring in this context to the marches that took place on Friday, February 22, 2019, demanding change.

The Algerian university - university professors and students - joined the ranks of the Algerian forces rejecting Bouteflika's continued rule and his candidacy for a fifth term in the presidential elections scheduled for April 18. In a statement they issued, stressing their bias towards the “popular will,” university professors and researchers in Algeria said:

“We, the academics and intellectuals, proceed from the conviction that clarity of positions and intellectual courage win in these critical historical moments in the future of Algeria. We, as academics and intellectuals, do not have the right to miss opportunities for social and political transformation in a society whose members aspire to live together in freedom, dignity and

progress, to be recognized as citizens belonging to a national group harmonious in its cultural differences.” (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed 2019).

Among the signatories of the appeal are Professors: Radwan Boujemaa, Khawla Taleb Al-Ibrahimi, Abdelaziz Boubakir, Mohamed Hanad, Nasser Djabi, Sherif Driss and a number of others. The call is addressed to *“free and honorable university graduates and intellectuals, to express their cohesion and fusion in the process of change that society demands, to break free from the shackles of a system of tyranny, contempt, rent, mediocrity, nepotism, and corruption, to support the will for peaceful change expressed by the Algerians in the recent demonstrations, not to underestimate the aspirations of society, to give Its members have the political capabilities to avoid the vacuum and spare the state from the inertia of an outdated political*



Figure 9: Photo of one of the demonstrations in 2019 in the Algerian capital. Agencie

system.” The statement added, “Our responsibility is to push society to make its way towards liberation and emancipation, in order to change the system that produced violence, corruption, and fanaticism, and to stand by society and participate in all forms of peaceful resistance. We call on it to continue. His path was peaceful and civil, not to respond to all forms of violence with violence.” (Al-Araby Al-Jadeed 2019)

3. Has populism really consolidated democracy?

Democracy in Algeria during the era of President Bouteflika, especially in the year 2019, witnessed the most difficult moments in its journey since its approval in the 1989 Constitution. Especially since the Arab region witnessed the winds of the Arab Spring blowing against the

heart of the ruling political systems. However, Bouteflika's Algeria refused to acknowledge many of the institutional problems and crises facing its democracy at home, stubbornly claimed that it was a respectable model of democracy despite the warning of rational Algerians and their explicit call at the time to submit completely to the opinion of the street raging against him. Al-Basair newspaper headlined its front page with the saying, “*Woe to those who do not listen well to the demands of their people and the tones of their voice*” (Al-Basair 2019), In



Figure 10: Photo taken from the account of Sheikh Dr. Abdul Razzaq Qassoum

this regard, Sheikh Dr., President of the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars, says in an interview devoted to this study: “*As for the position of the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars, it considers itself part of the national system as a whole*” (Qassoum 2024).

It seems that Bouteflika's regime at the time did not pay the slightest attention to the two major serious threats that represented a real danger to democracy in Algeria. The first is the growing movement against him by supporters of parties loyal to the president not the leadership of these parties, similar to the supporters of the Liberation Front party who reject the fifth term and the April 18th elections completely. The second threat is that the Algerian authority has begun to formulate state policies clearly separated from public opinion.

Through Bouteflika's government taking actions of an authoritarian nature, this reflected the frustration that has plagued many in Algeria over twenty years with the decline in living standards for the working and middle classes. It also reflected cultural concerns, especially related to the components of national identity, as Algeria became a country more open to Western culture. The Algerian educational system is being diluted under the supervision of Minister Ben Ghabrit. This constituted a real frustration among the general Algerian people, contradicted the direction and position of the Algerian reformists, as the former president of the Algerian Scholars association, added in his dialogue in favor of the memorandum, “*The association raises the slogan of reform based on averageness and moderation in application of correct Islamic teachings*” (Qassoum 2024).

From what was previously mentioned, this clear deviation contributed in one way or another to the formation of the nucleus of populism against Bouteflika's rule. The idea of “overthrowing Bouteflika before 2019” arose, which sparked a lot of controversy and ridicule on three axes:

- ✓ The first is that Algerian democracy grew and spread at the beginning of the nineties as an alternative. Civilized for the one-party system that cost the Algerians a decade of fighting, here the Algerian people have transcended the so-called necessity of the existence of an eternal leader who cannot be criticized in an irreversible manner.
- ✓ The second axis is that the only possible end to the historical conflict between the Algerians are only in exercising the principle of alternating power. This is what the President Zeroual planned and began in 1999 when he withdrew from power.
- ✓ The third axis is that socialism, liberalism, and the so-called Islamic parties have failed and have become incapable to achieve the democracy that the people seek, to actually draw a part of it, that the future of Algeria will be as the people want it, not as the authority or elites want it.

The reality of the Algerian situation before 2019 indicated the growth of the populist movement and the decline in the values of achieved democracy, in addition to the voter's reluctance and skepticism about the sanctity of the fund. Despite this, attempts have been active aimed at separating democracy and populism, even if the latter comes through the funds, these activists have made efforts to justify the failure of Algerian democracy during the Bouteflika era by blaming this on the economic crisis.

4. The peaceful conflict between populism and the Bouteflika regime.

The Algerians created a scene that changed all calculations of the authority, this is from the logic of positive awareness, the Algerian character's rejection of the systematic practices by the authority and its agents. The Algerian people chose "peace as a slogan." Their peaceful and civilized stances dazzled the world, analysts, politicians, and shocked the guessers who believed that the people had truly gave up his political rights by choosing living in the shadow of individual, collective surrender and despair, but the people came out in a civilized manner to take his rights away from traditional forms of demand. (Agencies)

1.4 The beginning of peaceful protests

The protests began after the announcement of the date of the presidential elections on April 18th, when Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika officially announced his candidacy for a fifth term. He is in a wheelchair, then he left for Geneva "to undergo routine medical examinations" for a period of 4 days, according to what the media reported, but the president was absent for a long time, as he stayed in the hospital for 15 days, during which there were

conflicting reports about his health condition, which was already deteriorating, after which he returned to Algeria. Unusually, Bouteflika found protests calling on him and those with him to leave instead of the roses he had received from those close to him. He found millions in the streets chanting against him. It is a welcome, but not like the welcome given by the president. The other thing that prompted the Algerians to take to the streets was the events of the so-called “Cashier Hall” in reference to the “Bidawiya (Oval) Hall” in the Algerian capital, which included an unusually large popular gathering on the tenth of February. It was organized by the National Liberation Front party and loyal parties, associations and representatives of civil society participated. Activists on social media at the time gave their famous name to this gathering, describing it as a “Kashir” gathering. Its aim was to announce their support for former President Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fifth term, but it caused a wave of anger. It has become widespread among Algerians, translated by social networking sites, which has reached the point of congestion. (Agencies)

2.4 Khenchela again and forever.

From Khenchela, 550 km east of the Algerian capital, on February 19th, hundreds of citizens came out in protest against the provocations of the President of the Municipal People’s Assembly of the municipality of Khenchela, “Mayor”, coinciding with the rally that would be held at the time by the presidential candidate at the time, Mr. Rachid Nekkaz. Then, on February 16th, a march took place in the city of Kharratah in the state of Bejaia, in protests against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth presidential term. three (3) days later, specifically on February 19th, the spark of the movement broke out from Freedom Square in the heart of the city of Khenchela, when protesters brought down the large picture of President Bouteflika that was hanging on the municipal building and proceeded to tear it down, leaving the national flag that was attached to it. Chanting the slogan, "take down the photo and leave the flag". That scene would be enough to break the barrier of fear among millions of Algerians. - The Kharratah protests were not expected to have a resonance - As for the political parties loyal to the president, they were in full swing preparing for the pre-emptive electoral campaign, promoting the fifth term of President Bouteflika under the slogans of “the Mujahid¹ father” and “a completion of what the president started.” (Agencies)

¹ Mujahid in Arabic means: warrior, it is a Islamic name given to those who participated in the Algerian revolution against French colonialism (1954-1962).

3.4 Social networking sites are rising

After what happened in the Oval Hall in the capital, anonymous activists circulated calls on social networking sites in parallel with other calls that had been launched by the “Mwatana²” movement, the opposition movements and parties rejecting the re-election of the president for a new term. The tension has reached its peak, as the emotional support exercised by the advocates of the fifth has turned into negative results. Negative movements began to block the path to the fifth term by young people born during the president’s era, to be the first spark for the popular movement protests that expanded to include all of the state of Tizi Ouzou in eastern Algeria, then the capital on February 18th and 19th last. (Agencies)

4.4 The popular outburst sweeps Algeria

All evidence suggested that a popular flood was coming, as preparations began for what was called “Friday of Rejection.” Blue Space played a prominent role in the popular movement after many calls spread across social networking sites calling on citizens to march in all cities on February 22, calling them “Melyonia³ Anger” Events have accelerated in an unprecedented manner. Indeed, popular protests erupted throughout the national territory, demanding the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika not run for a fifth presidential term. These protests began on February 22, immediately after Friday prayers, in all cities such as: Khenchela, the cradle of the movement, the capital, Souk Ahras, Tebessa, Annaba, M’Sila, Setif, Guelma, Jijel, Bejaia, Tizi Ouzou, Bouira, Boumerdes, Tiaret, Relizane, Oran and Ouargla...ect A total of 20 million Algerians came out throughout the republic in a precedent that the country had never witnessed before, according to activists, raising the slogan: “No for the fifth term,” stressing that it was “peaceful...peaceful.” (Agencies)

4.5 The popular outburst sweeps Algeria

Mo'ad Bouchareb, Secretary-General of the National Liberation Front party, came out in a dangerous precedent and responded to the demonstrators on state television by saying: “Whoever wants Bouteflika not to run, I tell them to dream.” Then, the phone call between

² Muwatana is a name of movement that means "Citizenship movement".

³ Milyonia Means A dozens of people (Million).

Bouteflika's campaign manager, Abdelmalek Sallal, and Ali Haddad, who was responsible for financing his election campaign, was leaked and circulated on social media. The content of this call was that Abdelmalek Sallal and Ali Haddad mocked the protesters and vowed to fight them with weapons as a solution to overcoming the protests. (Agencies)

4.6 Bouteflika's challenge to the demonstrators

The Presidency of the Republic issued a letter attributed to President Bouteflika on March 3rd, 2019, announcing the president's candidacy for a fifth term, with promises to organize early presidential elections. Thousands took to the streets to denounce his candidacy, considered the speech "a provocation from a sick man." He has not appeared or addressed the people for years! Events accelerated further. Three days later, Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Saleh, Vice Minister of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Algerian People's National Army, changed his tone for the first time. The Chief of Staff in his speech ignored mentioning Bouteflika, he went directly to address the Algerian people by saying: "Algeria is strong with its people," which is considered as a confidentiality phrase between the Chief of Staff and the people to continue the process of demands. (Agencies).

4.7 Beginning of waivers

After the speech of the Chief of Staff of the Algerian People's National Army on March 6th, 2019, street pressure increased to siege power, prompting the presidency to begin making concessions that began with abandoning the fifth term and ended with Bouteflika stepping down. These protests prompted President Bouteflika on March 11 to cancel his candidacy for a fifth term, without He tried to evade the Algerian street by canceling the April 18th elections deciding to extend the presidential term ending by one year under the pretext of amending the constitution and organizing an "inclusive" national dialogue. He also appointed Nouredin Bedoui as Prime Minister. (Agencies)

"The Rejection Friday of Extension" on March 15th. The Algerians considered what the president did is an attempt to circumvent their demands to save the regime, they decided to escalate with million-man demonstrations that raised the ceiling of their demands to reject the "extension for the fourth period" demanding the departure of the entire regime, as new groups joined the movement, to begin a series of successive collapses around President Bouteflika, than the clear division between the major parties and organizations that were calling for a fifth

term appeared. Dozens of political figures left the ranks of power, a number of representatives resigned, trade unions joined the movement. (Agencies)

The encouragement in this movement is the speeches of the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, who confirms every time that the Algerian military institution is biased towards the choices of the people, which made the end for Bouteflika approaching. In late March 2019, Bouteflika became alone, after everyone abandoned him, including the Mujahideen Organization (war veterans), which had called for a response to the people's demand. As a result, the country entered a state of anticipation and uncertainty, amid popular insistence on the departure of the regime, events accelerated after news of the secret meeting held by the president's brother and special advisor, Said Bouteflika, with senior generals.

The name of former President Lamin Zeroual, known to Algerians as "Uncle Zeroual," was widely circulated. The former president declared from Batna, 600 km east of Algeria, refuting the circulating rumor, in a statement in which he said that he met Said Bouteflika and rejected his offer to lead the transitional phase, calling them to "*Be wise and subject to the demands of the people.*" (Agencies).

On the evening of last April 2^{sd}, the army leadership held a largest emergency meeting in more than two decades, headed by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Saleh, where he announced his "complete and unconditional bias towards the demands of the movement," calling for the activation of Article 102 of the Constitution, which recognizes the vacancy of the position of president of the country, describing his action by "irreversible decision." Less than two hours later, Bouteflika announced relinquishing power after 20 years as president of the country, as he became the longest-ruling president, followed it with a "moving" letter of apology to the Algerians. (Agencies).

.Bouteflika from the fifth term ambition to the crisis than resignation

Provocation stage

- The President officially submits his candidacy papers for the presidency.
- A wave of strikes paralyzed the country.
- March 11, 2019 the ailing president retracts and announces the postponement of the elections.
- Nouredine Bedoui appointed as Prime Minister instead of Ahmed Ouyahia.

The beginning of the crisis

- February 10th, 2019 President Bouteflika announces his candidacy for the fifth term..
- Abdel-Ghani Zaalani was appointed as his election campaign manager, succeeding Abdel-Malik Sellal.
- Moad Bouchareb provokes the people and says on television: Whoever wants Bouteflika not to run, I tell them to dream.

A leaked phone call between Bouteflika's campaign manager, Abdelmalek Sellal, and Ali Haddad, who is responsible for financing Bouteflika's campaign, vowing to fight protesters with Kalashnikovs.

Spark of change Started

- February 14th, 2019: Hundreds of citizens came out in Khenchela in protest against the provocations of the prince loyal to President Bouteflika.
- February 16th, 2019: Citizens' exit in Khartrah, Bejaia Province
- February 19th, 2019: The spark of the movement broke out and the president's picture was torn down in Khenchela.
- February 22, general protests in rejection of the fifth term.
- March 3rd, 2019: The Presidency, in a statement, announces President Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth term.
- March 6th, 2019 The Algerian Army Chief of Staff changes his tone by saying, "Algeria is strong with its people" for the first time since the beginning of the crisis.
- March 11, 2019 Bouteflika withdraws his candidacy and cancels the April 18th elections.
- March 11, 2019 Bouteflika announces the extension of the presidential term for one year.
- March 15th, 2019 the people reject even the fourth term, and serious divisions occur within the ranks of Bouteflika.
- The ruling party supports the popular movement
- March 30th, 2019 The Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army calls for the implementation of the constitution.
- April 2nd, 2019 The Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army calls for the implementation of Articles 7, 8 and 102 of the Constitution (the vacancy of the presidential position). He described his decision as "irreversible".
- April 2nd, 2019 Less than two hours after Chief of Staff Bouteflika's speech announces his resignation from power after 20 years

The second requirement:**1. The dysfunction of formal institutions is the pretext of Algerian populists to gain power.**

The key to any mass movement against the regular institution is through the defect that afflicts it, the Algerian regular institution witnessed a severe setback at some point that led to the loss of the link that linked it to the citizen, which formed a terrible vacuum between the ruling authority and the governed popular base. This is how Algeria was in a certain period of its history... This vacuum created an authority parallel to that which actually exists in the wheels of government, which led to a stark contradiction between them in terms of seeing the future of the state and governance together, this is what created a discourse known to specialists as the existing critical discourse based on certain foundations and principles, which made it turn into an actual theory parallel to the theory of the existing system, which created what is called criticism of the democratic system according to populist theory. Here, researcher in political issues, at the University of Khenchela, adds in her dialogue devoted to the memorandum, *“The populist theory is necessarily a democratic theory, there is no doubt about that. Rather, it is a theory in its own right”* (Yahiaoui 2024), While those versed in politics confirm that populism *“often appears as a democratic movement or as radical democracy, but at its core it works the opposite of democracy.”* while, the Algerian parliamentarian and the researcher at the University of Khenchela intersect with the same proposition, as both of them absolutely denied the existence of any relationship between Algerian populism and democracy, where the researcher says, *“I said that populism is a clear theory in political practice, it may be valid in societies with certain characteristics”* (Yahiaoui 2024). The representative of the Algerian parliament adds, *“I do not see the truth in this statement, populism cannot rise to the level of democracy. Rather, I see that populism is an approach that was used at some point and achieved results for the movement that favors the policy of escaping forward. Unfortunately, a percentage of the political class favors and is accustomed to this approach. This also made a significant portion of citizens involved in political work, along with a segment of society that does not like realism, the diagnosis of phenomena and facts”* (Sharshar 2024).

“Algeria, our home, will burn,” shouted one of the demonstrators in 2019 in the heart of the Algerian city of Khenchela. It seemed that he was fully aware of the consequences of the growth of populism. At that time, one of the demonstrators responded to him in the same march - we do not know if it was in a sarcastic form or not, since the mockery is in the Algerian movement was so present -By saying, “O No, foretelling of our time.” this demonstrator seems to have been alerted to the dangers of the future of democracy in Algeria, which has a fragile structure,

the reason is the prior awareness of this person that this “human value” may live its last moments, as a result of the actual growth of the populist theory that threatened the throne of Algerian democracy in 2019, Which meant at that time that the leaders represented by the regime of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who were democratically elected at the beginning, then later strengthened their rule through re-election. These leaders often ignored the constitutional controls set for their authority, especially the article that determines the terms of the President of the Republic. These violations led to the deprivation of the citizens of Algeria of their rights and freedom to exercise power in accordance with this constitution. This neglect created what was called a dysfunction in the existing regime institutions, making them directly vulnerable to being targeted by those who are against the authority of President Bouteflika. This imbalance played a decisive role in creating a real confrontation between two parallel concepts of democracy in Algeria, namely the populist concept of democracy and the liberal concept of democracy, the victim was the people and their institutions. This proposal was referred to by the researcher in her dialogue for this graduation thesis, saying, *“In the Algerian model, I never linked populism to democracy at all. However, what I want to say is that populism is one of the actual or rhetorical paths that candidates follow to reach power, which may be democratic”* (Yahiaoui 2024).

While the former President of the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars, Dr. Abdel-Razzaq Qassoum, believes that there is a decisive confrontation that has actually occurred between two different concepts of democracy in Algeria in 2019, namely the liberal concept, which means the totality of institutions that express the will of the people and that are supposed to establish dialogue. An extensive and permanent discussion in order to protect itself against all tendencies of tyranny, including the bullying of those employees who speak on behalf of this will? And the new, old concept known as “populist democracy,” which means the direct expression of the people at any given moment of failure affecting the official state apparatus, when options are limited. In his dialogue for the memo, he says, *“The movement can be described as a combination of political and ideological conflict...”* (Qassoum 2024)

Algerian populism has a violent ideology when compared to other populisms in the world, so it is not yet known whether it is a purely democratic movement, a radical democratic movement, or a popular outburst governed by emotion, but what is clear about it, is that it stands completely in the opposite direction. What it calls for, among its principles, is that the will of the people must be implemented “immediately on the ground.” This is what made it a movement with a

violent dimension in terms of perception, but what made the populist trends characterized by a kind of coldness is the lack of a common and harmonious will among the members of the Algerian people on the ground, so this movement in 2019 attempted to sift and extract “the real people.” that described him as pure and loyal people from whole citizens, the doctor adds, “...*the conflict aims at comprehensive reform on more than one level*” (Qassoum 2024). In the midst of this fruitless search for the “true people,” the young democracy in Algeria has been subjected to a real process of grinding. This led to the emergence of the debate about democracy again. However, the late Libyan colonel settled the matter before more than forty years ago where he differentiate between democracy and crowd rage, saying, “*the outdated definition of democracy that says: Democracy is the people’s control over the government ends, to be replaced by the correct definition, which is: Democracy is the people’s control over himself.*” (qtd. Gaddafi 1977), Which in turn - perhaps - may have derived it from the explanations of the Greek scholar Aristotle, who confirmed that it is a system through which citizens exercise rule “on the basis of rotation,” a rule that says that the members of any people are not always ruled, but this rule was officially absent in 2019 in Algeria, this is what created a real conflict between “we,” which means the people, and “they,” which means the rulers.

It is a grave mistake to consider that democracy is living its last moments in Algeria, this is perhaps an inaccurate description that must be reconsidered so as not to miss the mark, as there are other democratic expressions that have actually spread in the twentieth century and the twenty-first century, which was known to the Algerian people as democracy of the masses, street democracy, or protest democracy with a nature that is capable of escalation and combustion, its manifestations may have appeared in the nineties of the last century, through “burning factories and official institutions,” through the 2011 demonstrations, until the “2019 movement.”

These crystallized manifestations in the form of massive protests were called by some the democracy of protests, as they resulted from the inability of Algerian democracy to adapt to the increasing tyranny of political leaders. However, at the same time, they demonstrated the inability of the traditional Algerian political parties to solve the problems at hand. This is what prompted a number of its members to emigrate to the ranks of the movement, it also prompted many fighters and activists to search for methods of struggle that have a more comprehensive dimension than the policies pursued by their parties. All social factions participating in the 2019 protests rejected, in the name of this democracy, the presence of field leaders for the movement,

also rejected the existence of a hierarchy and coordination between these movements, unions and parties, in order to perhaps avoid the imposition of some influential figures on their personal whims.

Which creates tyranny through opinion and bureaucracy, which may lead to taking over the movement and perhaps politicizing it in favor of this or that. The head of the Algerian Muslim Scholars Association warned in an article in Al-Basair newspaper against an attempt to steal the movement, *“Therefore, we call on the national popular movement to protect its initiative from diagnosis and misrepresentation... so beware of infiltrating the movement”* (Qassoum 2019). What can be concluded is that these protest movements as a whole, despite their strength, speed of mobilization and spread, have become unable alone to build stable institutions or provide long-term solutions to economic and social structural crises such as those experienced in Algeria. In the most extreme cases, these movements were able to achieving a small part of the demands or changing some political leaders, this is what actually happened. Where did this spontaneous and unorganized movement succeed, or even succeed, in removing a president who had been sitting on the breath of an entire people for two decades? Where did he use his rule to serve his interests and the interests of those close to him?

2. The confrontation between populism and the Bouteflika regime:

Before delving directly into the chapters of the confrontation between the populists and the regime of President Bouteflika, this research focused on a quick reading of the roots of the pre-confrontation and its causes. In the last official speech of Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika from the city of Setif, eastern Algeria, in May 2012 on the occasion of the commemoration of the sixty-seventh anniversary (67) of massacres of May 8, 1945, the president announced in a frank language, clear and understandable to everyone, saying: *“My generation has ended”* (Bouteflika 2012), meaning that the time has come for my generation to give up power, he added, *“God does not burden a soul with more than it can bear”* (Bouteflika 2012) At that time everyone - regime, authority and people - realized that the man was actually about to leave and wanted to hand over the reins of power to the generation of independence.

Proposals and concepts for building a new Algerian political system have been canceled, the sick man announced his candidacy for the 2014 presidential elections despite his critical health condition. Bouteflika suffered a stroke in 2013 he was admitted to the French Val-de-Grasse Hospital (Al-Arabiya Channel 2013). In the first reactions to this candidacy, which was

tantamount to opening a front for confrontation, the Hamas movement, a conservative political party at the time, through its president, Abderrazak Makri, called the parties that launched calls in support of Bouteflika's candidacy for a fourth term should review their positions, as he said, during a meeting with party leaders in Medea city, that the country should not fall into what he called "new mistakes that may mortgage its future and independence forever." (Al-Shorouk newspaper 2014)

While the National Democratic assemble, the second largest political party in the country called to support President Bouteflika. (France 24 11/23/2013). Meanwhile, the former Prime Minister, Mr. Ahmed Ben Bitour, tweeted on his Facebook account, saying: "*The game is over, the presidential elections are decided in advance*" (Ben Bitour 2014). He added, "*I do not think that Bouteflika will live this time knowing that his death is approaching, he will not have it for long. However, he chose to remain in power until he has a global funeral like Houari Boumediene, Nelson Mandela, and Jamal Abdel Nasser, the history will be written about him just as it was written about these people.*" (Bin Bitour March 7, 2014)



أحمد بن بيتور

7 Mar 2014 · 3

حسب رؤيوتي ومراقبة لهذه الاوضاع وبما ان اللعبة مغلقة والرئاسيات محسوم فيها مسبقا اقول انك احسن ما فعلت اذ انسحبت، يجب ان يكون هذا الانسحاب تكتيكي ويتم التحضير لرئاسيات المقبلة والمسبقة للاني لا ظن ان بوتفليقة سيعمر هذه المرة هو يعلم بدنو اجله وانه ليس له الكثير ولكنه اثر البقاء في الحكم حتى يحضى بجنائز عالمية على شاكلة هواري بومدين ونيلسون منديلا وجمال عبد الناصر ويكتب عنه التاريخ مثل ما كتب عن هؤلاء و للترقب وتحتسب وتعقد الاحلاف وتجهز نفسك فا المعركة القادمة ليس مع بوتفليقة بل مع بن فليس وهذا الاخير سيستنفذ كل طاقاته ويكشف او يكشف له كل عيوبه فهذه الانتخابات واظنك تعي هذا جيدا وحينها يكون لكل حادث حديث وشكرا سيدي الرئيس .

Figure 11: Photo taken from Ahmed Bin Bitour's Facebook account.

As for Moussa Touati, head of the Algerian National Front Party, he held the parties, media and civil society organizations the full responsibility for their silence regarding the amendment of the constitution in 2008, which enabled Bouteflika to run for a third term after he amended the article that defines terms, therefore, as he said: "*The train passed in 2008, there is no benefit today in crying over the ruins.*" Touati, who announced his candidacy for the upcoming

presidential elections, believes that the administrative bodies, including the administration, security, and the power parties of FLN, RND, TAJ, and the Popular Movement... are working in favor of a fourth term in any way, but as he said: *“We challenge them to make the upcoming presidential elections transparent elections that will take place under Electronic, media censorship, national and international organizations.”* Touati described the invitation of the FLN, President Bouteflika, to run for a fourth term, as tantamount to inheriting power through money after they had exhausted revolutionary legitimacy and security legitimacy. He said that the authority began buying the people's debts some time ago, by distributing the rents in the provinces by the Prime Minister, Abdelmalek Sallal. (Al-Shorouk newspaper 2014).

3. “I the people” Populist slogan to dismantle the Bouteflika regime.

The entire Algerian people laid a question, the same question still circulates whenever it comes to mentioning the former president: How did the late President Abdelaziz Bouteflika spend his last days in power?

From the beginning of the popular movement, which began on February 14th, 2019, and exploded on the 19th of the same month in Khenchela, then Algiers on February 22, 2019, until the resignation of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika on April 2^{sd} of the same year, crucial periods in the path of a man obsessed with politics and in lover of power for decades without getting bored or tired. What distinguished these last days of his stay in power? How did the army decide, under street pressure, to force him to leave?

On February 10th, 2019, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika sent a message to the nation, published by the official news agency, in which he announced his candidacy for a fifth term. It stated: *“In response to all appeals and calls, in order to continue performing my highest duty, I announce my candidacy for the presidential elections.”* (Algerian News Agency 2019), a few days after this unsurprising message to the people, the “sick man” spent his last days in the Mouradia Palace. But to be honest, this research delved into the last days of Bouteflika’s rule over Algeria.

3.1 Who was ruling Abdelaziz Bouteflika or his brother Said?

What is certain among the Algerian people, and what was widely heard, especially among the elite, is that Said Bouteflika, the president’s advisor and his younger brother, is planning a fifth term that has sparked widespread and severe condemnation by the Algerians. This is what the Algerian people actually experienced and was reported by the heavy Algerian media, where national television broadcast a statement attributed to the General Secretariat of the Presidency

instead of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic that does not bear the signature of the President, ending the duties of the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Army, Lieutenant General Gaid Salah.

Algerian journalist Farid Alilat says in his book “Bouteflika, the Secret Story.” Said Bouteflika exceeded the powers of the president and ignored the role of Vice Defense Minister and Army Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah, indicating that he began planning since October 2019 with some decision-makers, such as former intelligence chief Mohamed Medien, named “Tawfiq,” to impose a fifth term despite Bouteflika’s inability to assume his constitutional duties due to illness. According to journalist Farid Alilat, the plan seemed to Said Bouteflika simple and within reach, the writer adds, as it was to offer a transitional phase to the political opposition that would allow his brother to remain in power in exchange for promises to carry out constitutional reforms, most notably limiting the term of government to two terms only.

3.2 “Tawfiq” welcomes the organization of a transitional phase, while Gaid Salah categorically rejects it

Farid Alilat adds in his book, this idea was met with a mixture of astonishment and sarcasm, knowing that Abdelaziz Bouteflika had abolished Article 74 of the 1996 Constitution, which limited the period of rule to two terms no more, for this purpose, in April 2008, the former president summoned both chambers of Parliament in an extraordinary session to approve a constitutional amendment abolishing the aforementioned article, opening the way for him to serve a third and then a fourth term. Journalist Farid Alilat, in his book “Bouteflika, the Secret Story,” quoted the testimonies of several former prominent officials such as Mohamed Shirif M'sadia, (the former leader of the Liberation Front party) that Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s intention was from the beginning to reach power and remain there. For his part, former Defense Minister Khaled Nazzar stated in October 2003 in the Algerian press that “Bouteflika prefers his family and his clan over the institutions of the republic,” adding that Said “became the second man” in the state even though he was only an unofficial advisor.

3.3 The Army Chief of Staff calls on Bouteflika to resign.

While Said Bouteflika obtained the approval of the former intelligence chief, “Tawfiq” to move forward with organizing a transitional phase, as per journalist Farid Alilat adds in his book, he faced a categorical refusal from the Chief of Staff of the Algerian army, Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah. Said held secret meetings with “Tawfiq” and other officials (the Prime

Minister, the Minister of Interior, and the Head of Parliament) in order to impose his plan. In the face of Gaid Salah's opposition, the plan failed without Said Bouteflika surrendering. At the beginning of 2019, according to Farid Alilat's narrative, the former president summoned the Electoral College and set the date for the presidential elections on April 18th. On February 9, a prominent event occurred in the series of Algerian street explosions, with the "Front Liberation Party" organizing a huge festival in the Algerian capital to support Bouteflika's candidacy for a fifth term, in the absence of the latter, the organizers published what the Algerians called at the time "the frame," which was a picture of the sick president who did not speak or walk, around which the participants lined up to praise their hero.

That was the drop which overflowed the cup, the anger of the street began to appear publicly, starting with the city of Bordj Bou Arreridj (about 270 km east of Algiers) on February 13th, then the town of Kherratah in Bejaia province (300 km east of Algeria) on February 16th, leading to the February 22 demonstrations in the capital, which took part, there are hundreds of thousands in it.

3.4 The end of the "dream of death in power" after twenty years in power.

In the face of this new situation, the former president decided to postpone the elections to an unspecified date, which angered Ahmed Gaid Salah, according to what was stated in the book "Bouteflika, the Secret Story." In the face of Said Bouteflika's insistence on monopolizing power, in early March the Chief of Staff of the Army in the province of Ouargla in southern Algeria called on the former president to resign from his position in accordance with Article 102 of the Constitution - which stipulates that the position of president will be vacant in the event of his death or inability to carry out his duties. But the president refused to resign, while his brother Said continued his secret meetings with Tawfiq. The duo presented it to former President Lamin Zeroual, who took power in 1994 and resigned in September 1998. He headed the country for a transitional period but refused to "collude" with the presidential alliance.

In the same context, Farid Alilat revealed in his book that Said had confided to former Defense Minister Khaled Nazzar on March 7, 2019, that the president was "ready to impose a curfew or a case of emergency" in order to put an end to the movement. Journalist Alilat wrote that the fate of Abdelaziz Bouteflika was decided on April 2nd, during a meeting of army commanders at the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense in the upper part of the capital, in the presence of the commanders of the six military regions, the commanders of all army brigades and

sensitive centers in the first meeting of Algerian army commanders since independence (Al-Arabiya channel 2019). The army's decision was unanimously expressed by Lieutenant General, the Chief of Staff, in a broadcast on Algeria's official television, in which he said, "*We see that there is no room for further wasting of time and that the proposed solution, represented by activating Articles 7, 8 and Article 102 of the Constitution, must be immediately implemented*" (Gaïd Salah 2019),

The former president appeared on National television's 8 o'clock news submitting his resignation to the president of the Constitutional Council. In which it was stated, "*My intention in making this decision out of faith and hope is to contribute to calming the souls and minds of my citizens*" (Algerian News Agency, 2019), he added, "*I made this decision out of my desire to avoid and ward off the verbal quarrels that mar the current situation*" (Algerian News Agency 2019).

It's over for 82-year-old Bouteflika, and his "dream of dying in power" has evaporated after twenty years of absolute rule. He submitted his resignation letter to the Constitutional Council, which contained an important sentence in which the president said, "*This decision of mine comes as an expression of my belief in a dear and generous Algeria that assumes its status and taking all of its responsibilities in the fold of nations.*" (Algerian News Agency, 2019), he added, "*I took this measure in accordance with my constitutional powers in accordance with what is required by the sustainability of the state and the sound functioning of its institutions during the transitional period*" (Algerian News Agency 2019).

This is how Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who likened himself to Prince Abdelkader, the leader of the Algerian resistance against French colonialism between 1834 and 1847. He had convinced the army commanders following the resignation of Lamin Zeroual at the end of 1998 that he was "the right man." After stepping down from power under pressure from the street and the army, Bouteflika He lives alone in complete isolation in his residence equipped with medical equipment in the coastal town of Zeralda, about 40 kilometers southwest of Algiers. Bouteflika has not appeared in public since the street and the army forced him to resign on April 2nd, 2019. On that day, he appeared for the last time on Algerian TV submitting his resignation, after trying to cling the power until the last minute. A source in his circle said that "*he lives there surrounded by his sister and a medical team.*" For his part, Algerian journalist Farid Alilat, author of his latest biography, confirmed in an interview published last month by the French weekly "Le Point", He receives few visitors. He is still sitting in his wheelchair, knowing that he is unable

to speak due to his illness. He added. But he is aware of everything that is happening in Algeria. (France 24 channel 2020).

4. Algerian populism is a temporary political phenomenon.

First, populism, by everyone's agreement, is a phenomenon, as long as it remains so, it has limits. Therefore, there are controls that make it a passing or persistent wave. The first of these controls is in the clear differences between the factors of the promise before the elections, the result that the populists obtain after the elections. Populist leaders usually make loud and resonant statements, the aim of which is to show the way they conduct themselves in the affairs of the state. This reveals the falsity of their claims. Because they are not qualified to lead the state and its capabilities compared to the promises they make, but rather because they are surrounded by incompetents and lack experience in managing public affairs, means that there is a tactic that Algerian populists usually resort to - is not a vacuum speech- in order to preserve their credibility from failure to reach power and manage the affairs of the state, they resort to acting as if they are waging an election campaign, throwing accusations right and left, so you can see them at times criticizing the bureaucracy at other times the opposition. Parliamentarianism, unions, foreign interference and other charges...all of them considered the obstacle that prevented them from coming to power.

So far, we have not answered clearly whether Algerian populism is limited or a transient phenomenon, but what is true is that it is a phenomenon resulting from inequality and those disparities to which society has been exposed in certain periods, means that populism, in its origin, is a part of the people that is characterized by conservatism, i.e. it is a conservative elite, but it is politically lurking at the same time, waiting for the emergence of those social movements behind which the people usually rally as a result of poverty, unemployment, and corruption, which demand the improvement of economic and social conditions. Here comes the role of these political lurkers who carry the name of populism as a deceiving voice for the people, by broadcasting false speeches and slogans, containing the denouncers and absorbing the anger of the angry people. This is what made Algerian populism an ideology and a transient, non-continental political movement whose goal is to deceive the masses. Therefore, as an inevitable result, it is a loyal servant of the totalitarian system based on gathering all powers in the hands of the person of the president. It is the second face of the regime, but in the guise of a false, populist, rebellious mass.

5. Will populism take over after Bouteflika?

The reason for the rapid rise of these populist politicians in Algeria is that Algerian society has lost confidence in its elites, its political and traditional parties, as it was the same before 1999. the presence of a man like Bouteflika at the top of political power in Algeria, who is essentially a politician whose influence became widespread during the era of President Boumedien's main reason is that large segments of the people did not find anyone else in the political arena in 1999, after all the presidential candidates withdrew at that time, so they gave him their votes.

The former Algerian President Lamine Zeroual agrees with the proposition that Algerian populism is hostile to current political pluralism, but there is an addition for the president, which is that hostility to cultural pluralism has resulted in populism's hostility to all forms of institutional structures within the democratic system, parliamentary and judicial institutions, civil society organizations, and the Constitutional Council. He said, *"In this regard, it should be strongly pointed out to all those*



Figure 12: Photo taken from President Zeroual's official Facebook account

who still doubt the national genius that the Algerian people know how to distinguish between what is essential and what is trivial" (Zeroual 2019),

A reference to what was known in the past (the democracy of the masses), where Algerian populism saw these institutions as nests for falsifying and obstructing the popular will. The populist masses also see that the relationship between the people and their representatives must be a direct relationship without any political or constitutional mediator, which requires continuous communication between the people and their populist leader through massive mass conferences and even social networking sites that have appeared recently. This proposal was preceded by the late Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi when he said:

"The Representative Council essentially stands on behalf of the people, this basis itself is undemocratic, because democracy means the authority of the people, not a representative authority...The mere existence of a parliament means the absence of the people, the true democracy cannot exist except with the presence of the people themselves, not with the presence of their representatives" (Gaddafi 1977).

So, after this detail, what should we talk about specifically when it comes to asking the question “What is populism?” The Algerian case is a pattern that is difficult to understand due to the lack of clarity in the mentality of the Algerian individual itself. However, what we noticed in 2019 is the presence of two common mistakes that occurred. They include liberals, human rights activists, and many commentators or those interested in Algerian political affairs in particular:

The first is to reduce populism to psychological and social causes suffered by the weak class below the middle class. This broad segment is always threatened by nightmares of social downfall, so they find what they seek in populist discourses that promise them a solution to their suffering, their motive is excessive anger at the financial elites, celebrities, and the rich who control the wheels of government. (Ali Haddad, Ouyahia, who known as “the Buses owner”, the Kouninaf family...etc.) This is a dangerous description of the character of the Algerian individual who has proven his worth, endurance, and constant search to be different from others, the years of the revolution and the dark decade are the best evidence.

The second error is almost the same as the first error, but with a slight difference, which is limiting the growth of populist theory in Algeria to the cultural reason, since the Algerians’ election of Islamic parties at a certain period in the life of the state is based on the Islamic culture’s contempt for liberal values, the values of pluralism and difference, here the error. In this context, the former Algerian president says, “...involving all Algerians in achieving it, it is a great national goal.



Figure 13: A photo taken from the president’s official Facebook account

Anyone who believes that it may be achieved by the will of one man, no matter how inspired, is wrong, nor by the will of the strength of a single political party, regardless of the level of the majority does it represent. The greatness of the national vision is strongly linked to the greatness of the people and his ability to constantly work to gain a new democratic spaces” (Zeroual 2019).

There is a latent structural conflict that has affected Algerian liberal democracy, a conflict that has manifested itself between the original democratic tradition based on equality among all

members of one people, centered around basic categories such as: “rule of the people,” “popular sovereignty,” and “the will of the masses” as a single, morally equal whole. And between the liberal conception of democracy based on freedom, which - according to this point of view - may have reduced democracy to liberal elements only: “political freedoms, individual rights, freedom of expression, the centrality of institutions, parties in political practice, and the separation of powers.” here the structural conflict has been singled a spectrum out from the rest of the spectrums that make up Algerian society.

The late Libyan leader was more refined in his analysis of the phenomenon of populism in general than what senior analysts had imagined. He was very clear regarding democracy, which means rule by the people, or rather rule by the majority of the people, which has become a liberal hostage and subject to several constitutional restrictions. On the one hand, the Algerian constitution stipulates for example, the sanctity of individual freedom, the unconstitutionality of any law proposed by the majority that affects freedoms, minorities, private property, and freedom of media and opinion, On the other hand, politics was practiced through intermediary institutions such as parties, parliaments, and non-professional politicians, which led to the emergence of a political class that acted as an intermediary between the people and the head of political power. In this context, the Libyan Colonel says:

“The solution: is for the people to be the instrument of governance... from the Basic People’s Congresses to the General People’s Congress, for the government administration to end, and be replaced by the popular committees. The General People’s Congress should be a national conference in which popular congresses and popular committees meet. If there is a deviation from the law of society in such a system, it is dealt with through democratic review, not through force. The process here is not a process of voluntary selection of the method of change or treatment, but rather an inevitable result of the nature of this democratic system, as in such a case there is no party outside of another to direct acts of violence or hold it responsible for deviation” (qtd. Gaddafi 1977).

Conclusion.

Algerian populism has been able to present a discourse that is completely different from the way things were, this is the result of intertwined and complex factors, the most important of which is shocking clarity and frankness. These are characteristics that politicians do not prefer, but they are at the core of the nature of the Algerian people bold. More important than that is the direct discourse that came as a result of the populists' practice with the modern media, as they realized that the general public no longer believes the biased traditional media, they also no longer want more diplomatic speeches because they are false formations. Thus, the media, social media, and others are nothing but carefully selected patterns of awareness, as they actually showed the opposite of what they were concealing, so, the technology and the values of globalization did not bring more values of freedom and justice to Algerians in general, nor did they achieve a value revolution with real directions that serve the common good. On the contrary, these means have contributed to more misunderstanding of what matters are, more than that, they have unleashed an unconscious principle among the people of one people.

It was, and will still be the Algerian populism always means choosing citizens voluntarily to the approach of amending, evaluating, replacing or dropping the deviant democratic path, its fake legal and constitutional tools, based on the cases of the emotional horse against the prevailing elites, as it prevailed in 2019. This is based on the embodiment of the populist concept in the Algerian situation and its crises away from all forms of importing Western thought and employing it within the Algerian political field, despite this, the concept of populism is not the term through which we can understand the political transformations in Algeria, especially since this term has not been granted it defines things and trends with specific names, but rather gave them more mixing and chaos, this is what actually embodied in the 2019 movement.



Chapter III:

Data analysis and interpretation of the results.

Introduction

The third chapter of our research relied on the data analysis strategy, which is an exploratory and interpretive process that aims to understand patterns, trends, and relationships within a set of data. Therefore, we used graphical analysis in the various stages of the research to extract value and make smart decisions based on techniques such as descriptive statistics, exploratory analysis, Iterative analysis, and predictive analysis. This study also focused on graphical analysis primarily as part of the effective decision-making process, same time keeping pace with the digital era, as we believe that this method helps better and easier to understand human behaviors and their trends, thus analyze performance well. This is what ensures the success of performance operations.

We conducted a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the data collected in the previous chapter, using a variety of analytical methods and techniques to understand key relationships and trends in the data. As we focused on our conclusions and interpretations of the results and analyzed how these results affect the field of study and scientific applications. We also presented graphs and developed appropriate statistical tables and proportional area charts (circles) to support the results and recommendations that were presented in the previous chapter.

Therefore, we hope that the reader will gain a deep understanding of the subject of Algerian populism discourse by studying the growth and escalation of populist theories locally and their impact on changing the authoritarian regime that existed in 2019. We hope that the reader shall be able to extract value and make the right decisions based on data-based evidence.

1. Research design

The main goal of this study is to know the extent of the growth of Algerian populism theories and their prominent role in building the modern Algerian state. This research included a brief reference to the roots of Algerian populism and its continuity over two hundred years, but the study focused mainly on the period of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 1999- 2019 is considered a pivotal and essential period for the study. So, to accomplish this modest work, and to give a kind of credibility to our efforts, we relied on both descriptive and qualitative methods by diversifying samples at the national level. This study included different samples that touched almost all segments of Algerian society, whether University students, Research Professors, Politicians, Employees, Retirees, Representatives of the Algerian parliament, Journalists, the

economic and health sectors, and others, to answer a series of questions that varied between interviews, dialogues, and electronic questions based on voting.

2. Population and Sampling

The study was conducted on 3018 people, which represents the total number of participants in this scientific research. They frankly played a decisive role in achieving the success and validity of this study (Thanks to them). For us, they represent a diverse group of experiences and knowledge, this is what we targeted from the first moment when we chose this topic, as they first enhance cooperation between them, secondly, they contribute significantly to achieving and giving reliable and comprehensive results. This participation targeted experts in the field and representatives of civil society, in addition to involving academic, economic, and health institutions, by using their diverse knowledge, experiences and exploiting them to the fullest extent to make this study a success. This is what made this research different from its predecessors in terms of cognitive content.

2.1 Sample

The sample that participated in this research was random groups from various provinces of the country, divided into nine (9) categories, each category indicating a specialty that the study deems generalizable later. These categories are composed of: University professors, University students, Employees, Parliamentarians, Politicians, Journalists, Health sector, Economic sector, in addition to category entitled Others, as shown in the attached figure, with a total of 3018 participants.

Table 1: A table showing the ranks of the study participants.

		Questions			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	7	.2	.2	.2
	2.00	114	3.8	3.8	4.0
	3.00	46	1.5	1.5	5.5
	4.00	17	.6	.6	6.1
	5.00	136	4.5	4.5	10.6
	6.00	71	2.4	2.4	13.0
	7.00	514	17.0	17.0	30.0
	8.00	594	19.7	19.7	49.7
	9.00	1519	50.3	50.3	100.0
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0	

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

3. Data tools gathering

To answer the proposed research questions, we tried to find appropriate tools that could help us conclude the research with appropriate results. We used a descriptive design that chose to determine the relationship between Algerian populism and Algerian culture. We administered a questionnaire electronically, away from the traditional method that relies on distributing papers to the target sample, which we see as an ineffective method and was not at the required level given that it is a comprehensive national study. As it is a very expensive method in terms of material, effort and time, so we replaced the paper questionnaire with an electronic questionnaire, the results were much better in terms of time, effort, money and achieving the desired results. We do not hide the truth, the responses were very impressive for all expectations, as the study exceeded the target limits by twofold.

3.1 Questionnaire

This questionnaire aims to examine the extent to which citizens and students in particular know the impact of populism on their social, political lives and their backgrounds. The questionnaire included eighteen (18) dichotomous questions (Yes/No), to which the participant must place a check mark in front of it or in the appropriate box or answer only Yes or No. The voting participant also had the right to request assistance from the researcher, especially to clarify words with difficult meanings. The study also included questionnaires directed to influential figures in Algerian political life and academic ones. The study also discussed a question and issue orally in dialogues that brought together the researcher with a group of professors from various universities and colleges affiliated with higher education.

4. Implementation

In fact, this study was conducted in more than one location because it took on a national character. We tried to focus our efforts on specific places characterized by the weight of the figures participating in this study. The University of Khenchela was represented by the Faculty of Humanities, In addition to the faculties of political science and law, the University's main complex at Hamma has two places to hold many meetings and dialogues, We also held remotely meetings dialogue technology with political, parliamentary figures and journalists from the capital Algiers, and some other states, Without neglecting the elite of higher education

professors from the universities of Skikda, Ain Temouchent, Batna, Tlemcan, Bachar, Ouargla, Chlef, Bouira, Illizi, Djelfa...etc.

5. Data analysis/interpretation of results/analytical results of the phenomenon of Algerian populism, analysis of the study (Questionnaire).

The data was processed in the form of relative tables and proportional Area Chart (circles), accompanied by an in-depth explanation of the nature of these tables and circles. It is an analytical reading far from any bias, whether or not, we have translated the effort we made in the field into explanatory news words and sentences of the nature of the events that Algeria witnessed only. The information was also presented and analyzed according to the way the items were arranged in the questionnaire.


To answer the study question: Is there a relationship between Algerian populism and conservative ideology? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

Table (2) Shows the number and percentage of votes for populism with conservative ideology.

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	1	.0	.0	.0	5	5	1.33	4.49
Strongly disagree	385	12.8	12.8	12.8				
Strongly agree	2632	87.2	87.2	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (02), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that there is a relationship between populism and conservative ideology in Algeria. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.33), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.33–4.49). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1. (See Table No 02, P.134)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 02

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants’ answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2,632 of the study’s participants, i.e. a total of 87.2%, believe that there is a relationship between populism and conservative ideology in Algeria. The relationship between populism and conservative ideology in Algeria is strong. Therefore it is understood from their comments which unveiled that this strong relationship has actually played a large

Figure 15: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the first question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

and important role in shaping Algerian society and its stability, especially during the days of the movement in 2019, so the way in which the populists practiced and continue to practice their politics is correct method according to these voting processes. However, 385 of them, i.e. a total of 12.8% of participants, see exactly the opposite, which they reject the fact that there is a relationship between populism and conservative ideology in Algeria.

This study concluded beyond any doubt that populism in Algeria cannot in any way be linked to specific voters, confined to a specific political style, or described with socio-psychological characteristics. It is not a comprehensive ideology (in the purely neutral and descriptive sense) as is socialism in the East or liberalism in the West; nor it can be linked to neoliberalism. Rather, what the study found is that there is actually a strong connection and link between populism and conservative ideology in Algeria. This is what makes it a rare type of populism compared to the rest of the populisms in the world, this talk is circulating in Algeria today at the official level, i.e. the systemic level, meaning that there is a link between conservative ideology and populism. But what must be said is that the conservative ideology in Algeria has not yet been controlled at the conceptual level. While populism in Algeria has a special and specific logic that has not been properly controlled either, there is a reliable approach to dealing with so-called populism. Everyone must understand that populists in Algeria are not only hostile to elites, but also fundamentally hostile to pluralism. Their constant claim, even their slogan, says: "We - and only we - represent the true people," as evidenced by the fact that their political positions usually end directly to discrimination in terms of the principle of moral not in terms of the principle of politics, meaning that they distinguish between right and wrong, not between the right and left wings as it is politically popular.

This is what the people actually lived in 2019, the evidence for this is that the people expelled those cartoon characters who tried to exploit the movement to become its leader, such as Zubaida Assoul, Bouchachi Mustafa, Karim Tabou, Amira Bouraoui and many others who tried to stole and adopt populism in Algeria. It was agreed that Most of the Algerian street believes that "they are just mosquitoes hunting in murky ponds". The street judged them, the people executed them politically, here it can be said that Algerian populism is populism with a moral principle rather than populism with a self-interested political principle as understood by the regime of President Bouteflika and his followers. The study also found that the relationship between Algerian populism and conservative ideology actually emerged when populism focused on traditional values and cultural security. In addition to the emphasis on preserving and defending the national and cultural identity of the people, it can therefore be said that strengthening cultural and political dialogue has become necessary to enhance mutual

understanding and communication, and to enhance education to stimulate tolerance and respect for cultural diversity.


To answer the study question: Is Algerian populism a comprehensive idea or is it an idea hostile to pluralism? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table (3) Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of inclusive populism and its opposition to pluralism.**

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	1	.0	.0	.0	5	5	1,35	4,46
Strongly disagree	401	13.3	13.3	13.3				
Strongly agree	2616	86.7	86.7	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (03), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian populism a comprehensive idea and is it an idea hostile to pluralism. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.35), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.35 – 4.46).




Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 03

The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 03, P.135)

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) comes to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2,616 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 86.7%, believe that populism is a comprehensive idea and hostile to pluralism. Therefore, it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that this proposal has negatively affected Algerian society and its stability, especially during the days of the movement in 2019. Therefore the way in which the populists practiced and continue to practice their politics is incorrect according to these voting processes.

Figure 17: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the second question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

However, 401 of them, i.e. a total of 13.3% of participants, see exactly the opposite, meaning that they reject the idea of populism's inclusiveness and anti-transgression in Algeria.

From this perspective, and according to what the study concluded, democracy and representation in Algeria are two different ideas, this is based on what the Algerian people believed in 2019, so say those subjected to the opinion poll that we conducted with them, according to them, they are two parallel ideas that will never meet, no matter how long they extend. However, it is necessary to emphasize that the idea of representation in itself is not a democratic principle, this is always according to their perspective, the evidence for this is that true democracy says “no on behalf of the people.” Populists are also not enemies of the principle of representation, i.e. they also share the same violation with the authority in power at the time, that is, they are in conflict with correct democracy, as is the case with the ruling authority in 2019, equally. This evidenced by the fact that when these populists sit in the opposition chairs are asserting the people that are represented by the false and corrupt elites, this is the aspect of

the agreement that unites the populists and Bouteflika’s authority despite divergence is in principle, not in the goal.


To answer the study question: Is the idea of democracy in Algeria the representation of the people? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- Table (4) shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of democracy and representation.

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	1	.0	.0	.0	5	5	1,34	4,47
Strongly disagree	394	13.1	13.1	13.1				
Strongly agree	2623	86.9	86.9	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (04), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the democracy and representation are two different ideas. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.34), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.34 – 4.47). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 04, P.135)




Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 04

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2623 of the study participants, or a total of 86.9%, believe that "democracy and representation" are two different ideas, Thus it can be understood from their answers which unveiled that this major difference or difference had a large and important role in shaping the political thought of Algerian society, especially during the days of the movement in 2019, therefore, the method followed by Algerian populism is a correct according to these voting processes. However, 394 of them, i.e. a total of 13.1% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they reject the idea that "democracy and representation" are two different ideas.

From what the participants in this study said, it can be said that the majority of the Algerian people do not believe at all in representative democracy as an approach that leads them towards achieving their interests, as evidenced by the fact that democracy is based on certain principles, the most important of which is that citizens choose the person who will represent them and defend their opinions, through the elected person, for example, These citizens can present their ideas and opinions to the official, if the views of these citizens are not taken into account, They can express their opinion and complain to their representative. This is the true definition of representative democracy, it is a prevailing model in Algeria. Accordingly, legislative bodies can take their opinion into account, thus citizens have an oversight role, forcing elected representatives to act based on the opinions, ideas and policies of citizens.

But the reality that led to the unprecedented growth of populism is this democracy itself, the people's representatives in Parliament do not have a voice or an eye to see them from the day of their election until the end of their parliamentary term (Khenchela Sample). Therefore, the votes of elected officials in a representative democracy do not always reflect Will of the people, Officials are not legally obligated to vote the way the people who elected them want, which

Figure 19: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the third question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

means that their will may not be implemented, and their only option is to wait out the official's term, vote for someone else and remove him from office. This has been the process since independence, but its intensity decreased dramatically during the era of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika.


To answer the study question: Is populism against representation? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table (5) shows the number and percentage of those who voted for the idea of representation or not among the populists.**

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	1	.0	.0	.0	5	5	1,40	4,42
Strongly disagree	436	14.4	14.4	14.5				
Strongly Agree	2581	85.5	85.5	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (05), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian populism is against representation. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.40), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.40 – 4.42). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 05, P.135)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 05

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2581 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 85.5%, believe that populism in Algeria is hostile to representation. Therefore it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that this strong hostility has actually played a large and important role in neutralizing the populists and blocking the way for them to reach power, especially in 2019, so the way the populists practiced and continue to practice their politics is unacceptable according to these voting processes. However, 436 of them, i.e. a total of 14.5% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they reject the fact that there is anti-populism for the principle of representation.

Figure 21: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the fourth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

The existing debate in Algeria about the true nature of populism practiced in the field, through this study, a question posed spontaneously in 2019 by one of the demonstrators in one of the streets of the city of Khenchela was answered: Is populism against representation? Then another demonstrator responded to him: Perhaps there are movements with good intentions that want to represent the people, not lead them in a real way. But what is certain, the respondent adds, is that there are elements who are exploiting the situation in order to penetrate and spread their ideas among the masses in order to change their opinion towards appointment instead of representation, they are those calling for the transitional period. The truth of this matter put us at the time in confusion, because we did not actually have an answer, all we had at the time. It is our slogans and our insistence on the departure of the regime. The answer came five years later to confirm that populism is indeed against representation, which is what this study concluded.


To answer the study’s question: Is the “dysfunction of systemic institutions” an excuse for populists to gain power? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (6): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the concept of dysfunction of formal institutions as a pretext for populists to gain power.**

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	1	.0	.0	.0	5	5	1,35	4,47
Strongly disagree	398	13.2	13.2	13.2				
Strongly agree	2619	86.8	86.8	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (06), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the “dysfunction of systemic institutions” an excuse for populists to gain power. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.35), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.35 – 4.47). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 06, P.135)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 06


The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2619 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 86.8%, believe that the "dysfunction of regular institutions" in Algeria is a strong pretext exploited by populists. Therefore it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that these defects have actually played a large and important role in the growth of the Algerian populist theory, especially during the days of the movement in 2019, the way in which the populists practiced and practice their politics is an acceptable method as a result of a defect in the regular institution according to these voting processes.

Figure 23: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the fifth question



السؤال الخامس: هل يعتبر "خلل المؤسسات النظامية" ذريعة للشعبيين للوصول للحكم؟

3,018 رداً



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

However, 398 of them, i.e. a total of 13.2% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they reject the reality of the principle of populism exploiting the defect of the regime's institutions in Algeria as a pretext for gaining power.

Therefore, always and forever we see the party outside power, the majority of which represents the populists, lurking around the ruling authority through its constant endeavor to trivialize its achievements, to facilitate the process of pulling the rug under its feet to replace it, this is what is usually known as criticism directed at the fake representatives, which in turn results in a radical critique of democratic institutions. In this case, as we have said before, the populists are also a party in the political arena and are the most affected because they represent the silent majority concerned (or rather, all the people). According to this study, the majority of its participants believe that this damage is exploited by these populists as a direct justification to confirm that institutions undoubtedly suffer from a defect that requires their intervention, so, it is a direct cause of escalation, meaning that it is a real pretext that paves the way for the

populists to reach power, while the minority went to contrary to what was confirmed by the majority participating in this study.


To answer the study question: Did Algerian populism exploit some special terms such as representation, representation, the necessity of appointing a leadership, etc. during crises, and interpreted them according to their needs to reach power? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (7): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of populism exploiting terminology to reach power.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagree	391	13.0	13.0	13.0	5	5	1,34	4,48
	Strongly agree	2627	87.0	87.0	100.0				
Total		3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (07), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian populism exploit some special terms Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.34), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.34 – 4.48). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 07, P.135)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 07

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2627 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 87%, believe that Algerian populism exploited terms such as representation, prosecution, etc., which was interpreted according to their needs to reach power. Thus, it is understood from their comments which unveiled that this strong exploitation has actually played a role. It is a major and important factor in inciting the Algerian street and its instability, especially in 2019, so the way in which the populists practiced and continue to practice their politics is unacceptable according to these voting processes. However, 391 of them, i.e. a total of 13% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they reject the fact that populism exploits terminology to gain power.

Figure 25: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the sixth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

Simply, according to this questionnaire, the answer was generally “Yes.” The leadership emanating from the populists exploited some special terms such as representation, prosecution, the necessity of appointing a leadership and others during crises, interpreting it according to their needs in order to reach power. They understood - perhaps - that the relationship of representation is tantamount to a forced mandate for them. According to this principle, the will of the people must simply be implemented

“Unfortunately, the Algerian populists have understood that the relationship of popular representation is a relationship of coercive delegation to them, this is what prompted them to move forward”.

on the ground, a percentage of 10 % of the total subjects of the study affirmed that this perception of representing the will of the people is wrong, because there is no such coordinated

individual will of the people on the ground, this is why populists prefer, and tend to, symbolic representation of the people. According to their opinion, the real people must be extracted from the general population, by this they mean - perhaps - only the serious class of the masses, such as the Novemberites, the Boumediens, the Islamists, the Badis, etc., that is, those who represent the real people.


To answer the study question: Did populism in Algeria depend on the symbolic perception of the people as a political method?

- **Table No. (8): Shows the number and percentage of votes, along with the concept of populists’ exploitation of symbolic perception.**

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid Strongly disagree	416	13.8	13.8	13.8	5	5	1,37	4,44
Strongly agree	2602	86.2	86.2	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (08), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the populism in Algeria depend on the symbolic perception of the people as a political method Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.37), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.37 – 4.44). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931out of 1. (See Table No 08, P.135)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 08

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2602 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 86.2%, believe that populism in Algeria relied on the principle of symbolic perception that usually leads to inflaming the street. Therefore, it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that this strong perception has actually played a large and important role in the growth of Algerian populism, especially in 2019, so the way the populists practiced and continue to practice their politics is unacceptable according to these voting processes. However, 416 of them, or a total of 13.8% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they reject the reality of the existence of the principle of symbolic perception in Algerian populism.

As a preliminary conclusion, our study concluded that Algerian populism also uses the symbolic perception of the people against the ruling elite and existing institutions. It is a political method that does not differ from the same method that the elite resorts to gain power, they are two sides of the same coin their goal is power and survival. The perception that Algerian populism calls for, which is based on the existence of a real and morally pure people, is truly ridiculous. Let us assume for the sake of argument that this proposition is true to some extent. How can it be refuted on a realistic level? This is the dysfunction that populists fall into.

To answer the study's question: If the populists in Algeria gain the power, will they find opposition exactly as is the case with previous governments? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:


Perhaps, their political style may change

Figure 27: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the seventh question



السؤال السابع: هل اعتمدت الشعبوية في الجزائر على التصور الرمزي للشعب كأسلوب سياسي؟

3,018 ردًا




Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

- **Table No. (9): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of populists assuming power.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Disagree	604	20.0	20.0	20.0	5	5	1,14	4,13
	Agree	804	26.6	26.6	46.7				
	Strongly agreed	1610	53.3	53.3	100.0				
Total		3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (09), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the populists in Algeria in the case of they gain the power, will they find opposite. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.14), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.14–4.13). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.939 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 09, P. 137)




Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 09

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 1610 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 53.3%, believe that if the populists gain the power, they will find opponents, same as it was for those before them, while 804 i.e. 26.6% believe that the populists' style will change once they gain the power. Therefore, it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that this principle has actually played a large and important role in controlling the political thinking of Algerian society, especially in 2019. However, 604 of them, i.e. a total of 20% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they believe that populism will never find anyone to oppose it if it comes to power in Algeria.

The populists in Algeria, according to what we witnessed in 2019, are not opposition parties, or parties that reject the nature of the prevailing rule, also they are not protest parties, not at all. From this standpoint, they cannot be judged to be incapable of managing the rudder of power. This is not a contradiction between what was mentioned above and what we will mention now so as not to miss the mark. According to the questionnaire, the majority confirms that Algerian populism will rule in complete agreement with the internal logic of populism, because they are part of the people, and only they represent the real people. Because they emanated from it, therefore, no legitimate opposition to them could be registered. While others went on to saying that populism will inevitably find someone who opposes it, whether from the former authority that was removed, or from some of the figures affiliated with or affiliated with the former authority, or even from outside the former regime. Those who will justify their opposition positions by disrupting the state's apparatuses and vital institutions by populists, Therefore, it is disrupting the life of the simple citizen. This is a correct proposition to some extent, but it is more materialistic than humanitarian, since the authority that was removed had actually disrupted the lives of the people and left the state institutions as a party that it could exploit in

Figure 29: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the eighth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

times of need to slap the people or part of it when he first moved to demand his rights under existing and effective institutions.


To answer the study’s question: Will populism disrupt the state’s general controls if it takes control of power? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- Table No. (10): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the Algerian people’s response to the idea of the populists’ performance if they come to power.

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Agree	625	20.7	20.7	20.7	5	5	1,27	3,95
	Undecided	638	21.1	21.1	41.8				
	Strongly agree	1755	58.2	58.2	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (10), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that populism disrupt the state’s general controls if it takes control of power. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.27), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.27 – 3.95). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.942 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 10, P. 136)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 10

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 1755 of the study's participants, meaning a total of 58.2%, believe that populism in Algeria will disrupt the general controls of the state in case of they gain the power, while 625, i.e. 20.7% believes that populism does not reached this extent, So, it is understood from their comments which unveiled that this belief has actually played a large and important role in shaping the general perception of the state among Algerian society, especially in 2019. However, 638 of them, i.e. a total of 21.1% of participants, expressed that they were not aware of what was going on.

Figure 31: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the ninth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

Based on what we witnessed in some countries after the populists took control of power, public controls have actually been weakened and they have created an imbalance in public life. We cannot deny that. They have also disrupted some existing institutions. This is true, but populism is accustomed to following a “customer policy.” “It is also their habit to discredit and expose the opposition, whether in civil society or the media. They do this based on clear moral principles. Also, democracy, according to populism, is not the democracy known to the rest of the other movements. According to their perspective, democracy is that “the people must own their state,” and all public services must know their way to the real people, not to those who do not belong to them. Populism also considers that the voices opposing it, whether in the media or civil society, are voices that derive their existence and power from foreign powers, this, according to them, contradicts the original principles of democracy. Therefore, the first thing they do when they seize power is to cut off the roots of these people by completely disrupting such institutions and personalities.


To answer the study question: Do liberalism and populism are two sides of same coin in terms of the processes of excluding opponents? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (11): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the Algerian people’s engagement with the idea of the intersection of populism and liberalism.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagreed	568	18.8	18.8	18.8	4	4	1,48	3,6 3
	Undecided	661	21.9	21.9	40.7				
	Agree	527	17.5	17.5	58.2				
	Strongly agreed	1262	41.8	41.8	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire


From the statistical indicators in Table (11), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (4), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that Liberalism and Populism are two sides of the same coin. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (4–1.48), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.48–3.63). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.952 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 11, P. 136)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 11

The attached chart translates the participants' answers into numbers. Note that this question has more than one answer at the same time, so the voting percentage in this question reached 148.5%, with a total of 4481 votes from participants. Therefore, there are 1463 participants who chose two or more axes in this question. Accordingly, 1,143 of the study's participants, a total of 37.9%, believe that populism and liberalism are two sides of the same coin. As for 676 participants, or 22.4%, they confirm that populism is different from what is promoted. While a total of 1,031, or 34.2%, believe that channels of dialogue should be opened between them. While a total of 191 participants, equivalent to 6.3%, said that the law must be activated to eliminate regionalism. As for 1,440 participants, or 47.7%, they do not know the truth about what is going on between liberalism and populism.

Figure 33: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the tenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

From what was mentioned above, it can be said that those who follow Algerian political issues closely will find that there is a hidden conflict between the liberals and the populists. The Algerian liberals have actually carried out operations to exclude the opposition populist groups. This statement is not without a problem, those who oppose this proposition is made without clear evidence. He is an opportunistic politician lurking in the seat of power at the expense of the authority, the people, and the opposition themselves. Algerian liberals are extremely sensitive to everything linked to moral issues, they accuse populists of psychological

complexity. Therefore, they exclude them in the name of morality, just as populists morally exclude some citizens among the true and harmonious people. In this regard, the professor of economics at the University of Djelfa, Algeria, says: *“If we really want to change, not return to the vicious circle, we must invest in the euphoria of the movement (Hirak), moving to moral action derived from the movement (Hirak)”* (Shibout 2024). What is true is that channels of communication must be created between them instead of stripping the moral credibility of the populists. Liberals must first discuss the populists, or at least in order to get closer to the facts - to understand what is really going on. This was absent during the era of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, especially after he announced his candidacy for a fifth presidential term, which inflamed the situation. In cases where populists or liberals practice exclusion, the law must intervene, this also does not exist in Algeria, or it is inactive if it is a draft kept in the archives. The law must be implemented, even if the order is issued by a specific individual. The demands of the people must be taken seriously, taking into account seriously the alleged concerns of citizens based on the simmering conflict between the liberals and the people, which is based on accepting foreigners and dual nationals to run the state.


To answer the study question: Which of the currents is right regarding the existing conflict between liberals and populists, whose basis is the acceptance of foreigners and dual nationals to run the state? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (12): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of the right of populists and liberals to include dual nationalities in the running of the state.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagreed	522	17.3	17.3	17.3	5	5	1,50	4,2 6
	Agree	132	4.4	4.4	21.7				
	Strongly agreed	2364	78.3	78.3	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (12), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that populists current have the right. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.50), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.50–4.26). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.952 out of 1 according Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 12, P. 136)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 12

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2140 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 70.9%, believe that the Algerian populist wing has the full right regarding the acceptance of foreigners and dual nationals to run the state, while 132, i.e. 4.4% of them believe that both the populists and liberals are correct. Thus, it is understood from their

Figure 35: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the eleventh question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire comments which unveiled that there is a major intellectual conflict between these wings over the principle of management and governance, especially in 2019. However, 522 of them, i.e. a total of 17.3% of participants, see the exact opposite, meaning they see the both wings are wrong regarding foreigners running the state. While the rest ratio which is 225, i.e. 7.5% sees that the liberal wing has the full right concerning this issue.

Indeed, Algeria witnessed such a conflict, especially during the era of President Bouteflika, those with dual nationality were able to run the state directly in important leadership and sovereign positions, so a self-contradiction occurred, which is based on the exclusion of those who seek the exclusion of others. Here it can be said that the state witnessed a setback and fundamental weakness, in the democratic position - the Algerian liberal movement wants to include everyone into part, which means subjecting everyone to its opinion! This is what the people did not accept, despite these people exercising their duties. It's really terrible, it's not very convincing to the populists. Liberals assume that whoever owns a country's passport or has lived there for a long time necessarily belongs to it,

“What distinguishes populism from other wings is that it pushes people to think rationally about what these people really want from democracy”.

this is not only the perception of Algerian liberals, but of all liberals in the world. This is their criterion of belonging - while the Algerian populists consider this moral recklessness, they present a moral essence represented in the formula “The sincere Algerian who works must belong to the real Algerian people!” Thus, the Algerian liberal democrats found themselves facing one of the most difficult philosophical paradoxes of Algeria's young democracy compared to the populists. The professor of economics at the University of Djelfa, Algeria, said in an interview with the researcher, *“It is necessary to move towards the actual embodiment of moral movement in terms of practice and implementation in all domains and sectors, until the true vision of social movement is complete, instead of staying in talking about the details and wasting the golden opportunity for the existing movement action”* (Shibout 2024). Hence, the controversy exists, so these and those, whether the opposition, the authorities, or even the populists themselves, must understand that the questions of democratic integration, and what is meant by integration here are those with dual citizenship, cannot be resolved democratically. Because whoever says that the limits of democracy are from the heart of the people alone, are determined by the people and no one else, must first determine who are those who belong to this people? Who will lead this people? So that people can understand what it is about? This is the question that was widely posed in Algeria, which the Bouteflika regime was unable to answer, or at least avoid, this question is also considered one of the questions that incited the street against his regime.


To answer the study question: Does Algeria have a true democratic system emanating from popular authority? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (13): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of Algeria having a democratic system emerging from popular authority.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagreed	255	8.4	8.4	8.4	5	5	1,12	4,46
	Agree	585	19.4	19.4	27.8				
	Strongly agreed	2178	72.2	72.2	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (13), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that Algeria did not possess a true democratic system emanating from popular authority. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.12), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.12 – 4.46). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.935 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 13, P. 136)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 13

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants’ answers into numbers. Accordingly, 1451 of the study’s participants, a total of 48%, believe that Algeria does not have a democratic system at all, while a total 728, i.e. 24.1% of them said that Algeria has a strange democracy system. Thus it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that Algerians are divided over the existence of democracy in their country. However, 255 of them, i.e. a total

Figure 37: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the twelfth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

of 8.4% of participants, believe that Algeria has a correct democratic system, while a total of 585, i.e. 19.4% said that it is difficult to predict the fate of democracy in Algeria.

Democratically, Algerian democracy is neither Greek, European, American, Japanese, nor even African. It is a democracy, but not like all democracies, nor is it similar to those prevalent in the world today! Which means the participation of equal people, without mediation or through the representative system, in governing the city. Nor can it be equated at all with the Western democracies prevailing today, but what we must point out is that Algerian democracy “is a heterogeneous and incomprehensible mixture of features and principles that actually exist between the regime and people based on the principle of achieving special goals, both for the people and for the authority alike”.

Therefore, no one was able to clearly understand what is going on in Algeria. It is a unique and strange democracy of its kind that the world has never experienced before, a democracy based on mediation and the inclusion of people who are intellectually and physically unequal through representation in popular, provinces and national councils all the way to state institutions and agencies. They actually ruled the Municipality, the Province, the Ministry, and the state, thus they ruled society. Therefore, Algerian society, under this strange representative democracy during the era of President Bouteflika, was unable to achieve an optimal form of collective consensus emanating from the prevailing populist thought, despite the passage of twenty years of his rule.

This does not mean that President Bouteflika’s regime was never valid, or is no longer valid. No, we did not say this so that our words would not be interpreted into other meanings, or considered an attack, especially since we do not yet have a regime that meets the people’s ambition. If our words are interpreted with regard to the policy of President Bouteflika, then this is the rule of the losers, since this regime, whether good or bad, is gone forever, but the duty placed upon us as a people is not to leave the field empty for false populists such as Bouchachi Mustafa, Bouraoui Amira, Karim Tabou and other figures. The fake political parties and movements standing on the pavement of life those who claim that they are the only ones capable of fulfilling the original promise of democracy, which is to achieve collective consensus among the people of Algeria with their various political and cultural orientations...they are unable to do so. This is what people said about them in 2019.


To answer the study question: Is populism in Algeria the same as democracy in Algeria? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (14): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the differences between populism and democracy in Algeria.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagree	313	10.4	10.4	10.4	5	5	1,21	4,58
	Strongly agree	2705	89.6	89.6	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (14), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian Populism is one form and democracy is another. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.21), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.21– 4.58). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.935 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 14, P. 136)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 14

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2705 of the study's participants, meaning a total of 89.6%, believe that populism is one form and democracy is another. Therefore, it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that there is a great awareness among Algerian society regarding the differences in democracy and the theories that try to distort it, especially in 2019. However, 313 of them, a total of 10.4% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they believe that the democracy in Algeria is the same as populism.

Figure 39: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the thirteenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

As mentioned in this research above, we are not legitimizing this or that regime as some people think, but rather we are in an analytical study of what happened in reality during twenty years of rule by an authority “with known staff, unknown leaders, and amputated politicians,” where stark and fundamental contradictions between populism and democracy in Algeria. Through our research, we have recorded a terrifying divergence between these two concepts or terms. Algerian democracy, especially under the rule of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, violated basic political rights, broke the foundations and rules of the state's rule for itself, then the state's rule for its people. It allowed the presence of strange entities that practiced blind loyalty. Political vice was practiced in the form of new lobbies, but they were rejected by populists. It is not democracy at all. Perhaps it is something else that we have never seen before. Therefore, we can say that we have lived in a strange era for twenty years. Democracy without commitment to civil and political liberties is not democracy. In Algeria, the people's opponents are always part of the game, they are always at the top of the list, whether you like it or not. There is no escape. Algerian democracy is unlike the world's democracies. In Algeria, the majority actually turned into a minority, and the minority turned into a majority. Outwardly there is a people

ruling, but inwardly there is no rule by the people! This was the Algerian political scene during the era of President Bouteflika.


To answer the study question: In light of this conflict and existing political distortion, can populism become a democratic model in Algeria? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- Table No. (15): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of modeling populism democratically.

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid Strongly disagreed	317	10.5	10.5	10.5	4	4	1,16	4,12
Agree	1383	45.8	45.8	56.3				
Strongly agree	1318	43.7	43.7	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					


Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (15), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (4), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that Populism is the way to dictatorial rule with 45.8% and 43.7 for those who said that the Populism is a distortion of facts. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (4 – 1.16), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.16 – 4.12). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.936 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 15, P. 136)



The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 1383 of the study's participants, i.e. a total of 45.8%, consider populism to be another face of dictatorship, while 35.1% see it as a distortion of the facts. This means 80.9% of the participating people see it as a danger. However, 317 of them, a total of 10.5% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is, they believe that it could be a great model. While 260 of them; i.e. 8.6% expressed that Algerian populism cannot become a model of governance.

Figure 41: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the fourteenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

So, in light of this conflict, the existing and mutual political distortion between these and those, we are truly faced with many speculations, the most prominent of which is can populism become a democratic model in Algeria? With a little unusual frankness, let us say that Algerian populism, if we go to the domain together, is not capable of being democratic! Why? Because the majority it represents is not a majority compared to the rest of the other majorities present in the political arena. Algerian populism only intoxicates the “good” majority.

Therefore, it can be said that Algerian populism is, on the one hand, a distortion of the principle of the existing majority, on the other hand, a distortion of the existing constitutional institutions! If it comes to power, it may open the doors to renter rule, as was the case during the era of President Bouteflika. Or it may usher in a long-term authoritarian rule that may also turn into a bloody dictatorial rule that believes in iron and fire, given that this populism relies on a popular base that is intolerant of opposition and disdains pluralism, this is what we actually learned from the street during the months of movement in Algeria.


To answer the study question: According to your belief, do you accept that parties, organizations and other political figures that witnessed the 2019 movement become representatives of the people to achieve their demands? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (16): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of the people accepting those who lived through the 2019 movement to assume power to achieve their interests.**

Options for the question asked		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid	Strongly disagreed	319	10.6	10.6	10.6	5	5	1,26	4,04
	Undecided	429	14.2	14.2	24.8				
	Agree	749	24.8	24.8	49.6				
	Strongly agreed	1521	50.4	50.4	100.0				
	Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (16), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the majority of Algerian people neglecting them with 50.4%, while the those who does not accept them at all have 24.8%. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.26), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.26 – 4.04). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.935 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 16, P. 137)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 16

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 1521 of the study participants, a total of 50.4%, believe that the majority of the Algerian people reject them, while 749, i.e. 24.8% of the participants expressed their final refusal to become their representatives. Thus, it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that a total of 75.3 of the participants do not have confidence in populism. However, 319 of them, or a total of 10.5% of participants, saw exactly the opposite that is, that they accepted these people to become their representatives, while a total of 14.2% expressed their lack of knowledge.

Figure 43: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the fifteenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

According to the opinion of the participants in the opinion poll we conducted, a large number of Algerians rejected the “Stealing” of their demands by some political parties affiliated with the opposition, such as the “TAJ” Party, for example, or those that represent a specific movement, such as the Islamic Movement, which is no longer popular with its declining roles. And his chances of persuasion compared to previous years. The “expulsion of Abdullah Djaballah” incident demonstrated that the demonstrators reject the attempt of the “Brotherhood of Algeria” to ride the wave of massive popular protests that Algeria witnessed, which came against the backdrop of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to extend the “fourth term” and postpone the presidential elections without any constitutional basis. Based on this political and realistic fact, the Algerian demonstrators refused the involvement of any opposition party in their popular movement, because they believed - perhaps - that they were merely a front and a tool in the hands of the ruling regime, which made some political analysts confirm that the street movement in Algeria had actually surpassed all institutions and parties.

This was evident in the slogans raised by the demonstrators in the first four marches of the movement, most of which revolved around the necessity of maintaining peace and rejecting all forms of violence, or falling into the trap of partisanship or regional and ethnic conflicts that do not serve their movement. The director of Akhbar Al-Watan newspaper said in an intervention specific to the memorandum, *“Different political, ethnic, and intellectual groups tried to control the movement and its goals, this can be seen in the shift that occurred in the slogans raised after the first four weeks”* (Twaiqer, 2024),



Figure 44: A sign showing the demonstrators' rejection of political parties

What this study found after three months of research that Algerian populism “is a discourse, not an ideology.” It has transcended the usual political and social divisions. Therefore, analyzing the term Algerian populism as a language of political discourse has confirmed that it did not come from a specific ideology nor from a specific program, but rather it came from the composition of the false and deceptive discourse circulating mostly in cafes, which fed on the economic decline experienced by President Bouteflika’s regime. Therefore, it is a political phenomenon that appeared only when the crises that the existing regime is going through.


To answer the study’s question: Are the Algerian government and people heading towards becoming a populist country? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- Table No. (17): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of populism of the Algerian state or not.

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid Strongly disagree	453	15.0	15.0	15.0	5	5	1,42	4,40
Strongly agree	2565	85.0	85.0	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (17), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian government and people heading towards becoming a populist country. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5–1.42), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.42–4.40). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.931 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 17, P. 137)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 17

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2,565 of the study's participants, or a total of 85%, believe that the Algerian both government and people are heading toward becoming a populist country par excellence. Therefore it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that this strong trend may have been translated into complete harmony between the military institution and the people in 2019. However, 453 of them, i.e. a total of 15% of participants, see exactly the opposite that is they believe that Algeria is very far to be a populist country.

Figure 46: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the sixteenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

The person who says that there is a final standard for political affiliation, himself is a person who lacks both the democratic and political compass. This is what one of the professors who refused to include his name in the research said when answering our question. The Algerian liberals have truly lost their compass. They were able to get lost when they presented weak arguments against the populists to exclude them from power. Therefore, most of the respondents ask: Is there a democracy that emerged from nothing? Is there something in this life that does not have an opposite? If the answer is “yes,” then how can things be known if they do not have opposites? This is what the Algerian liberals fell into explicitly when they believed that they were the most worthy and capable of leading Algeria without anyone else, which gave birth to populist thought and paved the way for it to grow and escalate to the level of the movement. What the whole world knows is that democracy was based on a philosophical idea, not a political one. In other words, democracy is hostile to dictatorship, so many forms of injustice accidentally created what is called the term democracy today. Here, the professor of economics at the University of Djelfa, Algeria, intersects with this proposal, which he says in his interview in favor of the dissertation “*We must prepare well for the post-movement phase, moving to the construction phase, not repeat the mistakes of the past until we achieve the desired development breakthrough, restore trust between the people and the authority, through*

respect the laws of the republic within the framework of the theory of right and duty” (Shibout 2024).

This democracy is also a procedure, like all other procedures in human life, which was originally created to correct the forms of injustice that befall human beings. Perhaps, why not, through this democracy it is possible to negotiate new standards of belonging that guarantee the Algerian people the right to exist and coexist with different opinion of life and visions. Instead of speaking with one voice, what is more, it can be said that Algerian populism has actually turned into an influential and decision-making movement, especially in 2019.

Of course, there are no guarantees that we can provide in the long term about these effects, whether they will always go the right way or not. In the short term, there is evidence of this, which is what American Martin Luther King said, *“The path to moral verification is long, but it moves toward justice.”* This is what the Algerian people felt after the period of Bouteflika’s rule, at least at the media level, where news was passed that there are a number of punitive measures being taken here and there against those who try to harm the people. Maybe this is the case, maybe not. It is about citizens who are ready to work for justice and change under the slogan “We are the people.” But at the same time, these authoritarians organized under the banner of liberalism or other political brigades must explain to this people why the populists are excluded every time? When this question is answered frankly, clearly, and accurately, without addition or subtraction, then things will become clearer about those questions that have haunted the Algerian people more than once and in more than one form, but they are fundamental questions for them as a people. Namely, are the Algerian government and people heading towards becoming a populist country? In other words, closer to mind, is the number of Algerian populists increasing? Are populist theories really growing and escalating in light of the tension between the populists and the Algerian elites, whether consciously or not?


To answer the study question: Do Algerian liberals suffer from disorientation when it comes to presenting arguments against populists to exclude them? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- **Table No. (18): Shows the number and percentage of votes concerning the disorientation of Algerian liberals when they present arguments to exclude populists?**

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid Strongly disagree	404	13.4	13.4	13.4	4	4	1,02	3,59
Agree	2614	86.6	86.6	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.

From the statistical indicators in Table (18), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (4), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that the Algerian liberals suffer from disorientation when it comes to presenting arguments against populists to exclude them. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (4–1.02)




Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 18

which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.02 – 3.59). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.933 out of 1 according the Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 18, P.137)

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2614 of the study participants, i.e. a total of 86.6%, believe that the Algerian liberal wing suffers from disorientation, as evidenced by the fact that it presented arguments against the populists to exclude them from the democratic process. Thus it can be understood from their comments which unveiled that the Algerian people have the ability to distinguish between politicians in particular 2019, However, 404 of them, i.e. a total of 13.4% of participants, said that liberal wing has the right to exclude populists from the democratic process.

Figure 48: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the seventieth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

The answer is "Yes". But why? Simply in order to bypass and ignore unwanted responses? Firstly, the nature of the Algerian people is characterized by extreme emotion, secondly, the harshness of the popular responses, which are also characterized by a lack of politeness when it comes to the nation's issues. Therefore, the word "Yes" solves the problem. As for the question related to the growth and escalation of populist theories locally, even this question must be the answer is "Yes" why? Because the field has cut off analysts from all means of intellectual effort to find the answer. To enrich this topic, we must mention that some Algerian politicians, parties, and movements changed their positions between democracy and populism, for example but not limited to "Taj Party," which abandoned the democratic approach and tried to adopt the movement in 2019, but was expelled. In this regard, I reminded the positions of the famous Italian populist Beppe Grillo, who is very similar to Algerian politicians in terms of political beliefs. No way for evasion or denial, especially when he announced that his movement deserves one hundred percent of the seats in the Italian Parliament, but on the other hand, there

are those who say that he is not wrong when he says such things, according to the populist principals, he is right. Therefore, it seems to me as a researcher that he is acting as per Algerian populist manner in particular. There is no doubt about that. So, as we previously said in this research, Algerian populism is an almost unique phenomenon that prompts us to think carefully about what we actually want as a people from the Western democracy that existing among us? Do we have a democracy other than that found in other countries? What do we want to achieve through this populism?

Why does the Algerian populist street not pressure these enlightened democrats to abandon the illusions they are promoting to the people as salvation? To answer these and other questions, we say, quite simply, that populism will continue to exist and grow in an upward direction as long as people continue to live under representative democracies. Therefore, we repeat our statement, populism will continue to exist as long as theatrical plays continue to exist. The representative system is not democratic in itself. In this regard, the late Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi says: *“Representation is deception.”* Historically, “representation” is a quasi-system that preceded democracy into existence. A correct and successful democracy is one that allows all popular demands to emerge publicly and represent themselves, not someone who acts on behalf of the people to achieve for him his interests and demands.


To answer the study question: Does practicing populism mean favoring the people and their principles, or does populism mean using the people against their interests? The data was analyzed and the results were as shown in the following table:

- Table No. (19): Shows the number and percentage of votes on the idea of practicing populism. Is it a preference for the people and their principles, or is it using it to its advantage?

Options for the question asked	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	Mode	Mean	Variation	Rank
Valid Strongly disagree	447	14.8	14.8	14.8	5	5	1,41	4,40
Strongly agree	2571	85.2	85.2	100.0				
Total	3018	100.0	100.0					

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire.


From the statistical indicators in Table (19), it is clear that the arithmetic mean of the axis is (5), which falls within the first category on the five-point scale, which indicates a degree of “Yes”, meaning that the sample members believe that populism mean using the people against their interests. Looking at the participants’ answers to the statements of this axis, we find that they fell into the “Yes” category according to the five-point scale used, with arithmetic averages that ranged between (5 – 1.41), which indicates a lack of homogeneity in the answers to the various items in this axis, and standard deviations that varied between (1.41 – 4.40). The axis items were well established, estimated at: 0.932 out of 1 according to Cronbach's scale. (See Table No 19, P. 137)



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the Table 19

The attached proportional Area Chart (Circle) came to interpret the participants' answers into numbers. Accordingly, 2571 of the study participants, or a total of 85.2%, believe that the Algerian populism utilized the people against their interests. Thus it is understood from their comments which unveiled that the people are able to differentiate between the facts. However, 447 of them, a total of 14.8% of participants, said that the Algerian populism favoring the people and their principles.

Figure 50: A proportional circle representing the percentage of participants in the eighteenth question



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the questionnaire

Algerian populism, especially in the days of the 2019 movement, was a symbolic conception of a theoretical thought based on the complete absence of a charismatic leader and a blindly submissive public behind him. Rather, it was a symbolic conceptual populism that enshrined a society closed in on itself. Therefore, according to those elites whom we interviewed, it is a populism that came to repeat history. it re-presents yesterday in a brighter way. In this regard, the researcher and professor of political science at the University of Algiers³ said in his response to my question: *"I wish you delicious dreams of young democracy"* (Bouhouch 2024), He added, *"We are talking about the current situation... I refuse to talk about the generation that is supposed to arrive in the near or distant future"* (Bouhouch 2024). As for the populist leader, he is a completely absent leader, preserved in the shelves of history, he will not comeback from the past, this is what made him a sacred leader in the eyes and conscience of the masses.

So Algerian populism summarized itself as a movement that does not stand against the state and institutions to replace it, but rather it is a movement that stands against the deviant authority and all the intellectual, technocratic and bureaucratic elites in society that revolve around it, and

does not only recognize the other, but pours all its effort into abolishing and removing him by all means available.

The study also concluded that the phenomenon of populism is considered one of the most prominent diseases of the Algerian democratic system. Rather, it was based on policies, slogans, and incitement campaigns in the name of “the people,” but some of its results actually led to the sabotage of the political, social reality and the demolition of state institutions (the Black Decade). Algerian populist policies have previously placed a man or a specific party, sectarian or ethnic group in the place of the state and its institutions. (Dissolved political Party FIS) It wants to bypass the state, constitutions, and laws in the name of an alleged “popular will,” its most disastrous results were the destruction of the state and its replacement by a “leader or family.”

As a final conclusion reached by the study, it was found that Algerian populism as a movement, with the agreement of the majority of participants, can be described as “political evil” as it is based on misleading the masses. It uses the people against their interests to achieve special goals. It is also based on exploiting the defect of regular institutions and considers it an excuse to attack the state and its institutions. It stands in the face of all elites in society and stifles every voice in it to remain the only voice of the battle.

6. Objectives of the study

To achieve the objectives of the study, we relied on the following:

- Defining the problem and objectives by identifying the central problem and the objectives that the researcher wishes to achieve through this study.
- Literature review: We reviewed previous studies and research related to the topic of the growth of Algerian populist discourse.
- Defining the theoretical framework, which consists of defining the theories and concepts that will be relied upon to guide the research and interpret its results.
- Determine the research method by choosing a field study in addition to qualitative analysis based on the nature of the problem and the objectives of the study.
- Data collection by collecting all the data necessary for the study through the use of appropriate methods such as surveys, interviews, dialogues, document analysis...etc.

- Data analysis: The collected data was analyzed using statistical methods, the main results and outputs were drawn.
- Formulating the results and recommendations: The results were presented in a simple and clear manner, in addition to proposing the necessary recommendations for improvement and development.
- Writing the research report: The final report of the study was written in an organized, logical, and sequential manner that included the research stages, results, recommendations, and references used.

7. Limitation of study

This study focused on pre-defined elements, in order to give credibility to the research, which are as follows:

- **Geographical boundaries:** The study included 58 Algerian states, that is, the administrative component of the Republic of Algeria, including urban and rural areas, with the aim of understanding the interaction of the Algerian masses and society as a whole with populism discourse and its impact on the political and social context of the country, The goal was to secure a comprehensive representation of the Algerian reality and determine the impact of populist discourse on the country level in general
- **Time limits:**
 - ✓ Study period: The study focused on the period of President Bouteflika's rule from 1999 to 2019, specifically included the period that preceded the resignation of President Bouteflika. The goal is to understand the growth of populism discourse before and during the period of popular protests and its impact on the Algerian political system during this critical period in Algeria's life.
 - ✓ Application of the study: This study was applied during the second semester of the academic year (2023/2024).
- **Institutions and stakeholders:** The study included many Algerian political figures, Professors from various Algerian universities, lecturers, party leaders who evaded answering questions, various economic and health sectors, in addition to all segments of Algerian society with their various political and social orientations.
- **Theoretical and applied aspects:** This study combined the theoretical and applied aspects in a balanced manner.
- **Techniques used:**

- ✓ Text analysis: By analyzing politicians' speeches, news reports, and newspaper articles in textual form to understand their content and methods.
- ✓ Data analysis: This study relied on the use of social data and opinion polls to evaluate the public response and the impact of populist rhetoric on the political and social context.
- ✓ Media technologies: content analysis of social networks and media monitoring to understand the influence of the media on spreading populist discourse.
- ✓ Dialogues and interviews: as a tool for collecting data and understanding viewpoints, social and political interactions, their interpretations of the political and social developments that took place in the country during President Bouteflika's term.

- **Study terms:**

- ✓ The growth of Algerian populist discourse: The study worked to understand the extent of the development and growth of the use of populist discourse in the political and media arena.
- ✓ The disintegration of the Bouteflika regime: The study analyzed the transformations of the political system in Algeria during the president's term.
- ✓ The impact of populist discourse: The study examined the extent of the influence of populist discourse on the Algerian public, political and social context of the country.
- ✓ Power and national identity: The study analyzed the relationship between Bouteflika's political system and the formation of national identity in the context of rising populist discourses.
- ✓ The Algerian movement (Hirak): The study examined the extent to which the public and civil society responded to populist discourses and their impact on their behavior.

- **Study tools:**

To achieve the objectives of the study, the electronic questionnaire was used as a tool for the study. After reviewing the relevant literature, the questionnaire was built to answer the research questions. The sections of the questionnaire were divided into five sections, each section containing five paragraphs containing axes starting from two axes up to five axes according to the five-point Likert criterion, as shown in Table (19) below. The data was collected quantitatively and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program.

Table 20: A table showing the Likert scale criterion

Likert scale	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly agree
Code	1	2	3	4	5
Range	1 – 1.80	1.81 – 2.60	2.60 – 3.40	3.40 – 4.20	4.20 - 5

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

8. Reliability of Study

To evaluate whether the reliability coefficient is good or not, it depends on the context and the purpose of the study itself, so, according to Cronbach Alpha reliability statistics the succeed study should be respect the following two items shown down:

- If the reliability coefficient ranges between 0.8 and 1, it is usually acceptable.
- Values above 0.9 are often considered very well

Tbale21: Showing the Reliability Statistics of this Study

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
0.939	18 Questions

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

For the value provided above which fixed by 0.939, it falls within the acceptable range and indicates a very good level of reliability in the study, to due its consideration of the important factors such as sample size and the nature of the data as well.

Table22: Showing scale/ ALL VARIABLES

1. Case Processing Summary

		N	%
Cases	Valid	3018	100.0
	Excluded ^a	0	.0
	Total	3018	100.0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

2. Frequencies Statistics

Question Serial	
N Valid	3018
Missing	0
General Mean of study	7.8088
General Std. Deviation of study	1.75559

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 23: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 01	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is there a relationship between Algerian populism and conservative ideology?	72.38	238.532	.871	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 24: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 02	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is Algerian populism a comprehensive idea or is it an idea hostile to pluralism?	72.40	237.555	.879	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 25: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 03	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is the idea of democracy in Algeria the representation of the people?	72.39	237.685	.883	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 26: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 04	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is populism against representation?	72.45	235.928	.887	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 27: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 05	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is the "dysfunction of systemic institutions" an excuse for populists to gain power?	72.40	237.060	.895	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 28: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 06	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Did populism exploit some special terminology to reach power?	72.39	237.355	.896	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 29: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 07	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Did populism in Algeria depend on the symbolic perception of the people as a political method?	72.42	237.145	.876	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 30: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 08	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
If Algerian populists come to power, will they find opposition just like previous governments?	72.73	256.821	.492	.939

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 31: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 09	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Will populism disrupt the state's general controls if it takes power?	72.91	261.278	.325	.942

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 32: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 10	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Are liberalism and populism two sides of the same coin in terms of processes of exclusion of opponents?	73.23	279.906	-.118-	.952

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 33: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 11	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Which of the currents is right regarding the existing conflict between liberals and populists?	72.60	277.610	-.072-	.952

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 34: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 12	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Does Algeria have a true democratic system emanating from popular authority?	72.40	249.544	.716	.935

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 35: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 13	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Is populism in Algeria the same as democracy in Algeria?	72.28	246.991	.724	.935

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 36: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 14	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
In light of this conflict and existing political distortion, can populism become a democratic model in Algeria?	72.75	249.873	.676	.936

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 37: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 15	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Do you accept that the parties that witnessed the movement become representatives of the people?	72.82	247.369	.687	.935

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 38: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 16	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Are the Algerian government and people heading towards becoming a populist country?	72.47	236.505	.858	.931

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 39: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 17	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Are Algerian liberals suffering from disorientation when it comes to presenting arguments against populists to exclude them?	73.27	247.069	.876	.933

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

Table 40: Showing the Item-Total Statistics

Question N° 18	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Does practicing populism mean favoring the people and their principles, or does populism mean using the people against their interests?	72.46	236.990	.851	.932

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the results of the questionnaire

9. Interpretation of the Teachers' Interview

- **The purpose of the interview:** to understand the influence and growth of Algerian populist discourse from the perspective of professors.
- **Date of the interview:** During the second semester of academic year 2023-2024 the interviews were conducted with a group of Professors, Political, Media, and Reform figures, some of which were via social media platforms and others were direct.
- **Location of interviews:** online and at workplaces as follows:

1. Universities: University of Khenchela (Hamma Complex and Faculty of Social and Human Sciences), Bashar University, University of Tlemcen, University of Djelfa, University of Algiers 3, Oum El Bouaghi University.
2. Official headquarters of political figures: Parliament, France, the headquarters of the Labor Party in the capital, the headquarters of the Association of Algerian Muslim Scholars in the Alger's capital.
3. The official headquarters of media figures: the headquarters of Akhbar El Watan newspaper in the capital, the Bureau of the An-Nahar channel office in Khenchela.
4. The personal residence of the Algerian novelist.

Fourteen professors (14) were interviewed using WhatsApp, Messenger platforms and mobile phone, the others were interviewed directly. Twelve (12) questions were answered to obtain views on the growth of populist theories locally and their impact on the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime according to the following topics:

- First topic: Definitions and roots of Algerian populism.
- Second topic: The reasons for the growth of populist theories locally.
- Third topic: The major transformations of Algerian populism against the Bouteflika regime.
- Fourth topic: The results of the major transformations of Algerian populism during the era of President Bouteflika.

Interpretation

As mentioned, the data instrument used to collect qualitative data in the current investigation is an interview conducted with fourteen Professors at the Universities of Khenchela, Tlemcen, Béchar, Djelfa, Algiers, and Oum El Bouaghi. In addition to Political, Media, Reformist and Novelist figures from cities of Algiers and Annaba.

Participants were given enough time to answer the questions which were very clear as they were asked in simple words. Also, all the questions asked were answered in a systematic and organized manner.

It came in the first theme related to the definition and roots of Algerian populism, so, according to the sample respondents, all of them confirmed that they agreed that Algerian populist

discourse is a discourse directed to the public that uses simple language and targets people's feelings. Most of the interviewed samples also agreed that Algerian populism has historical roots extending back more than 200 years, as the professor of international relations confirmed that it goes back to the era of the Eilats during the Ottoman rule, it also had more than one form through which it became apparent.

As for the second theme, related to the reasons for the growth of populist theories locally, according to the sample respondents, it was found that they were divided into two groups, their answers ranged between affirmation and rejection.

The first group consists of 13 samples, which confirmed that the speech had spread widely, as the following factors contributed to its spread:

- Political issues such as corruption, weak confidence in institutions.
- Economic: such as unemployment and poverty.
- Social: such as regional.

These factors had an impact on both society and politics, as they had a negative impact on social cohesion, in addition to manipulating public opinion and directing public policy in favor of a specific group at the expense of society. This is the opinion of the interviewed samples, while some samples indicated that they believe that the speech is a type of attracting national public opinion to the real problems that the country is experiencing.

The second group: consists of one (1) sample who refused to include her name in the study who confirmed that the Algerian populist discourse was not subjected to harassment, therefore Algerian populism and its growth came by accident as a result of social imbalances, not through the political ones according to her.

The third theme relates to the major transformations of Algerian populism against the Bouteflika regime:

The first group, which included University professors, confirmed that the major transformations of Algerian populism were an inevitable result of the current situation during the era of President Bouteflika, the corruption that Algeria experienced, the collapse of the economic situation, and the political imbalances occurring in power.

The second group, which included political and media figures, which in turn confirmed the same proposition as the university professors participating in this study.

The third group, which included literary and reformist figures, which in turn pointed to the same reasons as political and media analysts.

The fourth theme relates to the reactions and results of the major transformations of Algerian populism during the era of President Bouteflika.

Whereas the first, second, and third groups agreed that the results of the rise of populism were the result of existing corruption, the blockage of dialogue channels, and a complete absence of national spirit, therefore the process of change is an inevitable result. According to the samples, there is an urgent need to strengthen the role of education and the media in confronting populist discourse, so, according to them, there is always agreement on the negative impact of this discourse on society and politics.

Interview recommendations:

The interview concluded with recommendations, the most important of which is improving the current situation by enhancing education and critical thinking, monitoring media content, in addition to implementing broad awareness campaigns in society.

Summary of interviews:


These interviews concluded the following:

1. The interviews showed the necessity of confronting populist discourse through education and media.
2. Analysis of these interviews may help in understanding how to confront populist discourse and its impact on Algerian society.

10. Discussion

This study sought to reveal the experience of the growing Algerian populist discourse during the years of independence up to the period of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's rule, from the point of view of the audience participating in the study. The results of the study showed that the overwhelming majority (87%) confirm that there has actually been a real change in the political arena of Algerian society for years, especially during the period of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. More than one tool was used in the study, the most widely used was the electronic

questionnaire (100%) during the three stages of the study, where ranked the first, Then the Messenger application (60%) where ranked the second, then the WhatsApp and mobile phone applications where ranked the third (43.33%). These tools are considered pioneering in the success of this comprehensive national study. It is one of the reasons that motivated the researcher to continue his study, especially since Algerian society has become an excellent electronic society in terms of using the electronic means in practicing their daily lives.



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on the percentage of using electronic tools during the study.

The results of the study during these periods indicated that electronic use contributed significantly to the success of the study, as the results indicated that (100%) of the participants whom the study was targeting actually ended their participation before the end of the specified time period, this is what motivated the researcher to extend the period. Voting for a second and third period, all of which achieved impressive results (See Figure: 1).

The results also indicated that the percentage of access to the targeted samples was very available in the first stage of the study. Whereas (90 %) of the targets of all groups have responded and dealt positively with the items of study. In the second stage, the response rate in general decreased, as a total of (80 %) of the targets has actually responded to the articles of the study. As for the third stage, the percentage of the targets has declined significantly, as the study itself supervised the end, as the percentage of participants ranged between 20 to 30 %, with the exception of the electronic questionnaire that continued attracting the public until the end of the voting period specified by the study.

The results showed that among the factors that helped the audience to deal with the study were: the motivation of the participants themselves, and the social nature of the topic, in addition to the fact that it is considered a precedent according to what everyone we interviewed said. This result is consistent with what was stated by the former President of the Scholars Association of Algerian Muslim, where he said: *“A brave topic, worthy of contemplation and a precedent in the history of Algerian academic studies”* (Qassoum 2024). All participants confirmed that using technology does not cause them any embarrassment, on the contrary, they are skilled in terms of using technology effectively. This literature confirms that the Algerian digital audience in this era can be called: “Digital native” because technology does not pose any concern to them. Moreover, the remainder who did not participate in the study, despite the researcher’s invitation to them to do so, do not see any benefit in using modern technologies and are indifferent to the importance of the subject. Their percentage was estimated at approximately 10 to 12%.

As for the difficulties faced by the participating audience - according to them - it was poor network connectivity at a rate of (62.9%) roughly. While (37.5%) roughly do not have a device to answer, while (33.2%) suffer from having network connection. This is consistent with a number of studies that showed that there are difficulties which still stand in the way of realizing digital projects, this consistent with what UNESCO has emphasized that *“institutions must... pay attention to bridging the digital gap...”* (UNESCO 2020).

It is noted when reviewing the results that the responses of the participating audience focused on agreeing to some extent to all the study’s questions, as was previously indicated in detail. The reason may be due to the development of cultural awareness among the Algerian public compared to the first and subsequent years of independence.

11. Study Ethical approval

Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Scientific Research Ethics Committee by order of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Languages at Abbas Laghrour University of Khenchela on 06.11.2024, under the supervision of the scientific training team. It was discussed on 06.12.2024 under the supervision of the examining committee by order of the administration of the English Language Department.

12. Study results

The process of probing opinions and the total number of dialogues and meetings conducted during three months (February, March and April 2024) on the growth and development of populism theories locally, and their relationship to the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime from 1999-2019, which included 3,018 participants at the national level, touched all sectors of Algerian society, including university professors and researchers. Specialists, in addition to political figures...etc. This study also included university students, health and economic sectors, parliamentarians, and journalists, so, it reached the following conclusions:

- 1) Populism in Algeria has actually developed within representative democracy, whether in the colonial era, or in the post-independence period, whether in the socialist era, where one-party thought was dominant, or even in the capitalist era known for party pluralism. This means that Algerian populism is characterized by a change in its style, this is an advantage if it does not fall. The evidence of this is its control over the country's crucial issues in critical times, the revolution 1954-1962, the events of 1986, then the 1988 uprising, then the black decade of 1992, then the events of 2011, and the 2019 movement.
- 2) The phenomenon of populism during the era of President Bouteflika's regime represented the black face of contemporary Algerian democracy, this was crystallized in the actions of the men of the regime, including ministers, heads of government, advisors, and diplomats... They are not the type of real officials who can be relied upon to building the state, nor are they were the type of leaders that the street embraced to make a difference. Rather, they were much closer to cartoon characters with ill-considered actions. In this regard, journalist Zahia Rafi wrote an article in Al-Bilad newspaper under the title "Craziness" of Prime Ministers Mr. Sallal and Wald Abbas, Ouyahia's arrogance and the "fifth" disaster, signs that hastened the collapse of the wall of silence and fear.
- 3) Through this study, it became clear that Algerian populism, not from a historical standpoint, but rather in the current era, is not a solution to the crises of the citizen and the nation. Rather, it is an approach that has positioned itself as a "good" majority that appears at every new crisis and begs for elections to confirm victory over the democracy of the ruling authority and the political parties. Those loyal to it, in addition to those failed parties in the Algerian political arena that claim to be opposition.
- 4) If we focus carefully on Algerian populism, we find that it has taken multiple forms throughout its historical path, but at the end it was unable to find solutions to the existing political and social problems for which it declared itself as an alternative authority

capable of finding a solution in the face of all parties and ideologies presented on the Algerian political and social scene.

13. Recommendations for further study

Therefore, through this socio-political approach, it can be said that the phenomenon of the growth and escalation of populist theories in Algeria came as an inevitable result of those social, moral, political and economic tremors that President Bouteflika's regime witnessed over twenty years of family rule. So, these tremors were the result of the absence of studies. Real and realistic concerns about such social development, so this study concluded with the following recommendations:

1. Socially.

- Promoting transparency and combating corruption by establishing independent bodies with powers to investigate and take legal measures against the corrupt.
- Developing anti-corruption laws to ensure that accountability is not evaded.

2. Economically

- Improving the economy through diversification and reducing dependence on oil as the main source of income.
- Addressing the phenomenon of unemployment by creating real and permanent job positions by encouraging the creation of small and medium enterprises according to the youth's professional specialization.

3. Politically

- Reforming the electoral system to ensure effective transparency of elections and encourage the participation of all segments of Algerian society.
- Promoting national dialogue through platforms that bring together all politicians to find solutions to national issues.

4. Judicially

- Reforming the judiciary by granting it complete independence from the executive and legislative authority, this creates a kind of trust between the citizen and the justice system.



Conclusion

The social tensions resulting from the political and economic imbalances that Algeria witnessed, especially what actually crystallized on the ground during the rule of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, played an important role in the prosperity, growth and escalation of Algerian populist discourse. As evidenced by these unstable variables with an upward trend, represented mainly by the instability of the Algerian middle class, the multiple negative effects of globalization on the economy and society in general, as a threat to the Algerian national culture, where many trends have emerged calling for the necessity of liberalizing the state and society, which created a kind of intellectual conflict between those who called for the need to preserve national identity from decline, and those who called for the necessity of total immersion in Western culture and opening the country to foreigners. This intense intellectual conflict actually led to the emergence of a real and terrifying state of alienation among the Algerian political elite. Evidenced by the fact that the Algerian street in 2019 agreed to criticize the elites, both elected and unelected, for their terrifying silence on what is happening in the country, in addition to directing unprecedented and harsh criticism of the representative institutions that limited popular participation and contributed greatly to hostility to environmental protection, as it has actually practiced the process of preventing judges from interfering in majority decisions on the grounds that they are unconstitutional.

These factors served as a real reference that Algerian populism benefited from and exploited, especially in 2019, to question the mechanism of the existing democratic system at that time, under the pretext of misuse of power, in a question we asked the Algerian politician: Ammar Bouhouch “If Algeria were one of the ancient democracies, would the antiquity and long-standing of its democracy be able to be surpassed alleging abuse of power during the era of President Bouteflika? He said: “*This topic is very complicated*” (Bouhouch 2024), He add, “*treating the subject of Bouteflika requires reading thousands of books and ten (10) years of continuous research*” (Bouhouch 2024).

Perhaps this could be the title of another research that others might start to answer. However, what we must add is that the stability of the principles of civil liberties and rights usually prevents one from falling into such heinous allegations. Indeed, democratic stability usually works to benefit from such skepticism, which may be an incentive and driver for the development of democracy. However, these aforementioned factors are considered a real

danger to emerging and modern democracies in general in the process of their development and transition to differentiate between the fixed and permanent state system chosen by the people, the unstable and non-permanent authority of the people that has not yet become accustomed to exercising freedoms, this is what Algeria has successfully overcome. Here, Algerian democracy has made a good step in its favor.



General Conclusion

This study dealt in general with the phenomenon of the growing Algerian populist discourse and its impact on shaping the features of society. The relationship between the elements of populism and liberal democracy in Algeria was a fundamental focus of the study. We tried to explain the existing relationship between them, especially in 2019, from it can be said that Algerian populism, has been based on the principle of creation in opposition to the ruling elite, that is, it argued according to moral values from a political perspective by linking politics and ethics, this almost shook the pillars of liberal democracy. Algerian populism assumes that Algerians are united and identical with regard to the homeland and governance, this is what made the relationship between liberal discourse and populist values in constant tension. That is, it is a very complex relationship, the study also found that populism is not necessarily a threatening phenomenon to the democratic system in Algeria.

Rather, it is a temporary rhetorical tool, as a non-standard mechanism, it aims to correct the course of authority when necessary. Therefore, Algerians are divided between those who argue that populism as a form of tyranny that constitutes a threat that undermines democracy, they are a minority, according to this study. And those who see populism as a new spirit that works to renew democracy through the change brought about by Algerian populism, where the pillars of power were renewed and thus established new policies in the Algerian political system, are the majority, according to this study. What fuels the permanent contradiction in the structure of democracy and populism is what the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski summarized in his saying: *“Democracy is based on the principle of popular sovereignty, while liberalism is based on the principle of individual freedom, which makes liberal democracy constantly work in two opposite directions, sometimes seeking to guarantee the absolute sovereignty of the people. But it always works to limit the daily ruling power of the majority, so as not to violate the rights of individuals and minorities”*.(Kolakowski)

This study concluded that the inability of the young Algerian democracy to answer many frequently asked questions is a fundamental matter that was exploited by populist discourse to surface, this is a result of the crisis of democracy within the parties. The fact that populism has spread more as a result of the weakness of the Algerian party system, which gave the impression to the popular factions that the democratic system as a whole no longer represents the will of the people, especially in the last years of President Bouteflika’s rule, when most political parties

turned into very weak factional entities, some of them resorted to the language of Alliances to stay in power or within its orbit.

From the above, we find that one of the most important loopholes that populism has taken as an entry point into its populist discourse against democracy is the latter's inability to implement the state's slogan, "By the people, for the people," while opponents of populism see that the authority and supreme authority in the state is based on the rule of law, where the importance of parliamentary work is emphasized. Individual rights and the balance between powers and interests. As for populism, it believes that the supreme authority and reference in the state is not for the law but for the people, this is the essence of the difference between populism and Algerian liberal democracy.



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The Algerian Populism Rhetoric

The growth of populism theories locally and their relationship to the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime.

A Comprehensive National Study.



APPENDIX

Please review the content of this questionnaire as required to reach the best result.

We appreciate it if you can take the time to help us by answering some of the questions below.

Your answers are protected under a strict research privacy policy and will remain confidential. Your answers will be used internally for the purposes of this research, on an aggregate level only. In this study, we need you to share your thoughts in the form of electronic recordings, rather than written, audio, or visual form.

Therefore, please provide additional answers so that points can be assigned to this questionnaire. Thank you in advance.

THE MORE YOU SHARE THE BETTER WE CAN MATCH EARNING OPPORTUNITIES WITH YOU. THANK YOU IN ADVENCE.

QUESTIONS

QUESTION 01:

IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALGERIAN POPULISM AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY?

- YES, THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALGERIAN POPULISM AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY IN ALGERIA.
- NO, THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALGERIAN POPULISM AND CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY IN ALGERIA.

QUESTION 02:

IS POPULISM IN ALGERIA A COMPREHENSIVE IDEA, OR IS IT AN IDEA HOSTILE TO PLURALISM?

- TRUE, POPULARISM IS A COMPREHENSIVE IDEA, BUT IT IS HOSTILE TO PLURALISM.
- WRONG, POPULISM IS NEITHER A COMPREHENSIVE IDEA NOR ANTI-PLURALISM.

QUESTION 03:

IS THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY IN ALGERIA THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE?

- YES, DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION ARE TWO DIFFERENT IDEAS
- NO, DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATION ARE NOT TWO DIFFERENT IDEAS

The Algerian Populism Rhetoric

The growth of populism theories locally and their relationship to the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime.

*A
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QUESTION 04:

IS POPULISM AGAINST REPRESENTATION?

- YES, POPULISM IS AGAINST REPRESENTATION.
- NO, POPULISM IS NOT AGAINST REPRESENTATION.

QUESTION 05:

IS THE "DYSFUNCTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS" AN EXCUSE FOR POPULISTS TO GAIN POWER?

- YES, "DISRUPTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS" IS AN EXCUSE FOR POPULISTS TO GAIN POWER.
- NO, "DYSFUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS" IS NOT AN EXCUSE FOR POPULISTS TO GAIN POWER.

QUESTION 06:

DID ALGERIAN POPULISM EXPLOIT SOME SPECIAL TERMS SUCH AS REPRESENTATION, REPRESENTATION, THE NECESSITY OF APPOINTING A LEADERSHIP, ETC. DURING CRISES, AND INTERPRETED THEM ACCORDING TO THEIR NEEDS TO REACH POWER?

- YES, ALGERIAN POPULISM EXPLOITED THIS TERM TO GAIN POWER.
- NO, ALGERIAN POPULISM DID NOT EXPLOIT SUCH A TERM TO GAIN POWER.

QUESTION 07:

DID POPULISM IN ALGERIA DEPEND ON THE SYMBOLIC PERCEPTION OF THE PEOPLE AS A POLITICAL METHOD?

- TRUE, THEY ARE.
- NO, IT DIDN'T COME TO THAT.

QUESTION 08:

IF ALGERIAN POPULISTS COME TO POWER, WILL THEY BE AS VULNERABLE AS PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS?

- MAYBE THEIR POLITICAL STYLE WILL CHANGE.
- YES, THEY WILL FIND THOSE WHO WERE IN THE PREVIOUS AUTHORITY, OR EVEN OUTSIDE IT, TO OPPOSE THEM.
- NO, THE POPULISTS HAVE NO LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION.

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QUESTION 09: WILL POPULISM DISRUPT THE STATE'S GENERAL CONTROLS IF IT TAKES CONTROL OF POWER?

- YES, TO A LARGE EXTENT.
- NO, NOT TO THIS EXTENT.
- NO, I HAVE NO OPINION.

QUESTION 10: ARE LIBERALISM AND POPULISM TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN IN TERMS OF THE PROCESSES OF EXCLUDING OPPONENTS?

- YES, THEY ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN.
- NO, POPULISM IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT PROMOTES.
- THERE MUST BE CHANNELS OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN LIBERALS AND POPULISTS.
- THE LAW MUST BE ACTIVATED TO ELIMINATE REGIONALISM AND EXCLUSION.
- NO, I HAVE NO IDEA CONCERNING WHAT'S GOING ON BEHIND THE SCENES

QUESTION 11: WHICH OF THE WINGS IS RIGHT REGARDING THE EXISTING CONFLICT BETWEEN LIBERALS AND POPULISTS, WHOSE BASIS IS THE ACCEPTANCE OF FOREIGNERS AND DUAL NATIONALS TO RUN THE STATE?

- THE LIBERAL WING IS RIGHT.
- THE POPULIST WING IS RIGHT.
- YES, BOTH OF THEM ARE RIGHT.
- NO, THEY ARE BOTH WRONG.

QUESTION 12: DOES ALGERIA HAVE A TRUE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM EMANATING FROM POPULAR AUTHORITY?

- YES, ALGERIA HAS A TRUE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.
- YES, ALGERIA HAS A STRANGE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM.
- ALGERIA DOES NOT HAVE A DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AT ALL.
- IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT THE FATE OF DEMOCRACY IN ALGERIA.

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QUESTION 13:

IS POPULISM IN ALGERIA THE SAME AS DEMOCRACY IN ALGERIA?

- YES, IT'S THE SAME
- POPULISM IS ONE FORM AND DEMOCRACY IS ANOTHER FORM.

QUESTION 14: IN LIGHT OF THIS CONFLICT AND THE EXISTING POLITICAL DISTORTION, CAN POPULISM BECOME A DEMOCRATIC MODEL IN ALGERIA?

- YES, IT CAN BE A GREAT ROLE MODEL.
- CAN'T BECOME A MODEL.
- POPULISM IS A DISTORTION OF FACTS.
- POPULISM IS A DIRECT GATEWAY TO DICTATORIAL RULE.

QUESTION 15: ACCORDING TO YOUR BELIEF, DO YOU ACCEPT THAT PARTIES OR OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FIGURES THAT WITNESSED THE MOVEMENT IN 2019 BECOME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE THEIR DEMANDS?

- YES, IT IS NECESSARY.
- NO, I WILL NOT ACCEPT.
- THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE REJECT THEM.
- NO, I HAVE NO IDEA.

QUESTION 16: ARE THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE HEADING TOWARDS BECOMING A POPULIST COUNTRY?

- ALGERIA IS MOVING TOWARDS BECOMING A POPULIST COUNTRY
- NO, ALGERIA IS FAR FROM POPULISM.

QUESTION 17: DO ALGERIAN LIBERALS SUFFER FROM DISORIENTATION WHEN IT COMES TO PRESENTING ARGUMENTS AGAINST POPULISTS TO EXCLUDE THEM?

- YES, THEY ARE A MOVEMENT THAT LACKS LEGITIMACY, YET THEY RULE.
- NO, THEY ARE RIGHT IN THEIR ARGUMENTS AGAINST POPULISTS TO EXCLUDE THEM.

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QUESTION 18:

DOES PRACTICING POPULISM MEAN FAVORING THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PRINCIPLES, OR DOES POPULISM MEAN USING THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS?

- YES, THE PRACTICE OF POPULISM IS TO FAVOR THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PRINCIPLES.
- NO, THE PRACTICE OF POPULISM IS TO USE THE PEOPLE AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS.



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*People's Democratic Republic Of Algeria
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research*



Khenchela University.

*Faculty of Arts and Languages.
Dep. Of English language.*

A Search form for the Managers' Category entitled:

*The Algerian populism Rhetoric
The growth of populism theories locally and their relationship to
the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime.*

*An interview with Mr. Kamal Hachouf, Mayor of Khenchela
Municipality 2007-2019*

*A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master
in Language and Culture.*

<i>Prepared by : Soufiane SIFI</i>	<i>Supervising of : Dr. Dachouche Fahima</i>	<i>English Dep. Chair</i>
<i>Academic year 2023-2024</i>		

First Chapter

First requirement

Questions :

1. Mr. Mayor: Official Algeria talks about the date of February 22^{sd} as the day of the movement, the popular of Khenchela talks about the date of February 14th as the day of the movement, while the Kharratah of Bejaia confirms that February 16th is the day of the movement, However, the actual spark was on the February 19th from Freedom Square in Khenchela... by virtue of your position in the executive board at that time, when exactly did the movement start? And why?
2. According to Al-Bilad newspaper, the Khencheli people thronged on February 14th in Freedom Square. While the “Mayor” provoked the people on February 19th the same day the Khencheli youth dropped the giant picture of the president, leaving the flag in its place. On February 22^{sd} the movement spread throughout Algeria... How was your reading? Was this acceleration sufficient, and was it a real breakdown facing the executive branch at that time?
3. As a Mayor, was the Khenshali youth’s spontaneous involvement in politics, or their involvement based on specific issues such as poverty, regionalism, corruption, combating poverty, etc.? Did the Khenshali movement carry a single ideology, or was it characterized by multiple dimensions and directions? Alternatively, was it a spark that paved the way for the emergence of hidden ideologies?
4. Does the thronged of Khenchela youth pose a challenge to the executive board at the level of Khenchela State? How did you read the youth's anger attempt of removing and tearing up the President Bouteflika's picture as a dangerous precedent? What is the local and central authorities’ reaction toward this incident?
5. How did the state authorities dealt with the movement throughout the year of 2019?

*The Former Mayor of
Khenchela Municipality.
Mr. Kamal Hashouf*

*Dean Of
Languages Faculty*

Second Chapter

1. Discourse analysts usually saying, “The idea is not innocent.” In your opinion, who stood behind the movement? Why February 19 in particular? Does this mean that the popular “populist” movement had an ideological dimension, or was it just an ordinary movement?
2. Does Khenchela “Mayor” made a grave mistake that cost him his career? Or is it a mighty revolutionary work worthy of honor and praise?

The second topic

The first requirement

The fifth element. The conflict between populism and Bouteflika’s regime.

1. Does the demonstrators aware of the truth of what they had done in the municipal square, “Freedom Square,” or just the movement was as a result of previous accumulations that were revealed on February 19th , 2019? Is there anyone behind the movement?
2. A security solution was feasible due to the rapid development of the events. How did the military sector of Khenchela read these events?

English Dep. Chair

Supervisor



Khenchela University.

Faculty of Arts and Languages.

Dep. Of English language.

A Search form entitled:

*The Algerian populism Rhetoric:
The growth of populism theories locally and their relationship to
the disintegration of the Bouteflika regime –*

Teacher's, Political and Press Interviews

*Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in
Language and Culture.*

<i>Prepared by : Soufiane SIFI</i>	<i>Moderated by : Dr. Dachouche Fahima</i>	<i>English Dep. Chair</i>
<i>Academic year 2023-2024</i>		

Interviews Questions

❖ **The first topic: The roots of Algerian populism.**

1. Does Algerian populism have a historical extension?
2. Is Algerian populism linked to the Great Liberation Revolution?
3. Is Algerian populism considered a temporary stereotype that only goes along with crises?
4. Is it a true, ancient intellectual discourse that was subject to development as a result of compelling circumstances to which society was exposed?

❖ **The second topic: The reasons for the growth of populist theories locally.**

1. What are the reasons that made Algerian populism rise from time to time and then disappear?
2. Do social and economic reasons have a special role in this growth process?

❖ **The third topic: The major transformations of Algerian populism against the Bouteflika regime.**

1. Is Algerian populism an ideological, political, and regional thought, or is it a new art aimed at mobilizing people?
2. Do those who come to the street every Friday really represent populism in the Algerian political arena?
3. Was the Algerian street faced one populism or populisms in 2019?
4. Does Algerian populism have a media and cultural reputation?

❖ **Fourth topic: The results of the major transformations of Algerian populism during the era of President Bouteflika.**

1. Do you think that these protesters are merely movements that exploited the crisis of representative democracy to extract more demands and thus more positions?
2. Did populism pose a real threat to the young democracy in Algeria during the movement?

<i>English Department Chair</i>	<i>Supervising Teacher</i>	<i>Languages Faculty Dean</i>

ملخص:

تهدف هذه المذكرة الى دراسة وتحليل الخطاب الشعبي في الجزائر، مع التركيز على تأثيراته الاجتماعية والسياسية. حيث يستخدم الخطاب الشعبي لغة بسيطة وتوجها يستهدف مشاعر العامة، ويعتمد على النقد اللاذع للنخبة السياسية ومؤسسات الدولة، مما ساهم في تفاقم الأوضاع الاجتماعية والسياسية، لقد استخدمت هذه الدراسة منهجية تحليلية وصفية، شملت مراجعة الأدبيات السابقة، وتحليل الخطابات السياسية والاعلامية، بالاضافة الى إجراء مقابلات مع أساتذة متخصصين. لقد توصلت الدراسة الى أن الخطاب الشعبي الجزائري يتميز بتركيزه على الهوية الوطنية، وانتقاه للنخبة السياسية، وتقديمه حولا سريعة للمشكلات المعقدة، ومن بين العوامل التي ساهمت في انتشاره نجد الأوضاع الاقتصادية المتردية، والفساد السياسي، والازمات الاجتماعية والسياسية. مما أثر سلبا على التماسك الاجتماعي والسياسات العامة، الأمر الذي زاد من الاستقطاب والتفرقة داخل المجتمع. ولمواجهة هذه الظاهرة، توصي الدراسة بتعزيز التعليم والتفكير النقدي، وتحسين دور الاعلام في تقديم معلومات موثوقة ومحرارية الأخبار الزائفة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الخطاب الشعبي الجزائري، عبد العزيز بوتفليقة. الاحتجاجات الشعبية، الفساد، الحراك الجزائري.