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The Ongoing Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Examining America's Contribution and Uncovering its Underlying Objectives.

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fullfiment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Language and Culture.**

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With deep respect and heartfelt gratitude, I dedicate my graduation and the immense joy it brings to:

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Abstract

This research aims at examining America's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, scrutinizing how its involvement has shaped the dispute's dynamics and the driving objectives behind its policies. Through qualitative research, this study delves into the historical context tracing the evolution of U.S. foreign policy and probes the political dynamics to better understand America's motivations. The study also critically analyzes the U.S double standards vis-à-vis the conflict and evaluates President Joe Biden's policy in favour of Israel, especially in light of the Second October Conflict of 2023. In this respect, these considerations are used to investigate how America's economic, political, and strategic interests have influenced the broader Middle Eastern region. The findings of the research clarified the U.S. objectives in Palestine, and revealed that the main U.S. strategic objectives were to bolster its influence in the area, to secure both Israel and energy resources, and counter Iranian influence. The study also dealt with some future directions of the ongoing conflict with a particular focus on the U.S policy.

Keywords: Biden Administration, Israel-Palestine Conflict, Middle East, U.S. Objectives, October 2023

Résumé

Cette recherche vise à examiner le rôle de l'Amérique dans le conflit israélo-palestinien, en scrutant comment son implication a façonné la dynamique du différend et les objectifs sous-jacents à ses politiques. À travers une recherche qualitative, cette étude plonge dans le contexte historique en retrouvant l'évolution de la politique étrangère américaine et explore les dynamiques politiques pour mieux comprendre les motivations de l'Amérique. L'étude analyse également de manière critique les doubles standards des États-Unis vis-à-vis du conflit et évalue la politique du président Joe Biden en faveur d'Israël, notamment à la lumière du conflit d'octobre 2023. Dans ce contexte, ces considérations sont utilisées pour examiner comment les intérêts économiques, politiques et stratégiques de l'Amérique ont influencé la région du Moyen-Orient dans son ensemble. Les résultats de la recherche ont clarifié les objectifs des États-Unis en Palestine, révélant que les principaux objectifs stratégiques étaient de renforcer leur influence dans la région, de sécuriser à la fois Israël et les ressources énergétiques, et de contrer l'influence iranienne. L'étude a également abordé certaines orientations futures du conflit en cours, en mettant particulièrement l'accent sur la politique américaine.

Mots clés: L'administration Biden , Conflit israélo-palestinien, Moyen Orient, Objectifs Américains, October 2023

ملخص

هذا البحث يهدف إلى فحص دور أمريكا في النزاع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني، محللاً كيف أثرت مشاركتها على ديناميات النزاع والأهداف الدافعة وراء سياستها. من خلال البحث النوعي، تستقصى هذه الدراسة السياق التاريخي الذي يتبع تطور السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية وتفحص الديناميات السياسية لفهم دوافع أمريكا بشكل أفضل. تحلل الدراسة أيضاً بشكل نقدي المعايير المزدوجة للولايات المتحدة في مواجهة النزاع وتقييم سياسة الرئيس جو بايدن لصالح إسرائيل، خاصة في ضوء نزاع أكتوبر الثاني 2023. في هذا السياق، تُستخدم هذه الاعتبارات لاستقصاء كيف أثرت مصالح أمريكا الاقتصادية والسياسية والاستراتيجية على المنطقة الشرق الأوسط بشكل عام. أظهرت نتائج البحث أهداف الولايات المتحدة في فلسطين، وكشفت أن الأهداف الاستراتيجية الرئيسية للولايات المتحدة كانت تعزيز تأثيرها في المنطقة، وتأمين إسرائيل وموارد الطاقة، ومواجهة التأثير الإيراني. تناولت الدراسة أيضاً بعض الاتجاهات المستقبلية للنزاع الجاري، مع التركيز بشكل خاص على السياسة الأمريكية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: إدارة بايدن-صراع إسرائيل-فلسطين- الشرق الأوسط- اهداف الولايات المتحدة- أكتوبر 23.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

GIA	Gaza Interim government
ICJ	The International Court of Justice
IDF	The Israel Defense Forces
OPT	The Occupied Plestinian Terretories
PA	The Palestinian Authority
PLA	The Palestinian Liberation Army
PLO	Palestinien Liberation Organisation
PNC	The Palestinian National Council
U.S	The United States
UAE	The United Arab Emirates
UN	The United Nations
UNRWA	The UN Relief and Works Agency
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter One: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Historical Background	8
1.1. Post-World War I: Palestine and the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire	10
1.2. Palestine in Post-World War II.....	12
1.2.1. The British Mandate in Palestine	13
1.2.2. Zionism	15
1.2.3. The United Nations Partition Plan	17
1.2.4. The Palestinian Refugees of 1948.....	19
1.2.5. Arab Pan Arabism.....	21
1.2.5.1. The Occupied Territories and Jerusalem.....	21
1.2.5.2. The Palestine Liberation Organization.....	23
1.2.5.3. War of October 1973.....	25
1.2.5.4. Camp David I	26
1.2.5.5. Intifada	28
1.3. Palestine in Post-Cold War Era	29
1.3.1. The Madrid Conference	30
1.3.2. The Oslo Accords	32
1.3.3. Camp David II and the 2000 Uprising	35
1.4. Understanding the Second October War of 2023 in Israel-Palestine	38
1.4.1. What Happened?.....	38
1.4.2. What Could Happen Next?	40

Chapter two: Examining the U.S. Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict..... 43

2.1. Analyzing the U.S-Israeli Special Relationship 45

 2.1.1. Support of Israel and the Containment of Arabs after World War II 45

2.2. Double Standards in US Presidents towards Israel after the Cold War Era 47

 2.2.1 George Bush..... 47

 2.2.2. Bill Clinton..... 49

 2.2.3. W. Bush..... 50

 2.2.4. Barak Obama 52

 2.2.5. Donald Trump's pro-Israel Policies 54

2.3. New Vision of Joe Biden in the Second October Conflict of 2023..... 57

2.4. The Role of Middle Eastern States: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan..... 59

Chapter three: Analyzing the Biden Administration’s Uncovering and Underlying Objectives in Israel- 64

3.1. Expanding U.S. Security Priorities 65

 3.1.1. Conditional U.S Support for Israel’s Response against Gaza..... 65

3.2. Israel’s Objectives for Gaza Campaign 69

 3.2.1. Israeli Policy 69

 3.2.1.1. Concluding the Campaign 71

 3.2.1.2. Post- Hamas Administration in Gaza 73

3.3 U.S Policy Objectives in Post-Conflict 75

 3.3.1 Israel's Security 76

3.3.2 Securing Vital Energy Resources	78
3.3.3 Deterring Iranian Influence	80
3.4. Predictions on Future Conflict and Prospects for a Resolution.....	83
Conclusion.....	86
Bibliography	89

List of Maps

Map 1: Annexe I - The Skyes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916	11
Map 2: Devision of the British Mandate of Palestine	14
Map 3: Map of the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine	18
Map 4: The Occupied West Bank	33

Introduction

Background

The struggle between Israel and Palestine began around the end of the 19th century. In 1947, the UN passed Resolution 181, known as the Partition Plan, dividing the British Mandate of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The creation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, sparked the first Arab-Israeli War. The conflict ended in 1949 with Israel's victory, although 750,000 Palestinians were displaced, and the land was divided into three parts: Israel, the West Bank (the Jordan River), and the Gaza Strip (Center for Preventive Action, "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict").

The region saw an increase in hostilities during the years that followed, mainly between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. These three Arab nations signed mutual defence agreements after Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula during the 1956 Suez Crisis, raising the possibility of an Israeli force mobilisation. The Six-Day War began in June 1967 when Israel launched a preemptive attack on the air forces of Egypt and Syria in response to a series of manoeuvres carried out by Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser. Following the conflict, Israel annexed territory from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip (Center for Preventive Action, "Israeli-Palestinian Conflict").

When Egypt and Syria launched airstrikes against Israel during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Israeli-Arab conflict saw a dramatic uptick in intensity. Two weeks later, the UN resolved to terminate the dispute, paving the way for later developments such as Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO. Tensions were increased by these acts as well as Israel's construction of Jewish colonies in contested areas such as East Jerusalem. There were deaths and instability when the First Palestinian Intifada broke out in 1987 as a result of popular opposition to Israeli occupation. The war continued, resulting in the Second Palestinian

Intifada in 2000, despite initiatives like the Oslo Peace Accords in the 1990s, which momentarily increased expectations for peace. The persistent difficulties in bringing about a durable peace in the area are highlighted by this cycle of violence (“Israel Palestine Conflict History Explained”).

Israel has been the main recipient of U.S foreign aid; since its founding, it has received almost \$300 billion in total in military and economic support. Although the U.S has provided significant help to other Middle Eastern nations including Egypt and Iraq, Israel stands out due of its allocations. While the U.S did give Israel substantial economic support between 1971 and 2007, the most of its current aid goes towards strengthening Israel's powerful military, the most sophisticated in the area. The US has agreed to provide Israel with over \$4 billion a year until 2028 under a memorandum of understanding. Moreover, during current hostilities, like the war with Hamas, American legislators are discussing additional assistance for Israel (Masters and Merrow,” U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts”).

Over 1,200 Israelis and international nationals lost their lives as a result of Hamas' surprise attacks on October 7, 2023, from the Gaza Strip. Additionally, 253 hostages were taken prisoner. Israel declared war in response to the attacks, which resulted in airstrikes and ground operations in Gaza that killed nearly 31,000 Palestinians by March 12, 2024. Despite reports of Iranian funding for Hamas, President Biden insisted there was no proof Iran was involved in the attack's preparation. 250 Palestinian inmates detained by Israel and 110 hostages held in Gaza were freed in late November following a temporary ceasefire (“Report to Congress on Israel and Hamas Conflict, U.S. Policy Options”).

The Israeli-Palestinian dispute is still unresolved because of Benjamin Netanyahu, the country's longest-serving prime minister, who is firmly against the creation of a Palestinian state. Human rights organisations in Israel and abroad have criticised his government for bringing in far-right groups who support the annexation of the West Bank and are warning of

the emergence of an apartheid-like system in the occupied territories. This has increased tensions. The confrontation has escalated recently, with Hamas attacks on Israel and Israeli bombings in Gaza highlighting the seriousness of the situation and taking it into an increasingly uncharted area (McGreal, "What are the roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict?").

Aim of the Study

The aim of this study is to examine America's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, focusing on how its involvement has shaped the dynamics of the dispute and the motivations behind its policies. The research delves into the historical context of U.S. foreign policy, critically analyzes the double standards in its approach, and evaluates President Joe Biden's pro-Israel policy, especially after the Second October Conflict of 2023. It aims to understand how America's economic, political, and strategic interests have influenced the broader Middle Eastern region and outlines the future directions of the ongoing conflict with an emphasis on U.S. policy.

Significance of the Study

The main value of this research is to navigate the complicated Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which dates back to the Ottoman Empire's fall after WWI and extends to the intricacies of Palestine in the post-Cold War era. An understanding of pivotal moments like the 1948 Palestinian refugees, the UN Partition Plan, and major wars like the War of October 1973 provides a historical context that sets the stage for the current division. The difficulty, however, is in striking a balance between historical background and current events, particularly in light of the Second October War of 2023, which adds complexity to the analysis.

The focus then shifts to the unique connection between the U.S and Israel, particularly the changing post-Cold War policies of American presidents towards Israel. This research attempts to clarify the complexity of international involvement in the battle by closely

examining the double standards in American foreign policy and the changing posture of the Biden administration after the Second October War. Moreover, examining the roles of significant Middle Eastern nations such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan adds another level of intricacy by emphasising on regional factors that affect the course of the war and possible strategies to resolve it.

Research Questions

The main question guiding this research is as follows: What characterizes the U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship and What are the U.S.'s underlying objectives in the most recent conflict?

To delve deeper into the research, this study also aims to answer the following sub-questions: What are the apparent double standards in the U.S. Presidents' policies towards Israel post-Cold War? What is Joe Biden's new vision during the Second October Conflict of 2023? What was the role of Middle Eastern states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan? Lastly, the research seeks to answer the question of what are the predictions on future conflicts and prospects for a resolution? This comprehensive critical analysis aims to provide a deep understanding of the research.

Research Methodology

To meet the study's objectives, qualitative research was conducted using both historical and critical analytical approaches. The historical one delves into the numerous dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tracing its origins from the aftermath of WWI, through the complexity of post-WWII dynamics, to modern occurrences, such as the Second October War of 2023. This historical lens contextualises significant events such as the British Mandate, the UN Partition Plan, and subsequent conflicts such as the Intifadas, providing insights into the conflict's evolution and long-term issues. The critical analytical approach investigates the United States' involvement in the conflict, assessing every aspect of its relationship with Israel

and the evolving policies of succeeding administrations. From post WWII to the present, this examination analyses double standards in US policy, the impact of presidential initiatives, and the evolving perspective under the Biden administration. It also looks at how regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan shape the war scene.

This study used a combination of primary and secondary sources as part of the research tools. Primary sources with direct insights into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and US engagement are given priority, including: newspapers, letters, videos, maps, and reports. Books, journal articles, and web articles are examples of secondary sources that complement the primary sources through offering scholarly commentary and more contextualization to the subject matter.

Literature Review

This dissertation draws upon a diverse range of sources. One of the sources particularly used to give a deeper understanding of the research topic, is an article by Ali Harb “Timeline: The Biden Administration on Gaza, in Its Own Words.” The article critically examines the political ramifications of Trump’s decisions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, noting their neglect of Jerusalem’s significance to Palestinian identity and the detrimental effects of a stalled peace process. It suggests that such oversight exacerbates not only Israeli-Palestinian tensions but also regional stability, potentially destabilizing Arab States and undermining the Palestinian Authority’s legitimacy. Furthermore, Harb points to increased Iran-Israel tensions, given Iran’s view of these actions as violations of Islamic sanctities. The U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution for a humanitarian ceasefire underscores America’s strategic support for Israel and highlights the complex diplomatic efforts at play. Overall, the article illustrates how the frozen peace process has broad and profound consequences for regional stability.

Another article by Marwan Bishara “This Israel Has No Future in the Middle East.” discussed that the Public opinion could pressure Israeli leaders to change their policies to protect their Middle Eastern interests, as illustrated by France’s demand to stop killing children in Gaza. It suggests Israel faces a critical opportunity to embrace President Biden’s vision of a two-state solution and avoid disaster after its recent war. however, Netanyahu’s extreme alliance often disregards the American council, continuing an aggressive stance despite potential consequences. Also, Bishara indicated that the criticism extends to Israel taking the U.S. support for granted while continuing actions described as massacres and apartheid against Palestinians, risking more complex future conflicts and underscoring the urgent need for policy changes to prevent escalating violence and instability.

Structure of the Study

This dissertation begins with a general introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which started in the late 19th century. Key events such as the UN's 1947 Partition Plan, the establishment of Israel in 1948, and subsequent wars have shaped the conflict. Despite efforts like the Oslo Accords, violence and disputes persist, highlighted by recent escalations. U.S. support for Israel and ongoing tensions continue to hinder a lasting resolution. It is divided then into three chapters. The first chapter, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Historical Background," delves deeply into the historical context of the conflict. The second chapter, "Examining the U.S. Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," investigates the US role in the conflict, outlining major interventions and policies. The third and final chapter, "Analysing the Biden Administration's Uncovering and Underlying Objectives in the Israel-Hamas Conflict," examines the current situation under the Biden administration, revealing and analysing its underlying goals and policies regarding the Israel-Hamas conflict. The dissertation concludes with a general conclusion which deals the US's policies towards Israel post-Cold War and their special relationship, characterized by military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and security

projects. Since 1948, the US has supported Israel through military aid, weapons provision, and diplomatic initiatives. However, the US has faced criticism for its support during the 2023 Palestine-Israel war. It also suggests that future US foreign policy will prioritize strong military and financial support for Israel, while also working to restore Israel's relations with Arab nations to counter Iranian influence and enhance regional stability.

Chapter One

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Historical Background

One of the world's longest-running and most intricate conflicts is the Israeli-Palestinian one. It has its roots in the lengthy history of territorial, political, and religious conflicts that have existed in the area between the Jewish and Arab communities. The conflict's beginnings can be traced back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, during the rise of Arab nationalism and Zionism, as well as in the aftermath of British colonisation in the area. Several wars, revolutions, and attempts at peace have been prompted by the conflict, but a long-term solution has proven elusive.

A turning point in Middle Eastern history was the aftermath of WWI, particularly for Palestine and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict began during this time when the geopolitical environment changed dramatically. The fall of the Ottoman state left an absence of authority that paved the way for rival nationalistic ambitions and territorial conflicts throughout the area.

Following WWII, the British Mandate in Palestine was established, and the Zionist movement which called for a Jewish homeland grew in strength. Palestinian refugees were forced to move in 1948 as a part of the U.S Partition Plan, which increased tensions. Meanwhile, Arab Pan-Arabism emerged as a counterforce, reshaping the geopolitical environment and establishing the foundation for ensuing confrontations, such as the October 1973 war.

A variety of diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian problem were launched in the wake of the Cold War. The Oslo Accords, the Camp David II debates, and the Madrid Conference all aimed at a peaceful conclusion. These efforts were not without challenges, though, and this contributed to the rebellion of 2000. During this time, there was a

change in the conflict's dynamics, with both hopes for peace and enduring barriers to its settlement.

Numerous issues arise as the world tries to deal with the conflict's ongoing effects, such as whether a fair and long-lasting resolution can be established. How will diplomacy on a global scale influence the destiny of the region? Perhaps most significantly, how can we negotiate the uncharted territory of the Israeli-Palestinian issue by learning from the past? During this investigation, we will examine significant historical occurrences, diplomatic initiatives, and conflict-related moments to shed a glimpse into the complexities of a conflict that continues to affect the Middle East's geopolitical environment.

This chapter's structure guides us through significant historical moments that shaped the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first section of the chapter, "Post-WWI: Palestine and the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire" explores what happened after the war and explains how the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created the conditions for the start of the conflict. Moving on to "Palestine in Post-WWII" this section examines Zionism, the UN Partition Plan, and the British Mandate while analysing the intricacies of Arab Pan-Arabism and its significant influence. The third section, "Palestine in Post-Cold War Era" examines key occasions such as the Madrid Conference, the Oslo Accords, and Camp David II, highlighting the impact of the post-Cold War environment on the conflict. The chapter finishes with "Understanding the Second October War of 2023 in Israel-Palestine" which presents important issues about recent developments. With this framework, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be fully understood by bridging historical settings with modern dynamics.

1.1. Post-World War I: Palestine and the Collapse of the Ottoman Empire


The Great War was a turning point in Middle Eastern history, ending four centuries of Ottoman dominion over Arab nations and paving the way for the current geopolitical configuration of the area. The seeds of this change were sown as early as 1853, when, despite assertions from Ottoman authorities suggesting otherwise, the Ottoman Empire's position as the world's preeminent force had started to fade. At this point, the empire's continued existence depended heavily on the unstable power dynamics that prevailed throughout Europe. The Ottoman state had been severely weakened by ongoing hostilities with Russia since 1768, as well as by broad revolutions throughout the empire, ranging from Serbia, Greece, and Egypt to Kurdistan. Plus, its official entry into WWI on October 30, 1914, together with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the declaration of Jihad, a holy war, all these events served to worsen this deterioration (Badem 1).

During this time, Palestine, known for its cotton, grain, and citrus output, ran a farming-based economy, exporting surplus products overseas and relying on imports to meet internal food needs. However, with the start of the sea blockade, all sources of supply were immediately cut off. Following the Ottoman Empire's participation in the war, prices for key commodities, particularly flour, increased rapidly. Despite the early presence of grain stocks, these supplies only sustained the population for a short time before the threat of hunger loomed over Palestine and Greater Syria, particularly in urban areas (Jacobson 77).¹

While the war was at its peak and the Ottoman Empire was visibly breaking down, the Entente Powers were actively negotiating over competing territorial ambitions. In 1916, discussions between Britain, France, and Russia, subsequently including Italy, led to the secret Sykes-Picot agreement on the transfer of Ottoman Arab provinces to European Powers' zones of influence (annexe I)². Considering places sacred to three world religions were located there, an international regime was first planned for Palestine, which would later fall under British rule

(Vladimir "Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I)"). Many people view the Sykes-Picot Agreement as a classic example of how European colonial powers divided up the Middle East to suit their interests, frequently ignoring regional boundaries based on ethnicity and religion. Many of the current borders and conflicts in the region were established as a result of it.

Map 1: Annexe I - The Skyes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916



Source: Koehler, Ron. "The Sykes-Picot Agreement." *History for Tomorrow*, 14 May 2016, historyfortomorrow.wordpress.com/2016/05/12/the-sykes-picot-agreement.

The surrender of Jerusalem to British forces on December 9, 1917, was a historical moment arranged by British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur Balfour. In a letter to Lord Walter Rothschild, a prominent figure in the British Jewish community, Lord Balfour conveyed the following message:

His Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object (Mabon "A Century on the Balfour Declaration Still Shapes Palestinians"

Everyday Lives"). The declaration signed by Balfour as expressed in this quotation, highlights the British government's imperialist goals in the Middle East and initiated a course of displacement, conflict, and ongoing struggle over identity and territory.

In a single 67-word letter, Palestine's political and geographic direction changed dramatically. As described by a Jerusalemite writer and teacher Khalil Sakakini:

“A nation which has long been in the depths of sleep only awakes if events rudely shake it, and only arises little by little ... This was the situation of Palestine, which for many centuries has been in the deepest sleep, until it was shaken by the great war, shocked by the Zionist movement, and violated by the illegal policy [of the British], and it awoke, little by little.” (Siddiqui "History of Turmoil in the Middle East"). For decades, Palestine was a dormant nation until its restful state was disturbed by outside forces like the Zionist movement and the Great War.

This awakening, however, was not without difficulties, as the Palestinian people were caught in the crossfire of conflicting nationalist movements and imperial ambitions. The stage was prepared for WWII, which would shift the direction of Palestinian history and the ongoing struggle for self-determination.

1.2. Palestine in Post-World War II

Following WWII, Palestine became a focal point for geopolitical changes, including the British Mandate, the emergence of Zionism, and the UN Partition Plan. The 1948 displacement of Palestinian refugees, along with the influence of Arab Pan-Arabism, complicated the region's long-standing struggle and quest for self-determination.

1.2.1. The British Mandate in Palestine

Immediately after WWI, the League of Nations Covenant established a mechanism that allowed the League to assign mandates to some of the winning nations to manage lands under German or Ottoman Empire leadership. As long as the mandated regions could not become independent, they would be administered on behalf of the League. The Allied powers' so-called mandate system was a barely hidden form of occupation and colonialism (Great Britain and Geneva : League of Nations, Council "Mandate for Palestine and Memorandum by the British Government Relating to Its Application to Transjordan"). The mandate system, according to critics, was merely a covert kind of colonialism that let the Allied powers keep control of these regions while seeming to be assisting them in becoming independent. Even though the system was designed to encourage self-governance, it frequently led to ongoing foreign interference and resource exploitation.

The British Mandate encompassed areas on both sides of the Jordan River, including Israel and Jordan. Approximately 77% of this Mandate lay east of the Jordan River, and in 1921, Great Britain established a distinct administrative entity called Transjordan. The amended mandate went into force in 1923 (Israeli Missions Around The World "The British Mandate"). This decision outraged the Zionists since it restricted the space available for a future Jewish state, which they believed to comprise all of Palestine, including the areas east of the Jordan River.

Map 2: Devision of the British Mandate of Palestine



Source: "The British Mandate for Palestine (1918 – 1948)." *The MENA Chronicle | Fanack*, 12 Aug. 2012, fanack.com/arab-palestinian-israeli-conflict/history-of-the-palestinian-israeli-conflict/rise-of-zionism/the-british-mandate-for-palestine/.

On September 16, 1922, the League Council officially granted Great Britain a mandate for Palestine which provided for the ultimate construction of a Jewish state, as stated in Article 2:

"The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion." (Great Britain and Geneva : League of Nations, Council "Mandate for Palestine and Memorandum by the British Government Relating to Its Application to Transjordan"). Subsequent articles addressed Jewish immigration, public administration, access to holy sites and religious buildings, public health, trade, and other matters.

For decades, historians have debated why the British Mandate was issued, offering numerous arguments based on diverse sources. While some contend that many in the British

administration at the time were Zionists, others argue that the mandate was issued with anti-Semitic motives, with the idea that giving Palestine to Jews would solve the "Jewish problem". But the true causes, around which the mandate is generally reached, are: Maintaining control over Palestine served a strategic imperial goal in maintaining Britain's area of influence over Egypt and the Suez Canal. Additionally, to mobilise Jewish support in both Russia and the U.S, Britain had to back Zionists in the hopes of persuading both countries' governments to continue fighting till triumph. Or perhaps most importantly, the British government understood the hardship endured by Jews who were being persecuted in Europe (Tahhan "More Than a Century on: The Balfour Declaration Explained").

1.2.2. Zionism

Zionism represents a settler-colonialist and racist movement that uses Jewish traditions to justify its illegal actions such as racism and the genocide of Palestinian natives. Its core beliefs are that there is only one country, which is comprised of all Jews, not just a particular religious or ethnic group, and that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine/Israel is the best way to combat anti-Semitism. The goal of Zionism, according to Theodor Herzl's World Zionist Organisation, which was founded in 1897, was to create "a national home for the Jewish people secured by public law." The religious connections that Jews had to Jerusalem and the Land of Israel served as inspiration for Zionism. However, nationalist ideology and colonial notions about Europeans' rights to colonise and settle other regions of the world had an impact on Zionism's policies (Zionism 3).

Before Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and the final solution³ was instituted to eliminate all Jews worldwide, most Jews were not Zionists, even though many of them had become Zionists by the early 20th century. Most Orthodox Jews held anti-Zionist views. For them, Zionism represented a transgression of God's will, and the only one who could bring Jews

back to the Promised Land was God. Some Jews in other parts of the world, particularly the U.S, opposed Zionism because they were concerned in recognising Jews as a distinct national rather than religious community would jeopardise their position and rights as citizens in their respective countries. However, the horrors of the Holocaust considerably reduced Jewish opposition or antagonism to Zionism, and after WWII, the majority of Jews around the world came to support the Zionist movement and demand the creation of an independent Jewish state (Zionism 3). This shift in feeling was partly motivated by the tragic repercussions of the Holocaust, which demonstrated that the Jewish diaspora was not safe and that a Jewish state was required for Jewish survival.

When it comes to their ambitions, Jews believe that all of the world's population has harmed them, and as a result, they have adopted enmity towards all nations, particularly Arabs. Considering that the Arab nations are seen by Zionists as having taken their land, one of Zionism's main objectives is to retake the promised land to establish a new global order. To that end, the Israeli government will be established in the land of David and Suleiman by occupying all Arab regions, forcing Jews to emigrate to Palestine and recognise Israel as their leader. This will increase the threat posed by the Arabs, which will further increase the role of the armed forces as the only line of defending this regime (Bisheh "What is Zionism and what are its goals").

Since the second half of the nineteenth century, when Zionism began to emerge as a convergence of profit-driven, politicised, and racist European-American Judaism, leaders of this political-social-religious ideology have been pursuing objectives such as controlling global communications and attempting to portray Islam as an anti-civilization movement through deceptive tactics and information. To preserve their reputation, that Islam poses a grave threat to the entire globe (Bisheh "What is Zionism and what are its goals").

The Zionist project is still going strong today, controlling the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza while spending many billions of dollars to keep that power. Zionist military troops have been defending and assisting Zionist settlers as they have pushed into these occupied zones for decades, constructing homes and settlements there. Like the Zionist project as a whole, these settlements are supported not only by a worldwide media apparatus that ardently upholds them but also by direct financial assistance, which allows the Zionists to keep growing and complicates efforts to reverse Zionist colonialism (Em and Aude "What Is Zionism?"). Its purportedly imperialist characteristics are used as an excuse to criticise the Zionist project's continued expansion into regions such as Gaza, the West Bank, Golan Heights. Evaluating the socio-political ramifications of settlement expansion is challenging because to the Zionist military's involvement as well as significant financial and media support.

1.2.3. The United Nations Partition Plan

Following WWII, growing tensions between Zionist militias and the British army, as well as between Arabs and Jews on Palestine's future, forced Britain to renounce its mandate over the region. The UN was just formed, and the British wanted them to decide what should happen to Palestine. However, the British government hoped that the UN would be unable to find a practical solution and return Palestine to them as a UN trusteeship. A UN-appointed commission made up of delegates from several nations visited Palestine to look at the situation. Although members of this committee disagreed on the shape of a political resolution, there was widespread consensus that the country would have to be partitioned to meet the interests and desires of both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. At the end of 1946, Mandate Palestine was home to 1,269,000 Arabs and 608,000 Jews. Jews had purchased 6 to 8% of Palestine's total land area, which amounted to approximately 20% of Arab land (The United Nations Partition Plan 7).

Map 3: Map of the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine



Source: *Maps of the 1947 Partition Plan for Palestine EN.svg - Simple English Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia.* 11 Nov. 2021, simple.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1947_Partition_plan_for_Palestine_EN.svg.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly resolved to divide Palestine into two states, one Jewish and the other Arab (Map 1). The UN partition plan divided the territory so that each state had a majority of its own population, however some Jewish settlements would fall under the proposed Palestinian state and many Palestinians would join the proposed Jewish state. Assuming a growing number of Jews would come there, the region intended for the Jewish state would be marginally greater than that designated for the Palestinian state (56 per cent and

43 per cent of Palestine, respectively). The UN partition plan called for Jerusalem and Bethlehem to become an international zone (The United Nations Partition Plan 7).

Zionists were able to pass off the ensuing conquest and displacement of Palestinians as both defensive and legitimate by highlighting their acceptance of the idea of partition and the Arab rejection of it, while ignoring the profound injustice ingrained in the proposal's details regarding both land and population. As a result, the UN Partition Plan is both the result of Zionist efforts to have Jewish sovereignty in Palestine recognised internationally and the direct forerunner to the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948, given that it was based on the forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes (“UN Partition Plan, 1947- Paving the Way to the Impending Nakba”). Most Arabs saw the planned Jewish state as a settler colony and said that British support for Zionist settlement in Palestine placed the subject of Jewish statehood on the international agenda against the interests of the Arab majority.

Within days of the UN partition plan's ratification, fighting broke out between the Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. The Arab armed forces lacked proper organisation, training, and equipment. On the other hand, despite their modest size, the Zionist military forces were well-trained, equipped, and managed. The majority of the land designated for the Jewish state within the UN plan was under Zionist control by the spring of 1948 (The United Nations Partition Plan 7).

1.2.4. The Palestinian Refugees of 1948

If embattled Israel was one major element in the post-1948 pattern, the antagonism of its Arab neighbours was a close second, and the plight of the vast number of Arab refugees was third. The violent creation of Israel resulted in a significant displacement of the Arab inhabitants, who were either driven out by Zionist armed forces before May 15, 1948, or by the

Israeli army after that date, or fled for fear of violence from these forces (“Palestine and the Palestinians (1948–67)”).

Many wealthy merchants and prominent urban figures from Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem went to Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan, while the middle class relocated to all-Arab cities like Nablus and Nazareth. The vast majority of fellahin ended up in refugee camps. More than 400 Arab villages vanished, and Arab life in coastal towns (particularly Jaffa and Haifa) collapsed. The heart of Palestinian life migrated to the Arab cities in the steep eastern portion of the territory, which was immediately west of the Jordan River and became known as the West Bank (“Palestine and the Palestinians (1948–67)”).

Population estimates, like so many other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, are passionately debated. When the war began, Palestine was home to about 1,400,000 Arabs. Estimates of the number of Arabs displaced from their original homes, villages, and neighbourhoods between December 1947 and January 1949 range from around 520,000 to about 1,000,000; however, there is widespread agreement that the actual number was more than 600,000 and most likely exceeded 700,000. About 276,000 people went to the West Bank, and by 1949, more than half of Palestine's prewar Arab population lived there (from 400,000 in 1947 to over 700,000). Between 160,000 and 190,000 people fled to the Gaza Strip. More than one-fifth of Palestinian Arabs abandoned their homeland. Around 100,000 of these were sent to Lebanon, 100,000 to Jordan, 75,000 to 90,000 to Syria, 7,000 to 10,000 to Egypt, and 4,000 to Iraq (“Palestine and the Palestinians (1948–67)”).

The 1948 uprooting of Palestinian refugees in the midst of Israel's establishment highlights the complexity of Arab Pan-Arabism. Conflict with Zionist forces caused this widespread migration, which destroyed Arab towns and altered the demography of the area. As

refugees sought safety in nearby Arab nations and regions such as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the need for Arab solidarity and togetherness grew.

1.2.5. Arab Pan Arabism

Arab Pan-Arabism⁴, has had a major impact on the Middle East. The struggle against Israeli occupation, particularly in Jerusalem, is central to this philosophy, and organisations such as the PLO advocate it. The Arab states' solidarity was tested during events such as the October 1973 War against common opponents. However, agreements like Camp David I in 1978 exposed internal differences, particularly Egypt's separate peace with Israel. Despite obstacles such as the First Intifada, Arab Pan-Arabism persists, exhibiting a tenacious dedication to a common Arab identity and goals.

1.2.5.1. The Occupied Territories and Jerusalem

More than 50 years ago, Israel shocked the world by seizing the last Palestinian territories of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula in a matter of six days. In the 1967 War, also known as the June War, Israel handed what became known as the Naksa which means setback or loss, to the forces of neighbouring Arab countries, as well as to the Palestinians, who lost what remained of their homeland (Tahhan, "The Naksa: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine in 1967"). The collective memory of the Palestinian people is still deeply scarred by the Naksa, a tragedy that has shaped their continuous battle for justice and the right to return to their homes. Palestinian rights are still ignored in spite of multiple UN resolutions demanding compensation, property restoration, and refugee repatriation.

The Naksa was a continuation of a previous major incident that laid the groundwork for the 1967 war, in which Israel annexed all of ancient Palestine, as well as additional territory from Egypt and Syria. By the end of the conflict, Israel had removed an additional 300,000

Palestinians from their homes, including 130,000 who had been displaced in 1948, and gained three and a half times its original area (Tahhan, "The Naksa: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine in 1967").

Converging historical grievances and calculated geopolitical moves led to the conflict's start. After the war of 1948, ongoing hostilities along the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Jordanian borders raised tensions and brought attention to the unresolved problem of Palestinian displacement. Retaliatory acts exacerbated the tensions, most notably the 1953 massacre in Qibya. The regional environment became more difficult due to the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the rise of Palestinian armed factions, as well as disagreements over vital resources, especially water rights. Misleading alerts and calculated actions, like Egypt blocking the Gulf of Aqaba, made matters worse (Tahhan, "The Naksa: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine in 1967").

Finally, the conflict was sparked by Israel's preemptive strike on Egypt's airbases in June 1967, which reflected the culmination of long-standing grievances and strategic imperatives. While historians and commentators disagree on the motivations for the war, some argue that Israeli territorial ambitions, as voiced by people such as Yigal Allon, played an important influence in influencing the conflict's trajectory (Tahhan, "The Naksa: How Israel Occupied the Whole of Palestine in 1967").

Following the 1967 war, Israel captured East Jerusalem, which it formally annexed in 1980 with the Jerusalem Law. Resolution 478, however, declared this statute to be "null and void" by the UN. The majority of countries view the West Bank and East Jerusalem as occupied Palestinian land, and the Palestinians want East Jerusalem to become their future capital. Major nations do not recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with the exception of the US. Even so, in 2017 President Trump relocated the US embassy to that location. The majority of other

countries keep their embassies in Tel Aviv, with the exception of Papua New Guinea, Guatemala, Honduras, and Kosovo (“How does Israel’s occupation of Palestine work?”). International law governing occupation has been criticised for not being followed by Israel during its possession of the Palestinian territory. There are currently about 750,000 Israeli settlers residing on Palestinian land as a result of the decades-long construction of an increasing number of illegal settlements.

1.2.5.2. The Palestine Liberation Organization

In order to free Palestine, secure Palestinian self-determination, and ensure the return of the refugees, the PLO was established in 1964. It was developed during an Arab League conference in Cairo and supported the use of force to accomplish its objectives. On May 28, 1964, in Jerusalem, 422 Palestinian leaders convened to choose Ahmed Shuqri as their leader. Along with drafting a National Covenant and Basic Law, the conference also established the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the PLO Executive Committee, a National Fund, and a legislative body called the Palestinian National Council (PNC). At that point, the PLO evolved into an umbrella group for many Palestinian factions and took on a crucial role in organising Palestinians across the globe and directing foreign assistance towards their cause. In addition to creating departments for Palestinians in need of health, education, and other services, the PLO also built a de facto government with its own foreign policy, information offices, and security forces (PLO, “The Palestinian Liberation Organisation”).

Following Israel's victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, the PLO started to increase its presence. Yasser Arafat, a military leader, formed a group known as Fatah that began to infiltrate and take control of the organisation. Arafat assumed the role of Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee in 1969 and remained in that capacity until his passing in 2004 (History "PLO").

From its bases in Jordan, the PLO began attacking Israel in the late 1960s. The PLO was obliged to move its headquarters from Jordan to Lebanon in 1971. While in Lebanon, PLO factions started focusing more on carrying out terrorism plots, such as high-profile bombings and aircraft hijackings, rather than attacking Israeli military targets. Arafat demanded in 1974 that the PLO cease its attacks on targets outside of Israel as part of a strategy to win legitimacy and acceptability throughout the world (History "PLO"). Palestinian interests are represented by the PLO in talks with Israel and on the international scene, and it remains a significant force in Palestinian politics. Notwithstanding continuous difficulties and internal conflicts among the Palestinian leadership, it continues to play a vital role in forming the national identity and ambitions of the Palestinian people.

The PLO was acknowledged by the UN General Assembly as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" on October 14, 1974. It was acknowledged in a similar manner as the only authorised representative of the Palestinian people at the Arab League's Rabat Summit two weeks later, on October 28. From their base in Algiers, the PLO declared Palestinian independence on November 15, 1988. The same month, they officially acknowledged Israel's existence inside its 1967 borders and gave up terrorism. Israel acknowledged the PLO as the authorised representative of the Palestinian people in 1993. Following Arafat's passing on November 11, 2004, Mahmoud Abbas has led the PLO. For now it is responsible for negotiating the permanent status issues towards a final agreement with Israel (PLO, "The Palestinian Liberation Organisation").

1.2.5.3. War of October 1973

Anwar el-Sadat (1918–81), who took office as president of Egypt in 1970, inherited a country in dire need of economic reform and unable to finance its never-ending war against Israel. He desired peace since it would bring stability and the Sinai back to Egypt, but it was doubtful that Israel would offer Egypt favourable conditions for peace in the wake of its triumph in 1967. Sadat therefore devised a bold scheme to strike Israel once again in the hopes that, even in the event of failure, it would persuade the Israelis that peace with Egypt was necessary. In 1972, Sadat drove out 20,000 Soviet advisors from Egypt and established fresh diplomatic relations with Washington, D.C., an important ally of Israel that would play a pivotal role as a mediator in any peace negotiations in the future. He forged a new alliance with Syria and organised a coordinated offensive against Israel (Onion "Yom Kippur War").

On October 6, 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out. At that time, many Israeli soldiers were off duty for Yom Kippur, also known as the Day of Atonement, and the Arab armies had made significant progress using their modern Soviet weapons. Soon after, Iraqi forces entered the conflict, and Jordan backed Syria. After a few days, Israel had fully mobilised, and at great expense to soldiers and equipment, the Israel Defence Forces started to reverse the advantages made by the Arabs. Israel benefited from an armaments airlift from the U.S, but President Richard Nixon (1913–1994) gave Egypt a week's notice before providing emergency military assistance. The UN succeeded in securing an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire on October 25 (Onion "Yom Kippur War"). The UN was instrumental in negotiating a truce between Egypt and Israel, which put an end to hostilities and a temporary halt to warfare.

Global ramifications of the war's aftermath were profound and immediate. After coming together for the first time, Arab oil producers sharply raised oil prices, which led to inflation and the end of the post-WWII economic boom. Until Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan's actions weakened unions, this inflation continued in the Anglosphere. After the war, right-wing

nationalist groups in Israel came together to form Likud, which came to power in 1977 and shaped the nation's expansionist philosophy and West Bank settlement policies. While all of this was going on, Anwar Sadat was in Egypt negotiating the restoration of Sinai. Three years later, he was assassinated, and among the conspirators was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who would go on to create al-Qaeda (“October 1973: The War That Changed Everything”).

1.2.5.4. Camp David I

The Camp David Accords were accords reached on September 17, 1978, between Israel and Egypt that resulted in the signing of a peace treaty the following year, the first between Israel and any of its Arab neighbours. The Camp David Accords, which were negotiated by U.S. President Jimmy Carter between Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and officially titled the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," came to be known as such because the negotiations took place at the U.S. presidential retreat in Camp David, Maryland. Sadat and Begin were given the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for their efforts to the agreements (Carter "Camp David Accords").

Sadat first made direct contact with Israel in November 1977. He then staged a dramatic visit to Jerusalem, where he addressed the Israeli Knesset, or parliament. However, Begin's attempt at a reciprocal visit failed, and little headway towards peace was achieved. First lady of the U.S Rosalynn Carter then recommended to her husband that he extend an invitation to Begin and Sadat to Camp David, located in rural Maryland, where the relative solitude and quiet could offer a conducive environment for a breakthrough (Carter "Camp David Accords").

After both leaders accepted Carter's offer, the summit took place for 13 days, starting on September 5, 1978. It was highly atypical for heads of state to participate in a summit gathering where the result was so uncertain. Not only had Egypt and Israel been at war for many years, but the leaders' divergent personalities also promised to make communication difficult.

Commence was meticulous in every way, always dressing and behaving in a formal manner. She was also wary of the potential consequences of any agreements. His expectations for what could be accomplished at Camp David were low, and he urged that the goal be restricted to creating an agenda for subsequent sessions. In contrast, Sadat was casual and outgoing, dressed stylishly for a sporting event, and open to engaging in extensive talks to resolve any contentious matters at the brief meeting (Carter "Camp David Accords").

Three days into the negotiations, the contentious talks came to a standstill, making direct communication between Begin and Sadat difficult. After that, Carter combined all of the recommendations into one document, gave it to the leaders individually, evaluated their feedback, and reworked the draft around twenty times before sending it back and forth for their approval. The chances of reaching a solution at Camp David looked so bad that Sadat threatened to withdraw as the days went by, and Carter made plans to go back to the White House and face the political fallout that would probably follow. On the last day, however, a deal was struck when Begin abruptly consented to let the Knesset decide what would happen to the Israeli colonies that had been built on the Sinai Peninsula which Begin had promised not to forsake and which Sadat had ordered razed (Carter "Camp David Accords").

The final result of these negotiations, known as the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," was divided into three sections: (1) a procedure for the establishment of Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank; (2) a structure for the conclusion of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel; and (3) a comparable structure for peace agreements between Israel and its other neighbours. The Israeli Knesset and the prime minister decided that the Israeli political and military forces in the occupied territories would be replaced by an elected Palestinian government that would rule itself during a transitional period (Carter "Camp David Accords"). Even while the accords did not end all problems in the region right away, they did

signal a dramatic change from "a state of near-constant conflict to an era of peacemaking" and set the stage for other developments, like the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO.

President Carter's Camp David ideas were largely reflected in the peace accord that Egypt and Israel signed in March 1979, officially ending their state of war. Israel consented to leave the Sinai, and Egypt pledged to restore diplomatic ties between the two nations and allow Israeli ships—which had previously been prohibited from using the canal—to pass via the Suez Canal. These instructions were appropriately followed. Instead of adopting Egypt's strategy, the majority of Arab nations shunned Egypt and drove it out of the Arab League. The accords were also rejected by the PLO, which claimed to speak for the Palestinian people (Carter "Camp David Accords").

1.2.5.5. Intifada

The First Intifada was a popular resistance movement led by Palestinians that began on December 9, 1987, and ended on September 13, 1993. Following the December 8, 1987, run-over of four Palestinian men by an Israeli jeep outside the Jabalya refugee camp in Gaza, popular demonstrations against the 20 years of Israeli occupation and oppression of the Palestinian people began in the camps housing Palestinian refugees and eventually expanded throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) (Makan "First Intifada").

According to Raji Sourani "The Intifada message was simple. [...] The message is that the Palestinian people don't want occupation. They want self-determination. The whole world has received this message" (Sourani Stories From the Intifada). By boycotting, demonstrating, and closing their businesses, Palestinians mostly used nonviolent means to express their resistance to the Israeli occupation. Many people consider the First Intifada to be the pinnacle of Palestinian mobilisation in history. Israel killed, injured, deported, and jailed thousands of Palestinians in an attempt to quell the protests. 1,162 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli

soldiers and civilians between December 9, 1987, and September 13, 1993, according to B'Tselem. In the same timeframe, Palestinians killed sixty Israeli troops and one hundred Israeli civilians. During this period, as a sort of retribution, the Israeli military also destroyed 493 Palestinian homes and filled 404 with cement (Makan "First Intifada").

The First Intifada also saw the growth of Islamist entities such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad as a reaction to the PLO perceived ineffectiveness and capitulation to Israeli power. Nonetheless, in response to the Intifada, the PLO and the Israeli government held negotiations in Madrid in 1991, followed by Oslo Accords (Makan "First Intifada"). By highlighting the necessity of talks, mutual recognition, and a fair resolution of fundamental issues like borders, refugees, and Jerusalem, the First Intifada set the stage for diplomatic attempts towards a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Thus began the process of negotiations, which was headed by dependable and representative individuals. Some of these individuals were senior leaders such as Haydar Abd al-Shafi and Faisal al-Husseini, while others had developed during the Intifada and included Hanan Ashrawi, Ghassan al-Khatib, and Saeb Erekat. The negotiations took place first in Madrid on October 30, 1991, and in Washington. The people, as well as their local leadership, were ready to combine resistance actions with ongoing negotiations based on national self-determination, which were backed, it should be mentioned, by Palestinians living abroad as well as some who were in refugee camps ("The First Intifada, 1987-1993- Exhilaration of Revolt, Promise of Freedom").

1.3. Palestine in Post-Cold War Era

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, Palestine became a major international focus, characterised by major diplomatic initiatives and turbulent events. Key players were brought together to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the 1991 Madrid Conference, which

is remembered as a turning point in the quest for regional peace. After that, while with mixed outcomes, the Oslo Accords of 1993 offered a framework for negotiations aimed at forging a durable peace. The Second Intifada, a time of extreme violence and instability in the region, began in 2000, however the collapse of Camp David II dampened the hope that these agreements had created.

1.3.1. The Madrid Conference

The failure of the US and Israel to respond significantly to PLO moderation led to PLO opposition to the US-led attack on Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The PLO did not support Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, but it saw Saddam Hussein's challenge to the U.S and Gulf oil-exporting countries as an opportunity to change the regional status quo and draw attention to the Palestine issue. Following the fighting, the PLO became diplomatically isolated. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia withdrew their financial support, driving the PLO to the edge of crisis (The Madrid Conference 38).

Following the Gulf War, the U.S sought to solidify its position in the Middle East by encouraging a resolution to the Arab-Israeli issue. Despite their opposition to the PLO, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were eager to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and alleviate the regional instability it caused. The Bush administration felt committed to its Arab friends and persuaded a hesitant Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (of the Likud party) to initiate negotiations with the Palestinians and Arab states at a multilateral conference held in Madrid, Spain in October 1991. The US accepted Shamir's criteria, which excluded the PLO from the discussions and did not explicitly address Palestinian desires for independence and statehood (The Madrid Conference 38). The Bush administration demonstrated a proactive approach to conflict resolution by attempting to negotiate with Israel and Arab states during the Madrid summit.

This underscores the significance of multilateral engagement in resolving long-standing problems.

The Madrid meeting was mostly symbolic, with the goal of launching a new international peace initiative. The substance arrived after the summit, in the shape of distinct 'tracks' of bilateral discussions. This meant that Israel conducted separate negotiations with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians. In future negotiating meetings in Washington, D.C., Palestinians were represented by a delegation from the occupied areas rather than the PLO. Participants in this delegation required Israeli consent, and citizens of East Jerusalem were prohibited due to the city's status as part of Israel. Despite being nominally excluded from these talks, the PLO's leaders provided regular advice to the Palestinian team. Although Israeli and Palestinian officials met numerous times, little progress was made. Later, after leaving office, Prime Minister Shamir publicly stated that his strategy was to postpone the Washington negotiations for ten years, at which point the annexation of the West Bank would be completed (The Madrid Conference 38).

In June 1992, Yitzhak Rabin led a new Labour Party government in Israel that promised to conclude an Israeli-Palestinian peace quickly. Rather, the Washington negotiations broke down in December 1992 when Israel drove out more than 400 Palestinians living in the occupied territories on the grounds that they were radical Islamist activists, though they had not been proven or proven otherwise. The situation for human rights in Gaza and the West Bank drastically worsened after Rabin took office. Several Palestinian delegates resigned as a result, undermining the legitimacy of the delegation to the Washington negotiations (The Madrid Conference 38). The deteriorating state of human rights under Rabin's administration in Gaza and the West Bank highlights the fine line that must be drawn between security considerations and upholding basic rights in areas of conflict.

The failure to make headway in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the worsening of the human rights and economic situations in Gaza and the West Bank contributed to the rise in popularity of a radical Islamist opposition to the PLO. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade was formed by Hamas as a military wing dedicated to killing Israelis and Palestinian accomplices. Tensions were further escalated by Hamas and Islamic Jihad's violent attacks on Israeli targets. Ironically, Israeli authorities had supported and assisted Islamist groups prior to the intifada in an effort to weaken support for the PLO's secular nationalism and to divide Palestinians living in the occupied territories. As Islamists' popularity expanded and threatened the PLO's relative moderation, Israeli leaders began to regret their policy of fostering political Islam. Eventually, Yitzhak Rabin concluded that Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the larger Islamic forces of which they were a part posed a greater threat to Israel than the PLO (The Madrid Conference 38).

1.3.2. The Oslo Accords

On September 9, 1993, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), delivered a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognising Israel. The letter is significant and worth quoting :

The PLO recognises the right of the state of Israel to exist in peace and security. The PLO accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides ...Accordingly, the PLO renounces use of terrorism and other acts of violence, and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators ... (T) he PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist ... are now inoperative and no longer valid (Malik 135). In contrast to previous rhetoric that rejected Israel's legitimacy, the PLO indicates a shift

in position by calling some provisions of the Palestinian Covenant "inoperative and no longer valid," raising the possibility of more diplomatic communication and collaboration.

In response to the letter, Yitzhak Rabin stated that Israel recognises the PLO as the genuine representative of the Palestinian people and will begin negotiations with them as part of the Middle East peace process. Mutual recognition enabled the formal signing of the Oslo Accords (Malik 135).

On September 13, 1993, the first Oslo Accord, or Oslo I, was signed. Both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders recognised each other for the first time as a result of their agreement. The parties also promised to put a stop to their long-running dispute. Oslo II, a follow-up agreement, was signed in September 1995 and provided further information about the composition of the organisations that the peace process was meant to establish ("What Were the Oslo Accords Between Israel and the Palestinians").

The Oslo Accords were intended to enable the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination by creating a state alongside Israel. This would imply that Israel, which was established in 1948 during the Nakba, an event known to Palestinians as the formation of historic Palestine, would recognise claims to national sovereignty made by the Palestinians. But the claims would only cover a portion of historic Palestine; Israel would retain authority over the remaining territory ("What Were the Oslo Accords Between Israel and the Palestinians"). There was no clear Palestinian state as a result of the accords, and there were obstacles in the way, such as Israel's sluggish troop withdrawal and unresolved problems with Jerusalem's status, borders, and settlements. A formal peace treaty was not reached during the Oslo process, which left important issues unsolved and raised doubts about the possibility of a two-state solution.

Map 4: The Occupied West Bank


OCCUPIED WEST BANK

Areas A, B and C

In 1995, as part of the Oslo Accords, the occupied West Bank was divided into three areas: A, B and C.

Area A
18%

Under Palestinian control



Area B
22%

Under joint Israeli-Palestinian control



Area C
60%

Under Israeli control



Source: OCHA | September 13, 2023



Source: “What Were the Oslo Accords Between Israel and the Palestinians?” *Al Jazeera*, 26 Sept. 2023, www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/13/what-were-oslo-accords-israel-palestinians.

Regretfully, though, right-wing Israelis were unwilling to make any kind of compromise with the Palestinians and were opposed to any kind of accord with the PLO, which they viewed as a "terrorist organisation." Additionally, Israeli settlers feared that it would result in their forced relocation from the occupied territories' illegal colonies. In the meantime, Palestinian organisations like Islamic Jihad and Hamas issued warnings, claiming that a two-state solution would negate the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the ancient territories that were taken from them in 1948 when Israel was established (“What Were the Oslo Accords Between Israel and the Palestinians”).

Furthermore, Rabin was killed in 1995 for signing the Oslo Accords because of the strong opposition from far-right elements. Itamar Ben-Gvir, the current Minister of National Security in Israel, was one of the individuals who had threatened Rabin prior to his passing. As a result, a definitive treaty was supposed to be achieved in five years, but it hasn't ("What Were the Oslo Accords Between Israel and the Palestinians").

1.3.3. Camp David II and the 2000 Uprising

It was July 2000 that marked the final significant effort to find a solution to the problems between Israel and the Palestinians. At his retreat in western Maryland known as Camp David, US President Bill Clinton extended an invitation to Yasser Arafat, the chairman of the Palestinian Authority, and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to meet. The strategy for this summit was "all or nothing," with no room for compromise or partial agreements. The two sides were to work towards an agreement on the status of settlements and territory, Jerusalem and the Temple Mount, refugees and the Palestinian demand for the right of return, and security arrangements (Lipman "What Really Happened at the Camp David II Summit").

The Clinton proposal sought to resolve critical concerns in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In terms of territory, Palestinians were offered 94%-96% of the West Bank, as well as land swaps to obtain virtually all of their desired area. Security measures included a three-year phased departure of the Israeli army, which was replaced by an international force with a limited Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley. Jerusalem was divided into Arab and Jewish neighbourhoods, with shared jurisdiction over sacred landmarks. The refugee problem would be addressed by declaring Palestine as the refugee's country and offering international support. The accord aimed to definitively stop the fighting and violence while addressing Israeli aspirations (Lipman "What Really Happened at the Camp David II Summit"). The plan's vision for Jerusalem demonstrated an appreciation of the symbolic and theological value of the city

while attempting to manage its complexity in a reasonable and courteous manner to guarantee access for all.

On December 27, 2000, the Israeli government decided to approve the proposal. Although Arafat never formally answered "no" to Clinton, he never replied "yes," which effectively meant that the idea was rejected, bringing an unceremonious end to Camp David II and Clinton's efforts to broker peace. Arafat was cited as saying the following in notes made by White House representatives during the Camp David II negotiations in an attempt to persuade the Palestinian leader to accept the agreement:

The Palestinian leader who will give up Jerusalem has not yet been born. I will not betray my people or the trust they have placed in me. Don't look to me to legitimize the occupation. No one can continue indefinitely to impose domination by military force – look at South Africa. Our people will not accept less than their rights as stated by international resolutions and international legality (Lipman "What Really Happened at the Camp David II Summit"). By drawing parallels between the fight against apartheid and the Palestinian aspiration for self-determination, the comparison to South Africa emphasises the leader's faith in the ultimate triumph of justice and equality.

Some said that the Palestinians felt they should have full sovereignty over all of eastern Jerusalem, including the Western Wall, and acknowledgement of the full right of return for Palestinian refugees, and that the land swaps being offered to them were inferior to the lands they were giving up in the West Bank (Lipman "What Really Happened at the Camp David II Summit").

During this time, a Palestinian crowd in Ramallah attacked two off-duty Israeli reservists, lynching them and celebrating their deaths. Within a short period, grassroots participation in

the violence dwindled, and Palestinians resorted to directly attacking Israeli civilian centres, military installations, vehicles, and civilians with suicide bombings, drive-by shootings, and rocket launches, killing over 1,000 Israelis and injuring thousands more (Adl "The Second Intifada 2000").

In several ways, Israel tried to retaliate against Palestinian violence. To dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, it most directly participated in military operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. After a Hamas suicide attack on March 22, 2002, during a Passover seder at a hotel in Netanya that left thirty people dead and 140 injured, a significant invasion was initiated in March and April of that same year. The Israeli government took aggressive steps in 2003, authorising the construction of a security fence or barrier to keep Palestinian terrorists from reaching their civilian targets within Israel (Adl "The Second Intifada 2000").

Several international initiatives were made to resolve the crisis, such as the Mitchell Plan, which called for an end to violence, Israeli confidence-building measures, and final status negotiations; and the Tenet Plan, which was put forth by CIA Director George Tenet and called for an end to Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The U.S, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the U.S—collectively known as "The Quartet"—announced in September 2002 that they would be supporting "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." an terror and violence, Israeli confidence-building measures, and final status negotiations (Adl "The Second Intifada 2000"). In order to foster an atmosphere that is favourable to communication and compromise between the parties, these attempts included confidence-building measures including Israeli withdrawals, prisoner releases, and the demolition of settlement outposts.

In conclusion, the collapse of Camp David II in 2000 laid the groundwork for ongoing tensions and conflict in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. This unresolved dynamic would add

to the complexity leading up to the Second October War of 2023, highlighting the persistent challenges in achieving long-term peace in the region.

1.4. Understanding the Second October War of 2023 in Israel-Palestine

Resolved tensions erupted into the Second October War of 2023 in Israel-Palestine, bringing with it great bloodshed and misery. Two possible outcomes from the aftermath are either ongoing conflict and instability or fresh diplomatic attempts for peace. Everyone's willingness to put communication and compromise first will determine how things turn out.

1.4.1. What Happened?

In October 2023, Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa, attacking Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip. They used a variety of techniques, including rocket barrages, infiltration using motorised hang gliders and motorcycles, and disguised vehicles, to attack military bases and civilians (Taft "The Second October War: Israel's War With Hamas").

The assault had disastrous repercussions, with considerable casualties among Israeli troops and police. According to accounts, as than 1,400 Israelis were slain, and nearly 200 were kidnapped. The majority of the deaths were civilians, including infants, children, and young adults, especially those living in settlements along the Gaza-Israeli border. 260 people died and numerous others were abducted as a result of the violence, which notably turned the Super Nova music festival in Re'im into a focal point. Roughly thirty American citizens also lost their lives in the fight. Since innocent lives were lost and the attacks were severe, the situation quickly became more urgent, generating concern among many and drawing attention from around the world (Taft "The Second October War: Israel's War With Hamas").

Even though they were completely unprepared, the Israeli government and the Israel Defense Forces reacted swiftly to the unfolding events; an hour after the incursion, the IDF

issued security alerts, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared war. In less than two hours, Israel launched airstrikes on Gaza after bringing up 300,000 reservists—the largest number since the 1967 Six-Day War. It took until Tuesday, October 10th, to retake control of the territories surrounding the Gaza Strip despite this and the orders to evacuate Israeli communities close to the strip. Along with tightening its blockade, Israel also cut off Gaza's supply of food, gasoline, electricity, and water and declared that it would not remove it or bring back power or water until the captives were freed (Taft "The Second October War: Israel's War With Hamas").

During the fighting, the Palestinian Ministry of Health estimated that Israeli airstrikes killed roughly 7,028 Palestinians, while thousands more were injured. Furthermore, nearly a million Palestinians were driven from their homes after Israel issued a 24-hour evacuation order in northern Gaza. Several Arab countries condemned Israel's actions, accusing it of aggravating the humanitarian catastrophe by forcibly removing Palestinians from Gaza. Meanwhile, Israel justified its operations as required to counter threats presented by Hamas and other violent organisations (Taft "The Second October War: Israel's War With Hamas").

Israel experienced international criticism from 2023 to 2024 as a result of civilian losses and destruction in Gaza. President Biden recognised Israel's declining popularity. Israel modified its policy in January 2024, resulting in fewer daily casualties. Mediation initiatives advocated a break in violence in exchange for negotiations, which included prisoner releases. Israel's strategy to prolong the conflict sparked worries, raising tensions with the United States. The IDF planned civilian evacuations, while the US decided not to veto a UN cease-fire resolution (The Israel-Hamas War).

1.4.2. What Could Happen Next?

There is a sense of hopelessness in the region due to the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Hamas, which is currently in its ninth week. However, new diplomatic initiatives provide a glimmer of hope for peace amid the chaos of war. The successful hostage exchange facilitated by the U.S, Qatar, and Egypt after a brief ceasefire shows that talks and negotiations can take place even when there is bloodshed. This coordinated attempt to lower hostilities and improve communication between the opposing sides emphasises how important diplomacy is in settling complicated disputes (Zaha, Daniel and Omar “How Will This War End? How Can the Next One Be Prevented?”).

The importance of regional stakeholders in diplomatic procedures is demonstrated by Qatar's role as a major mediator in regional conflicts. Through its diplomatic channels, Qatar has been instrumental in mediating talks and forging agreements between Israel and Hamas. Hamas has welcomed the ceasefire plan put forth by Qatari and Egyptian mediators, despite Israel's misgivings about it due to differences with its demands (Hamas accepts Qatari-Egyptian proposal for Gaza ceasefire).

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's administration has stated that it intends to work with mediators to reach a possible compromise, notwithstanding Israel's position. Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, expressed in a statement that his organisation approved the ceasefire proposal to Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the prime minister of Qatar, and Abbas Kamel, the minister of intelligence in Egypt. This demonstrated Hamas's willingness to pursue diplomatic channels for a settlement (Hamas accepts Qatari-Egyptian proposal for Gaza ceasefire).

Even if there are still many obstacles in the way of peace, the most recent diplomatic developments offer some hope for the future. Building-confidence initiatives like prisoner

swaps and altruistic acts have prepared the way for further talks aimed at a long-term solution. Nonetheless, the path ahead will necessitate a persistent dedication from all stakeholders and ongoing backing from the global community. In the end, the recent events serve as a reminder that, even in the middle of conflict, diplomacy may still be a ray of hope for a better future for the area (Hamas accepts Qatari-Egyptian proposal for Gaza ceasefire).

To sum up, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a deeply ingrained struggle for territory, identity, and sovereignty that has lasted since the fall of the Ottoman Empire until the recent events of the Second October War of 2023. Fueled by historical grudges and rival nationalist aspirations, the war continues despite sporadic attempts at peace, such as the Oslo Accords and the Madrid Conference. The events of 2023 highlight the critical necessity for an all-encompassing and inclusive strategy for peacebuilding that guarantees the rights and dignity of all parties engaged while addressing the underlying causes of the conflict.

Looking ahead, establishing a lasting peace in the area will need sincere communication, compassion, and a dedication to justice. There is yet hope for a future where everyone can live in peace and security by acknowledging the humanity and justifiable grievances of both Israelis and Palestinians, as well as by establishing an atmosphere of trust and collaboration.

End Notes

¹According to Justin McCarthy's findings, Palestine saw a considerable population decrease of more than 6% during the war years, owing to a mix of starvation, sickness, casualties, and deportations. Meanwhile, agricultural production declined, aggravated by a locust outbreak in 1915, which decimated already depleted harvests. These two crises offered severe hurdles to relief operations in Jerusalem and elsewhere, emphasising the enormous hardships faced by the public during this turbulent time .

Jacobson, Abigail. «A City Living through Crisis: Jerusalem during World War I.» *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36.1 (2009): 73-92. JSTOR. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/40593219>>.

²The Sykes-Picot Agreement (annexe1): was a secret 1916 agreement between Great Britain and France, with Russia assenting, that defined their mutually agreed spheres of influence and control in Southwestern Asia, under control of the declining Ottoman Empire.

Boundless. Partition of the Ottoman Empire | World Civilizations I (HIS101) – Biel. <https://courses.lumenlearning.com/suny-fmcc-boundless-worldhistory/chapter/partition-of-the-ottoman-empire/>

³During World War II, the Nazi regime's murderous plan known as the "Final Solution": sought to systematically eliminate the Jewish population of Europe. This phrase, which was first used in 1942 during the Wannsee Conference, sums up the horrific use of concentration camps, gas chambers, and other systematic acts of violence to carry out mass murder. As a result, millions of people the Nazis deemed undesirable—such as Romani people, people with disabilities, and political dissidents—as well as approximately six million Jews perished.

“What Was the ‘Final Solution’? :: About Holocaust.” About Holocaust, <https://aboutholocaust.org/en/facts/what-was-the-final-solution>

⁴Arab nationalism: is a political ideology asserting that Arabs constitute a single nation. As a traditional nationalist ideology, it promotes Arab culture and civilization, celebrates Arab history, glorifies the Arabic language as well as Arabic literature, and calls for the rejuvenation of Arab society through total unification.[1] It bases itself on the premise that the people of the Arab world — from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea — constitute one nation bound together by a common identity: ethnicity, language, culture, history, geography, and politics.

Wikipedia contributors. “Arab Nationalism.” Wikipedia, 14 Apr. 2024, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_nationalism.

Chapter two

Examining the U.S. Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a diverse and long-standing issue characterized by a complex interplay of connections and interests, particularly the difficult relationship between the U.S. and Israel. This post-WWII connection has been critical in maintaining Israel's sovereignty over Palestinian areas and its treatment of Palestinians, despite international condemnation. The U.S. ongoing support, which includes political, economic, and military aid, protected Israel from serious consequences and slowed the advancement of resolutions critical of Israeli actions at the U.N.

Following the events of WW II, the Middle East experienced a transformation with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. For the U.S. the establishment of Israel represented both an opportunity and a challenge. Embracing Israel's democratic values and common strategic interests, the U.S. quickly emerged as a significant partner, providing critical military aid and political support. However, this support has strained relations with Arab states in the area and fueled resentment among Palestinians and their supporters, highlighting the complexity and consequences of the US-Israel relationship in the Middle Eastern environment.

As the Cold War began, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict got entangled in the larger ideological fight between East and West, with the U.S. casting itself as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. The containment of Arab nationalism and the safeguarding of Western interests in the area became top priorities for American politicians, strengthening the US-Israeli alliance.

The US administration faced the complexity of integrating assistance for Israel with larger regional objectives. From George H.W. Bush's careful pragmatism to Donald Trump's openly pro-Israel agenda, each president used their strategy to manage the complexities of the

Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Nonetheless, despite continuous shifts in the policy, the core dynamics of the US-Israeli relationship remained essentially intact, anchored by shared ideals, strategic imperatives, and domestic political concerns.

Against this backdrop, Middle Eastern states play an important role in defining the direction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan all wield substantial power in the area, presenting both possibilities and challenges to achieving peace and security. Their changing connections with Israel, along with their own internal and regional issues, add another layer of complication to an already intricate geopolitical issue.

The chapter is structured into four primary sections, each providing a unique perspective on the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the role of the U.S. The first section examines the U.S.-Israel Special Relationship, tracing its origins from the post-WWII era to the present, and analyzing its strategic foundations. This section also explores the support for Israel and the containment of Arab nations following WWII. The second section investigates the double standards in U.S. presidential policies towards Israel after the Cold War Era, examining the diverse approaches of different administrations, from George Bush to Donald Trump. The third section evaluates the new vision of the Biden administration in the aftermath of the Second October Conflict of 2023, probing the evolving stance towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Finally, the chapter considers the influence of Middle Eastern states, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan, on the regional dynamics of the conflict, shedding light on their contributions to peace and stability in the Middle East.

2.1. Analyzing the U.S-Israeli Special Relationship

The special relationship between the U.S. and Israel has been a cornerstone of international relations, particularly concerning supporting Israel and containing Arab actions since the end of WWII. The alliance has influenced diplomatic efforts, shifted the dynamics of the region, and sparked debates regarding the U.S. position as a key player in Middle Eastern affairs.

2.1.1. Support of Israel and the Containment of Arabs after World War II

After World War II, the U.S. supported the formation of a Jewish state. President John F. Kennedy emphasized it in 1962, referring to it as a special connection sharing a deep historical and financial relationship, on a common belief that Israel has the right to exist peacefully. Historically, US officials have always maintained that the US-Israeli relationship is a strategic cost in stabilizing the Middle East and preventing instability that would jeopardize America's long-standing access to the region's oil supply. Israel exchanges over \$50 billion in products and offers with the US annually (Narea, "US-Israel Support: How the US Became Israel's Closest Ally").

In 2013 Vice President Joe Biden referred to the relationship with Israel as a moral and strategic commitment that if there were no Israel America would create one. The fact that the world recognizes Israel as an independent state by the world, aligns with the strategic objectives of the U.S. government (Narea, "US-Israel Support: How the US Became Israel's Closest Ally"). Narea emphasizes the shared benefits and strategic relevance of the alliance with Israel in safeguarding American strategic interests and stabilizing the Middle East.

John J. Mearsheimer argued that the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. has significant power in influencing U.S. foreign policy towards Israel and employs legal political tactics to change the scales in debates and decisions, however, this lobby does not represent the entire Jewish American community. The lobby influences the election results as well as how the media

communicates, and those who oppose the lobby's aims may face resistance, such as losing the opportunity to speak publicly. When the US public generally agrees with Israel, this does not imply unconditional support (The University of Chicago, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy: John J. Mearsheimer”). This deviation shows how the lobby functions in supporting policies that meet its needs, which may not always agree with the larger public opinion, showing the significant role of the lobby in determining American policy towards Israel.

Under Egypt's President Nasser, Arab nationalism thrived in the 1950s and 60s, reinforcing Arab ties during a period of modernization. The movement supported women's rights, expanded social services, developed resources, reformed land, enhanced the economy, and provided universal education. Islam at that time was viewed as an obstacle to development. The world was divided into developed countries and Third world countries, communist and capitalist, and socialist and Marxist doctrines, that impacted the movement. The Pan-Arab movement encouraged resistance against Israel, independence from superpowers, and socioeconomic changes for equality. Arab nationalism responded to European imperialism, and then the Arab countries were inspired by Nasser. Additional supporters were Saddam Hussein, who promoted an Arab golden era through violence, and Anton Saadah of the Greater Syria movement. Unfortunately, the Arab nationalism movement came to an end with the 1967 Six-Day War loss, which sharply raised tensions between Arabs and non-Arabs (Hays, “Middle East After World War II”).

After WW II the world was divided into the Communist East and the West, which gave Arab countries new opportunities, while before WWI, neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union had a substantial presence or interest in the Middle East or North Africa. Seeking safety from American, British, and French action, these newly constituted Middle Eastern countries sought help from the USSR. In 1957, during Eisenhower's presidency, the Soviet daily Izvestia said that the U.S. intended to worsen the global crisis, reignite violence, and sabotage UN peace

efforts in the Middle East. It claimed that Washington's Middle East approach was a continuation of previous actions that had triggered major world crises and led to the Communist threat. Plans were developed when the USSR sought to grab control of the Persian Gulf oil deposits during the Cold War but eventually, Socialism and communism came apart with the end of the Cold War and Soviet support, and so did Arab nationalism in the Middle East (Hays, "Middle East After World War II"). The role and action of the U.S. in the region increased the global crises and contributed to the rise of communism.

The US-Israeli alliance, formed during WWII, has been more than just a strategic necessity; it is an interaction of economic and political interests, greatly influenced by the pro-Israel lobby. This connection, although vital for regional security, frequently deviates from popular sentiment and has had a significant impact on Middle Eastern geopolitics. The rise and fall of Arab nationalism, affected by global ideological differences, has had a considerable impact on the region's political narrative, with the US playing a more aggressive role post-Cold War, reflecting the controversial nature of US foreign policy.

2.2. Double Standards in US Presidents towards Israel after the Cold War Era

The relationship between the U.S. and Israel in the post-Cold War era exhibited clear double standards in U.S. Presidents' approaches. Due to, the consistent support to Israel's security and prosperity, certain actions and policies have raised questions about its impartiality and consistency. Various administrations shaped U.S. policy toward Israel, including domestic politics, strategic interests, and broader Middle East dynamics, creating adverse consequences.

2.2.1 George Bush

During George Bush's period of presidency, the US and USSR co-sponsored a Middle East peace conference in 1991, hosted by Spain. The conference's main aim was to reestablish peace negotiations between Arabs and Israel by inviting Arab nations, involving Israel, Syria,

Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians, before diverging into discussions between the two parties. Meanwhile, the Madrid conference did not achieve to stop the Arab-Israeli conflict. President George W.H. Bush shed light on the historical importance of that conference, taking into account that the conference was followed by the Oslo Accords and the Israel-Jordan peace treaty (“The Madrid Conference of 1991: 30 Years On.”). Despite the conference's dedicated focus on fostering regional cooperation, the reality on the ground was horrible, the situation in the occupied territories epitomized this unfair dissonance, characterized by a state of upheaval and suffering that diverged sharply from the conference's overarching objectives.

The American agenda of the Middle East included extended and difficult shuttle diplomacy before and after the 1991 allied ground campaign in Kuwait. The goal was to do what the Reagan Plan had failed to do after the 1982 conflict of position the U.S. as the dominant force in the area through a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The resolution's goal was to reconcile the key American allies in the region between Saudi Arabia and Israel, to reduce tensions in US-Saudi ties that had existed since 1945. As a result, the Bush administration attempted to capitalize on potential outcomes of the Middle East war, using America's greatly improved global stature post-Cold War. These included three major Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, joining forces with the U.S. in the military campaign against Iraq, the elimination of Iraq's offensive capabilities as the region's best military force, and the PLO's significant weakening as a result of its alliance with defeated Iraq (Khalidi 30, 31).

The Palestinian leadership's alliance with Iraq proved strategically unwise, alienating Arab Gulf governments critical to the PLO's finances and leaving Palestinian populations in the Gulf exposed to reprisals. Following Kuwait's freedom, half a million Palestinians feared mass displacement. As a result, the PLO faced substantial debilitation, exacerbated by the fall of its old ally, the USSR. These regional tendencies appearing to strengthen the U.S. strategic

position in the Middle East following the Gulf War, may not be as beneficial as they seem (Khalidi 30, 31). The U.S. aims to be the dominant force in the Middle East with its strategic diplomacy leading to a significant weakening of the PLO, because of the alliance with Iraq making the Palestinians more vulnerable.

2.2.2. Bill Clinton

In September 1995, Oslo's second agreement was signed, it aimed to pave the way for Palestinian self-determination by establishing a sovereign state coexisting alongside Israel within delimited boundaries. Despite the assurances of a phased withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the territories under the occupation of Israel since 1967, The unresolved matters had critical issues like the status of Jerusalem and the legality of Israeli settlements remained unresolved, casting a shadow upon the agreement prospects (“What Were the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians?”).

The creation of the Palestinian Authority was declared by the accords, portraying administrative control in the West Bank areas A, B, and C. However, the Israeli occupation with the frequent incursions in the Palestinian-administered areas has prevented the effective implementation of the Accords, exposing the harsh realities on the ground and the gap between the promised progress. The Israel state has further raised tensions and extended the cycle of conflict, making it hard to continue true peace and autonomy in the area (“What Were the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians?”). The shortcomings of the Oslo Accords, saw a gradual deterioration as Israel persisted in occupying Palestine territory, refusing to leave the West Bank military, and conducting into areas that the Palestinian Administration believed to be fully administered.

In April 1996, after the Israeli force attacked the UN site in Qana, southern Lebanon, US President Bill Clinton defended Israel. Israel stated that the strike, which killed over 100

civilians and injured many more who sought refuge at the complex, was a mistake, however, a report filed to the UN Security Council indicated differently. It noted that, while not implausible, the distribution of strikes in the Qana region indicates that the bombing of the UN facility was not caused by technical or administrative mistakes (“Timeline: How US Presidents Have Defended Israel Over Decades.”).

Bill Clinton mentioned the terrible episode in Qana in a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a group that lobbies for pro-Israel legislation, ten days after the horrific slaughter. He stated that Lebanese children were unhappily engaged in a brutal conflict for two fundamental reasons. First, Hezbollah's deliberate actions included specific positioning and firing. Second, he highlighted an unfortunate misfire during Israel's legitimate act of self-defense, emphasizing the complexities of the case, and underlining the terrible conditions in which the innocent children of Qana found themselves (“Timeline: How US Presidents Have Defended Israel Over Decades.”). The U.S. defended Israel's errors, even when these errors threaten the peace in the Middle East, and disregarding the international law.

2.2.3. W. Bush

The Bush administration on January 20, 2001, implemented a strategy of global disengagement. This strategy covered Palestine, and the White House selected a policy of minimum engagement. During the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Washington, D.C. and New York City, the Israeli military launched intensive attacks in the West Bank. As a result, the Palestinians thought Sharon argued that Israel was using the US assaults as a pretext to increase the attacks against them. According to a Palestinian official, political diversions in Washington and New York will hide Israel's operations in the area, exploiting the absence of international attention (Gregory, “Palestine and the “War on Terror.”).

However, in order to create such a secret region, a carefully constructed area had to be replaced, proving that Israel's attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center acted as both a rationale and a diversion. In reaction to the circumstances, a political campaign was launched alongside the military operation. Sharon stated that the terrorism suffered by Israeli civilians is similar to bin Laden's terror activities against Americans. In the war against terror, the global society that values freedom is fighting destructive forces that threaten our freedom and way of life (Gregory, "Palestine and the "War on Terror.""). The Bush administration's policy of disengagement shows the intentional use of global events to hide, justify, and shift attention away from Israel's contentious actions against the Palestinians.

When asked about the underlying reasons for the September 9th terrorism in an interview, Edward Said, a Palestinian-American scholar, literary critic, and political activist, stated that they stem from a long history of US involvement in the affairs of the Islamic world, oil-rich regions, the Arab world, and the Middle East - areas deemed critical to US interests and security. The U.S. has played a unique role in a series of unfolding exchanges, which most Americans have either been shielded from or are unaware of. (Barsamian, "Interview with Edward W. Said."). Said argued that the U.S. played a significant role in the emergence of terrorism as a result of its involvement in the Middle East, which was motivated by strategic interests, particularly in oil and security, and that it maintained a military presence in the region and was involved in various conflicts and political developments in order to protect those interests.

During his first term, George W. Bush achieved very little advances in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This was partly because he took over an undeveloped process in January 2001. His policy was founded on diplomatic and political pragmatism, instead of personal principles or ideas. The events of 9/11 did not result in substantial changes to U.S. policy. However, during his second administration, Bush launched a new formal negotiating

procedure. This was the U.S. penultimate major effort to negotiate a peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians, a topic that has received little scholarly attention. When Barack Obama assumed office in early 2009, he showed few signs of picking up where Bush had left off (Smith, “Always Part of a Vision? The US and the Israel–Palestinian Dispute under George W. Bush and After.”).

Furthermore, the U.S. effectively ended serious dialogue with the Palestinians after Obama's chosen strategy failed before the end of his first term. The strategy became more clear, a course eventually taken by President Donald Trump. He minimized and pushed aside the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, preferring to focus on other critical Middle Eastern concerns instead (Smith, “Always Part of a Vision? The US and the Israel–Palestinian Dispute under George W. Bush and After.”). During George W. Bush's administration, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process made minimal progress, reflecting the administration's prioritization of domestic affairs and a strategic focus on Middle Eastern issues, which were more beneficial for the U.S. This approach underscores the complex interplay of domestic and international politics in shaping foreign policy decisions.

2.2.4. Barak Obama

During Obama's administration, U.S. policy was significantly biased in favor of Israel, despite making a stronger and more compelling case for Palestinian rights in the 2009 presidential election. The official goal of the U.S. was to achieve a negotiated two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians, but the progress was impossible due to Israel's adamant and clear refusal to halt settlement expansion, the administration's determination to maintain Israeli impunity in international fora, and the substantial taxpayer subsidy to the Israeli military equipment. Negotiations for a two-state solution have failed. The president who took over after Obama had to face a very different situation, primarily due to the rising impact of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaigns (Ruebner, “Obama’s Legacy on

Israel/Palestine.”). Obama's actions have weakened the peace process, because of the administration's unwillingness to stop the expansion settlement, allowing more actions that block peace efforts.

In contrast, Obama rejected the idea of presenting the peace plan and started indirect conversations in May. Netanyahu visited Washington in July 2010 in a significantly more friendly way than in March; yet, Abbas' vow to resume direct discussions with Israel in early September 2010 was the only result of the indirect negotiations, which were attended by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. When Netanyahu's temporary settlement pause expired on September 26, it was clear that the third phase of peacemaking would begin, but Abbas terminated the negotiations because they were insufficient and delayed. The fourth phase of the US campaign ended when Israel turned down a large offer from the US to give security assistance, including twenty F-35 fighter aircraft in exchange for a ninety-day extension of the settlement (Freedman, 73). Obama's administration had failed due to the absence of decisive action, and comprehensive preparation in the peace negotiation, which did not succeed because Israel continued the settlement.

In July-August 2014, Israel launched a 10-day aerial assault on Gaza Strip, followed by a military invasion. On July 18, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu contacted US President Barack Obama, who restated his strong support for Israel's right to self-defense, stressing that no government should tolerate bombs shooting into its borders or terrorists tunneling into its territory. Obama did, however, emphasize the U.S. and its partners' deep worry about the risk of further escalation and the loss of more innocent lives (“Timeline: How US Presidents Have Defended Israel Over Decades.”).

According to the UN, the Israeli military assault in Gaza killed nearly 1,500 Palestinian civilians, including more than 500 children. After Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari was

assassinated in November 2012, Israel conducted an assault in Gaza that killed over a hundred Palestinian civilians. Barack Obama, the US president at the time, backed Israel's actions, claiming that no country would tolerate rockets launched from beyond its borders at its inhabitants. He declared his unshakable support for Israel's right to self-defense against such attacks (“Timeline: How US Presidents Have Defended Israel Over Decades.”). the U.S. support for Israel's right to defend itself from Hamas is only an excuse for allowing Israel to continue its attacks, resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians and violating international law.

2.2.5. Donald Trump's pro-Israel Policies

The Israel lobby holds major influence over executive decisions. This lobby ensures individuals in high government positions retain a good attitude towards Israel. Moreover, the Israel lobby believes that the choice of secretary of state is very important and that whoever wins this job would have a positive view of Israel and oppose those who do not support Israel. The pro-Israel individuals possess prominent positions and dominate in the Trump administration; For instance, President Trump's National Security Advisor, John Bolton, reinforced the Iraq war in 2003. He has a cordial strategy towards Israel but a firm stance towards the Middle East. Furthermore, under the Obama administration, both Bolton and Mike Pompeo opposed the Iran nuclear agreement, and without regard for international law, they both pushed Trump to reject the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“the Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy”). This Israeli influence in the Biden administration has had a negative impact relating to Middle East matters.

On Wednesday, December 6, President Trump announced his decision to transfer the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as well as the designation of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. This decision not only broke decades of American foreign policy precedent, which has avoided declaring Jerusalem as Israel's capital in the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian peace

agreement. It also put an end to the PA's hopes that the U.S. would help advance the aim of East Jerusalem becoming the capital of a future Palestinian state.

The consequences of Trump's decision are too early to assess, but it appears that what comes before differs from what follows. Especially if the Palestinian people decide to escalate their efforts to reverse the decision by inciting widespread opposition. The president's efforts to change the status in Jerusalem may fail. The current administration's Middle East strategy will be weakened, and the U.S. capacity to function as an unbiased mediator in a future peace process will most likely be limited. These aims include combating militant Islamist organizations, limiting Iranian influence, and settling the Arab-Israeli conflict (“Trump’s Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s Capital: Background and Ramifications”). Biden's decision destroyed the hopes of the Palestinian Authority, which held expectations that the U.S. would recognize East Jerusalem as the capital of a prospective Palestinian state.

President Donald Trump's administration tried to normalize ties between Arab states and Israel in order to put pressure on the Palestinians to adopt a new paradigm. Normalization placed pressure on the Palestinians from the outside Normalization made it harder for Palestinians because it led to less support from Arab countries, which made it more difficult for them to make agreements with Israel and the huge decrease in official Arab support for the PA in recent years was a clear evidence of this. If more Palestinian business owners agree to the new peace terms, they will be more likely to capitalize on possible joint Arab-Israeli investment opportunities that may arise. The UAE stood out among Arab countries due to its financial resources and interest in forming partnerships with Israel, aiming to gain technological advancements that would provide it with a competitive advantage in its regional conflict with Iran (4, “الاتفاقيات الإبراهيمية من المعونة الدولية للاستثمار الخاص؟”). Since the U.S. has a significant influence over The UAE, the latter consequently tends to support Israel's interests and the U.S. in the region rather than Palestine.

Soekarno used neoclassical realism concepts to analyze the internal environment and systemic components that influenced US foreign policy in favor of Israel during President Donald Trump's term. Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the threats posed by various radical terrorist groups in the Middle East, which jeopardize the position of the United States and its allies in that region, are currently the most significant systemic factors driving US foreign policy in favor of Israel in the Israel-Palestine conflict. It is apparent that Iran's connections with its Middle Eastern allies are as strained as its relations with the United States, particularly with Israel (Anisah and Soekarno, "United States' Unwavering Support to Israel: Biased Foreign Policy in Israel-Palestine Conflict under President Donald Trump's Administration 2016-2019").

Iran's leader has long maintained strong anti-American and anti-Zionist views, recognizing that the Zionist government and the U.S. are the Islamic nation's opponents. This poses a significant risk not just to the US and Israel, but also to the region's stability. A nuclear-armed Iran would represent an increasing danger to the US' moderate Arab allies, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others. Because these nations are already concerned about Iran's strong regional activities, the US and its Middle Eastern allies continue to impose tough sanctions on Iran to ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons (Anisah and Soekarno, "United States' Unwavering Support to Israel: Biased Foreign Policy in Israel-Palestine Conflict under President Donald Trump's Administration 2016-2019").

The delicate balance of Israelis and Palestinians living together in the city appears to have escaped Trump's decision. It also fails to recognize Jerusalem's importance to Palestinian national identity and objectives, as well as the terrible consequences of a blocked peace process. It might have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the political ecology of a region where history means life or death. It has the potential to destabilize numerous weak Arab states as well as the PA, which is currently lacking legitimacy. Furthermore, it is likely to increase

tensions between Israel and Iran. Along with Trump's renewed friendship, Iran sees this as an offense of Islamic sanctities (Sofos and Felci, "What Trump's Recognition of Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel Means for the Middle East."). Trump's decisions increased instability in the region without considering other contributing factors to Palestine and the Arab nation.

The problematic relationship between the U.S. and Israel, characterized by massive military and economic aid, has been criticized for facilitating Israel's activities, notably its occupation of Palestinian territory. The pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. has been accused of holding enormous influence over American foreign policy, using legal strategies to alter discussions and decisions. The U.S. different presidents have long asserted that its support for Israel is a strategic cost of stabilizing the Middle East and avoiding disturbances that may jeopardize its access to the region's oil supplies. Despite this, the U.S. has contributed to the spread of communism in the region as well as the escalation of global issues. The U.S. has also been prioritizing its interests above a balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as seen by its failure to make meaningful progress in the peace process under several administrations. The complex interaction of domestic and international politics in affecting US foreign policy decisions emphasizes the need for a more nuanced and objective approach to the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the larger Middle East region.

2.3. New Vision of Joe Biden in the Second October Conflict of 2023

The coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians appears to have avoided Trump's decision. It also fails to recognize Jerusalem's importance for Palestinian national identity and objectives, as well as the terrible implications of a frozen peace process. It might have profound consequences, affecting not only the political system of a region where history means life or death. It has the potential to destabilize numerous Arab states as well as the PA, which is currently lacking legitimacy. Furthermore, this could create tensions between Israel and Iran, because Iran sees this behavior as a violation of Islamic sanctities. That same day, Biden issued

an aggressive warning to any state considering attacking Israel and the US rejected a UN Security Council resolution calling for a humanitarian cease-fire in the conflict. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US ambassador to the UN, supported the veto by underlining the ongoing diplomatic efforts and the need to allow them to be completed (Harb, “Timeline: The Biden Administration on Gaza, in Its Own Words.”). the frozen peace process exacerbates the tension not only between palestine and Israel but also has negative consequences for regional stability.

On a Monday in Northern Virginia, President Biden officially addressed pro-Palestine protests at university campuses, condemning antisemitic demonstrations and criticizing those who were unaware of the Palestinian situation. Someone from the press interrupted him, stating that more than a hundred individuals had been detained since the protests at Columbia University began the previous week, 45 protestors at Yale University were arrested on Monday for refusing to leave the plaza. Other arrests were made outside the Stern School of Business at NYU on Monday night when students from Yale and Columbia demanded an end to the war in Gaza and divestment from Israeli-related companies. Nonetheless, a few Jewish Columbia students voiced concern about their safety because they believed there was antisemitic yelling, while MIT, Boston University, Emerson College, and Tufts University, among other schools, have all reported analogous demonstrations. (Watson, “Biden Condemns ‘Antisemitic Protests’ and ‘Those Who Don’t Understand What’s Going on With the Palestinians.’”). The actions of the U.S. government to shut down these protests reflect a bias in favor of Israel and an effort to suppress dissenting political views, despite the demonstrations being peaceful, the students were violently arrested.

On Tuesday, the U.S. rejected a draft resolution on the Israel-Hamas conflict for the third time since the crisis began on October 7. The resolution, sponsored by Algeria and supported by 13 council members, called for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire. However, the U.S. opposed it, instead calling for a temporary truce linked to the release of Hamas

captives. U.S. diplomats expressed worry to UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield about the resolution's potential to undermine ongoing discussions between the U.S., Egypt, Israel, and Qatar to mediate a ceasefire and the release of hostages in Gaza. She insisted that if an agreement was not reached for Hamas to release the hostages, demanding an immediate, unconditional ceasefire would not produce long-term peace but would instead increase hostilities. The resolution, written by Algeria and vetoed, called for an urgent humanitarian truce and the unconditional release of all hostages without connecting the two demands (“US Blocks Ceasefire Call with Third UN Veto in Israel-Hamas War.”). The U.S. opposed the peace resolution prioritizing geopolitical interests over humanitarian concerns, indicating a preference for continuing the war rather than prioritizing the hostage's release.

The Biden administration's policy during the Second October Conflict of 2023 has been marked by unwavering support for Israel, despite international and domestic appeals for a more balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. approach, notably its rejection of UN ceasefire resolutions, has drawn criticism for prioritizing strategic interests over immediate humanitarian needs. This not only reflects the continued complexities of Middle Eastern politics but also demonstrates the U.S.'s biased role towards Israel in this conflict.

2.4. The Role of Middle Eastern States: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan

Saudi Arabia, as the Arab and Islamic world's leader, is progressively normalizing relations with Israel, a notable move considering that the country has never openly recognized Israel since its inception in 1948. Recognizing the importance of the Palestinian issue, Prince Mohammed bin Salman insists that any settlement improves the lives of Palestinians, However, the condition is the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. While Palestinian authorities have formally called for the establishment of their own state, they have also secretly asked for further financing and control over the occupied West Bank in exchange for

participating in the Saudi-Israel plan (Gritten, "Saudi Arabia Interested in Israel Normalisation Deal after War.").

The Saudi authorities put the discussions on hold when Hamas launched an attack on October 7th. Following the meeting with the Prince, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that he was willing to pursue normalization as long as the Gaza situation was handled and an acceptable route to establishing a Palestinian state was identified. The Saudi ambassador in London confirmed that a deal was close and would not hurt the Palestinian people, with the ultimate goal of creating an independent Palestinian state (Gritten, "Saudi Arabia Interested in Israel Normalisation Deal after War."). Despite Saudi Arabia's prominent role in the Arab world, it has not undertaken any significant actions in support of Palestine, instead persisting in its pursuit of normalization with Israel.

The first permanent Holocaust memorial on the Arabian Peninsula opened in Dubai, attended by Israel's highest ambassador there. Despite the most recent 11-day conflict between Israel and Hamas, this occurrence and the development of a joint venture between an Israeli and Emirati firm underlined the UAE's commitment to improving relations with Israel. Beginning in the final days of Ramadan, the war killed 12 Israelis, including an Israeli soldier and two children, as well as 254 Palestinians, including 66 children or more. Despite the destruction, Israeli Ambassador Eitan Na'eh announced a departure from the past, stating that what was happening in the UAE was the "exact opposite" of the situation in Gaza. However, the violence angered individuals in all of the Gulf Arab governments, and some of them resorted to social media and publicly protested to express their support for the Palestinians and their opposition to Israel. In response to the killings in East Jerusalem, the UAE government and its leaders publicly voiced concern and condemned the Israeli security forces' invasion of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, as well as the deportation of Jewish Israelis from the Sheikh

Jarrah neighborhood (Batrawy, "UAE And Israel Press Ahead With Ties After Gaza Cease-fire.").

This was the UAE's first public criticism of Israel since diplomatic relations were restored last year. Some questioned if the UAE would reduce or stop its current pace, despite the two countries' strategic relationship, which includes direct flights, intelligence exchange, tourism, investment in Israel's gas sector, and a \$10 billion investment fund. The UAE reserved direct condemnation of Israel and requested that all parties involved in the violence stop when it escalated into a conflict between Israel and Hamas. Ambassador Na'eh, who is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, indicated that throughout the crisis, he had friendly and inquisitive discussions with Emirati authorities marked by shared sympathy over the casualties incurred by both sides. Na'eh delivered her statements at the "Crossroads of Civilization," a privately supported museum in Dubai that is now hosting a Holocaust exhibition. Jewish and Israeli authorities, and the German ambassador in The U.A.E, visited the Holocaust memorial and raised awareness about the risk of ethnic cleansing, which signified the friendship depicted in a courtyard artwork with an Israeli and an Emirati enjoying coffee under the term "cousins" in both Arabic and Hebrew (Batrawy, "UAE And Israel Press Ahead With Ties After Gaza Cease-fire."). the relations between Israel and the UAE continued and did not get affected even after the Israeli violation of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which shows the UAE's stance with Israel.

The Rafah border crossing in Egypt is the sole port of entry into the besieged Gaza Strip, home to Palestinians, that is not directly controlled by Israel. For years, Cairo has closely controlled this bridge, which Palestinians sometimes refer to as their "lifeline." It is occasionally available for as few as 32 days per year. These restrictions are part of Israel's 2007-old siege of Gaza, which has transformed the Palestinian area into what some consider to be an open-air prison. However, Egypt was unwilling to assist in sending life-saving supplies to almost 2.2 million Palestinians when Israel unleashed a major bombing campaign on Gaza last month,

citing Israeli limits. Thirteen days after the attack began, on October 21, a group of twenty trucks carrying first aid was able to make its way inside, while before, Israel had been bombing both sides of the border, destroying parts of the crossing and the surrounding roads, then Egypt declared the crossing to be officially open but unusable (Shalaby, “Israel-Palestine: Who Controls the Egypt-Gaza Rafah Crossing?”).

The World Health Organisation classified the number of help trucks permitted into Gaza before, citing the difference from the previous daily average of 500 vehicles. Following the temporary truce deal signed by Israel and Hamas on Thursday, the number of trucks given entry has grown to over 200 each day. According to Middle East Eye, Israel and Egypt's ongoing limitations at the Rafah border, which are firmly founded in legal and historical circumstances, contributed to the long-standing siege of the Gaza Strip, adding layers of complexity to the issue (Shalaby, “Israel-Palestine: Who Controls the Egypt-Gaza Rafah Crossing?”). Despite the comprehensive blockade imposed on Gaza, it was not until Israel granted authorization that President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi initiated the opening of the Rafah crossing for the entry of humanitarian aid vehicles, a decision that came thirteen days after the commencement of the aerial bombardment on Gaza.

Jordan's prime minister, Bisher al Khasawaneh, believes that any attempt to push Palestinians out of the nation would be an existential danger, despite the fact that making peace with Israel remains a strategic option. Jordan was concerned that if violence by armed settlers backed by the army continued, the Gaza issue could deepen, prompting a mass movement of Palestinians to the other side of the Jordan River. During a seminar in Davos, Khasawaneh acknowledged Jordan's 1994 peace accord with Israel, He said that any acts leading to mass displacement would breach the treaty and threaten Jordan's existence, mandating a reaction. Given Jordan's unshakable commitment to permanent peace, he remained optimistic that such an incident would not occur. Khasawaneh further stated that since October 7, regional initiatives

including major energy and water agreements with Israel have been halted. He complained that, given the current environment, Jordanian officials would never participate in public interactions with their Israeli counterparts (“Jordan’s PM Says Peace with Israel Remains Strategic Choice despite Gaza War.”). Jordan's Prime Minister, Bisher al Khasawaneh, views the potential displacement of Palestinians as an existential danger to the country which indicates that Jordan prioritizes national security over humanitarian issues in Gaza.

In conclusion, The U.S.-Israeli alliance is a multifaceted relationship shaped by economic, political, and strategic interests, and has been a significant factor in Middle Eastern geopolitics since WWII. This partnership, often at odds with public sentiment, has played a pivotal role in the region’s history, particularly in the context of Arab nationalism and the U.S.'s assertive post-Cold War foreign policy. Criticisms of the alliance focus on the U.S.'s substantial military and economic support, which is seen as enabling Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories and reflecting the powerful influence of the pro-Israel lobby on American foreign policy. The U.S. has defended its support for Israel as necessary for regional stability and safeguarding its interests, including oil access, but this has often come at the expense of a balanced approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite worldwide demands for neutrality, the Biden administration's unflinching attitude during the Second October Conflict of 2023 demonstrates the U.S. persistent prioritization strategy above humanitarian concerns. Despite their longstanding resistance to Israel, significant Arab states increasingly engaged in normalization efforts, fueled by economic and diplomatic benefits, even while the Palestinian crisis remains unresolved. This combined with the U.S. unwavering support for Israel, highlights the complex interplay of domestic and international politics that shapes American foreign policy, as well as the urgent need for a more equitable and peace-centric approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and broader Middle Eastern dynamics.

Chapter Three

Analyzing the Biden Administration's Uncovering and Underlying Objectives in Israel-Hamas Conflict

The Biden administration demonstrates a sophisticated awareness of the mechanics of regional security in its handling of the Israel-Hamas conflict. The administration has underlined the significance of balanced responses to guarantee the safety of civilians while restating support for Israel's right to self-defence. This tactic is part of a larger initiative to strike a compromise between the advancement of Middle Eastern stability and U.S security concerns.

Israel's goals for its Gaza war are complex within the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict. The country's long- and short-term strategic objectives are outlined under the subtitle "Israeli Policy." The sections "Concluding the Campaign" and "Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza" outline Israel's goals for achieving certain results, such as weakening Hamas's military might and creating an environment that will support a long-term peace agreement in the area.

The Biden administration is committed to further US interests and fostering regional stability in the wake of the Israel-Hamas war. Supporting Israel's security requirements while fending off regional influences that destabilise the area is part of this. In line with larger strategic imperatives meant to protect regional security, the administration also aims to preserve essential energy supplies and dissuade Iranian influence.

Although the end of hostilities provides a little reprieve, unsolved issues and underlying tensions continue, which raises fears about the possibility of new violence. Nonetheless, there are still chances for communication and diplomacy, with interested parties looking for ways to defuse the situation and boost confidence. All sides concerned must ultimately maintain their commitment to and involvement in the process of finding a lasting solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

This chapter investigates the complex nature of the Biden administration's approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict, examining its fundamental goals and repercussions. Beginning with a study of the expanding U.S. security goals, it delves into the nuanced position of conditional US backing for Israel's reaction to Gaza. Moving on to Israel's aims for the Gaza campaign, the debate delves into Israeli policy, with a particular emphasis on campaign completion and the potential implications for a post-Hamas administration in Gaza. It then defines US policy objectives in the aftermath of the conflict, emphasising Israel's security, safeguarding critical energy supplies, and preventing Iranian influence. This chapter concludes with predictions on future conflict and possibilities for resolution, providing a full study of the numerous facets of the Israel-Hamas conflict within the framework of U.S and Israeli strategic aims.

3.1. Expanding U.S. Security Priorities

The US is re-evaluating its foreign policy goals to take on new challenges in the world of security. In reaction to growing tensions, the U.S. is now providing Israel with conditional backing in the Israel-Gaza war, which is a clear example of this recalibration. With its careful handling of intricate geopolitical dynamics and upholding of strategic alliances, this nuanced approach represents a larger shift in U.S. foreign policy. By giving conditions top priority when providing help, the US seeks to strike a balance between its security concerns and diplomatic attempts to establish a lasting peace in the region.

3.1.1. Conditional U.S Support for Israel's Response against Gaza

Since the country's founding, Israel has benefited from more U.S foreign aid than any other country, with an estimated \$300 billion in total—amounts adjusted for inflation—in both military and economic assistance. Though Israel is unique, the U.S has also given significant foreign aid to other Middle Eastern nations, mainly Egypt and Iraq (Jonathan and Will “U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts”).

Any military aid that the U.S gives to recipients must only be used in accordance with the terms and conditions that have been established, and the U.S. government is responsible for keeping an eye on how the equipment it supplies is being utilised. In the 1980s, for example, the Reagan administration prohibited the transfer of cluster munitions to Israel for a number of years after learning that Israel had used them against civilian targets during its invasion of Lebanon. One such instance is the Biden administration's decision to halt the December 2023 delivery of assault rifles manufactured in the U.S to Israel because of worries that the guns would fall into the hands of radical Israeli settlers in the West Bank (Jonathan and Will “U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts”). In order to guarantee that military assistance is used in compliance with international humanitarian and human rights legislation, the Biden administration decided to stop supplying assault rifles to Israel.

From 1971 to 2007, the US gave Israel a lot of financial support; but, nowadays, almost all of that funding is used to bolster Israel's military, which is the most sophisticated in the area. Through a memorandum of understanding, the U.S has tentatively committed to give Israel approximately \$4 billion annually until 2028. Additionally, U.S. politicians are considering providing billions of dollars in additional money for Israel in the midst of its conflict with Hamas (Jonathan and Will “U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts”).

Ever since the crisis began, the Biden administration has asked for \$14 billion in military assistance for Israel, while the U.S has stationed two Navy carrier groups off the coast of Israel in the Mediterranean Sea. Along with these diplomatic efforts, the administration has helped secure humanitarian aid for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and negotiated the release of Israeli hostages during brief truces. As things stand right now, a ceasefire has been reached in which Israel has freed some Palestinian prisoners, Hamas has released some of its hostages, and Gaza has received humanitarian aid. With assistance from the US and other countries, Qatari middlemen managed to broker a ceasefire that is set to expire on November 30 (Mastriana "U.S.

Foreign Policy Decisions in the Israel-Hamas Conflict: Part 2"). The Biden administration's approach to the crisis in the region reflects a multi-faceted strategy that combines military assistance for Israel with diplomatic efforts to broker ceasefires and facilitate humanitarian aid to Palestinians in Gaza.

Although a few members of Congress and the Biden administration have called for a ceasefire, the majority in both houses of Congress and the White House has publicly opposed any official end to hostilities in order to remain in line with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Those who oppose a formal ceasefire have various justifications for their positions. They argue that this kind of action will hinder efforts to demolish Hamas, giving the group time to heal and reassemble, thereby extending the war. They further emphasise Hamas's unwavering dedication to Israel's annihilation, contending that Israel cannot be expected to consent to a ceasefire after its inhabitants have been attacked nonstop (Mastriana "U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions in the Israel-Hamas Conflict: Part 2"). With an emphasis on keeping Hamas from growing stronger and creating a new threat to Israel's security, this position reflects worries about the long-term effects of a ceasefire.

Furthermore, proponents of this viewpoint contend that since a ceasefire would lessen the pressure from Israeli military invasions, it would make it more difficult for Hamas to release the remaining Israeli hostages. Statements from freed Israeli detainees highlight the critical need to secure the release of all hostages and describe horrific experiences of cruel treatment, including malnutrition, family separation, torture, and executions while held captive by Hamas. Moreover, given Hamas's track record of breaking previous ceasefires, Israeli authorities voice scepticism towards any ceasefire arrangement (Mastriana "U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions in the Israel-Hamas Conflict: Part 2").

On the contrary, there is growing pressure on the US government to use force to put an end to the conflict; but, according to recent surveys, opinions among US people on US military assistance to Israel are mixed, with age groups showing the biggest differences in opinions. Younger persons have the least support for military aid to Israel, while senior respondents have the most. With Hamas's October 7 surprise terror strike, which included claims of war crimes and atrocities against civilians, Israel was greeted with broad sympathy in the West. However, since Israel's fight against Hamas also results in the deaths of thousands of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and exacerbates a humanitarian catastrophe that relief organisations claim is heading towards famine, support for Israel has declined in the US and many other countries (Jonathan and Will "U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts"). The generational swings in public opinion that could occur are indicated by the age-related variances in sentiments about military aid to Israel. Policymakers should take these differences into account when making decisions.

With some calling Israel's policies indiscriminate and others accusing it of war crimes, the international community is placing more and more pressure on Israel. Over the course of the conflict, worldwide support for Israel has decreased, notwithstanding the fact that these accusations are open to political interpretation. Remarkably, almost 120 UN members have demanded an immediate end to hostilities; the US and the majority of its European allies are among the prominent exceptions (Mastriana "U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions in the Israel-Hamas Conflict: Part 2").

The lack of a clear end goal beyond Hamas's elimination is cited by critics of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, who call for a plan that addresses Gaza's future and the Palestinian population living there. The demands for changing policy include calling for an instant ceasefire, strengthening support for Israel's defence, giving humanitarian aid to both Israelis and Palestinians first priority, endorsing measures that protect civilians and human rights, and acting as an impartial third party mediator to help find a political solution in order to avert future

hostilities. The Biden administration has not significantly changed its support for Israel policy, even though it has warned Israel against needless civilian losses (Mastriana "U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions in the Israel-Hamas Conflict: Part 2").

In conclusion, the ways in which the U.S has supported Israel's military actions demonstrate the difficulties in managing foreign policy in the context of regional crises. Policymakers are under increasing pressure to address wider ramifications, including the pressing need for comprehensive strategies to protect civilian lives and advance humanitarian assistance, as cries for a ceasefire get louder and international scrutiny increases. Comprehending Israel's goals in its Gaza assault is essential to directing future diplomatic initiatives and promoting stability in the area.

3.2. Israel's Objectives for Gaza Campaign

Israel's campaign in Gaza has two primary goals: successfully completing the operation and preparing Gaza for the post-Hamas government. The goal of the campaign was to stop Hamas militants' rocket strikes in order to resolve security concerns. Israeli policy aimed to reduce Hamas's power through a combination of military actions and diplomatic initiatives. Following the war, Israel worked to create circumstances that would lead to changes in Gaza's governance dynamics, striving for stability through political involvement and reconstruction initiatives.

3.2.1. Israeli Policy

Israel launched Operation Swords of Iron in reaction to the October 7 terrorist attack by Hamas, a protracted air, sea, and land effort aimed at securing the safe release of the 229 or more Israeli and foreign captives that were abducted during the attack. Targets of the air and sea assault have included the political leadership of Hamas, which is located in Gaza, its military commanders, fighters from the organization's land, sea, and air forces, as well as

command centres, training facilities, missile launch sites, the tunnel network beneath Gaza, and military workshops (Eisenstadt "Israel's Campaign Against Hamas in Gaza: War Aims and Operational Challenges").

Last Friday, October 27, 2023, Israeli ground forces finally made their way into the northern part of the Gaza Strip after a series of small-scale incursions. It is said that they are now progressively increasing their activities there (Eisenstadt "Israel's Campaign Against Hamas in Gaza: War Aims and Operational Challenges"). The scope and intensity of Israel's Operation Swords of Iron, which involves air, sea, and land forces, highlight the seriousness of the situation and the commitment of the Israeli government to ensure the release of the hostages and eliminate the threat posed by Hamas.

It is necessary to define the policy and strategic goals that guide such initiatives when taking into account the intricate dynamics of operations in Gaza. Leading the list of these goals is the desire for a stable Gaza, with a leadership that categorically rejects using terrorism to intimidate Israel or its citizens. By reducing the threats posed by extremist elements, this fundamental goal not only strives to promote security within Gaza but also helps to regional stability. Moreover, it is envisaged that the intended results in Gaza will be used as leverage to convince or coerce other regional parties to stop supporting terrorist organisations (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign").

Additionally, a key element of the strategy is a coordinated restoration process that seeks to come to an understanding with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia regarding the normalisation of relations with Israel, thereby promoting greater peace and stability in the region. This project emphasises the connection between diplomatic efforts and operational strategies and is in line with the larger goals of the Abraham Accords (Benson "What Is the

End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign"). These stated policy objectives offer a cogent framework for outlining the military objectives of IDF, based on a realistic assessment of what force can accomplish in pursuit of these overarching goals and the understanding that policy influences strategy and the conduct of operations.

To direct the IDF efforts in the context of military operations in Gaza, a series of precise and targeted military goals have been established. In the first place, these goals are to weaken, isolate, and eventually destroy Hamas, all the while offering assistance to make it easier for a new, inclusive administration to take power in Gaza. The strategic necessity to destroy Hamas's military power and infrastructure and so weaken its ability to carry out violent and aggressive activities against Israel is at the heart of this endeavour (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign").

Moreover, the IDF is responsible for defending Israel from the variety of dangers that emanate from Gaza, which calls for a multipronged strategy that includes both defensive actions and proactive counterterrorism programmes. Added to that, military operations aim to destroy not only Hamas but also the terrorist networks that receive backing from other countries, all the while obtaining intelligence on local, national, and international terrorist actions (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign"). This all-encompassing strategy include targeted operations to apprehend or destroy war criminals and terrorists, as well as endeavours to get the release of hostages wrongfully held by the Hamas government.

3.2.1.1. Concluding the Campaign

Instead of ordering Israel to stop its military operations in Gaza, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued temporary measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis and stop acts that could lead to genocide. Despite claims of state-led genocide in Gaza, South Africa requested the (ICJ) for an emergency order requiring Israel to cease all military operations. However, the

ICJ refused to grant the injunction. The panel of 17 judges recognised that there was a possibility that some of Israel's acts and inactions in Gaza could have violated the terms of the genocide treaty (Dettmer "Top court stops short of ordering Israel to suspend Gaza campaign"). The ICJ did not decline to issue an order compelling Israel to halt all military activities in Gaza. Rather, it focused on the urgent and pressing needs of the Palestinian people in Gaza and adopted interim measures to solve the humanitarian situation and stop acts that could result in genocide.

Taking a punitive approach to this campaign, eliminating Hamas, and then withdrawing from Gaza will not advance the interests of the Israeli and US administrations. The campaign's outcome must create the framework for improved regional peace. In order to remove Hamas, a route to peace for both Israel and the Palestinians must be provided. There needs to be optimism (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign").

One cannot stress the importance of successful post-conflict rehabilitation and governance programmes in the wake of crises in areas like Gaza. The creation of an all-encompassing structure under the supervision of a civilian special representative of the Secretary-General under the UN is essential to this endeavour. As the person tasked with supervising the reconstruction, this delegate must skillfully and impartially negotiate Gaza's complex sociopolitical terrain. Most importantly, maintaining Gaza's fragile peace and stability depends on a strong security infrastructure. Thus, it is a calculated move to hand over command of this kind of force to a respectable organisation like the Saudi armed forces, backed by other Sunni countries like Bangladesh and Malaysia. The likelihood of establishing a sustainable peace trajectory is greatly increased by utilising the combined strength and influence of these entities in the region (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign").

Furthermore, the UN special representative's establishment of a final schedule for holding open elections throughout Gaza is a critical turning point in the process of democratisation. With international oversight and transparent electoral procedures followed, these elections should produce a government that accurately represents Gaza's varied population and its many interests. But we also need to recognise that this changeover phase comes with a number of complex problems. There are several obstacles in the way of achieving lasting peace in Gaza, from reducing socioeconomic inequality to promoting intercommunal harmony. Therefore, negotiating the complexities of post-conflict rebuilding and state-building initiatives requires a nuanced and flexible approach, bolstered by steadfast support from the international community (Benson "What Is the End State? Assessing Israel's Objectives for a Gaza Campaign"). Encouraging public trust, guaranteeing the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral process, and advancing a government that represents the people's will all depend on international scrutiny and transparent electoral practices.

3.2.1.2. Post- Hamas Administration in Gaza

Three primary elements should comprise the proposed Gaza Interim government (GIA): a civilian government, a law enforcement and public safety apparatus, including a major role for Arab state contingents and an international coalition for development and reconstruction (Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza").

In a post-Hamas Gaza, the civilian management of the GIA would be crucial, highlighting Palestinian leadership under a Chief Administrator in charge of several departments. In order to promote efficient governance across crucial sectors including health, education, and the judiciary, this system seeks to combine the knowledge of prominent local leaders with that of Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora. The goal of having both local celebrities and technocrats in the community is to give the people a sense of representation and ownership

(Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza").

Although basic services would continue to be provided by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) during the interim period, negotiations regarding the agency's long-term role are contingent upon the Palestinian Authority (PA) eventually returning to the region, indicating a commitment to regional self-governance balanced with outside assistance (Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza"). Through the integration of local leaders' expertise and experience from Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora, the GIA aims to improve governance and decision-making processes by utilising a wide range of viewpoints and talents.

The GIA suggests a cooperative approach to public safety and law enforcement, led by a group of Arab governments who have peace agreements with Israel in place, in an effort to promote trust and effectiveness. By using specialised police or gendarmerie detachments instead of regular military formations, this tactic seeks to allay occupation fears. A dedication to regional security cooperation while upholding Palestinian sovereignty and local sensibilities is demonstrated by the leadership of a non-territorial officer from a contributing Arab state and liaison offices that facilitate cooperation with Israeli and Egyptian counterparts (Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza").

In order to solve Gaza's urgent infrastructural requirements and promote economic growth, an international coalition possibly led by the UAE would be necessary for the reconstruction and development arm of the GIA. This Arab-led initiative aims to undertake large-scale initiatives like building a new port for Gaza and industrial zones to increase employment prospects, all the while leveraging financial resources, knowledge, and

international relationships to expedite quick repairs (Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza").

The US must take the lead in organising support, coordinating with other relevant parties, and establishing international legitimacy possibly via UN Security Council or Arab League mandates in order to achieve this endeavour. The goal of liaison with Israel is to facilitate the shift from a restrictive siege to a more cooperative framework that addresses Israel's security concerns and promotes Gaza's long-term self-sufficiency (Robert, Dennis and David "Israel's War Aims and the Principles of a Post-Hamas Administration in Gaza"). The success of this project depends on Gaza's development becoming self-sufficient and sustainable over the long run. In order to guarantee that the advantages of development and reconstruction are long-lasting and empowering for the local populace, the alliance should place a high priority on the establishment of resilient economic institutions, skill development, and capacity building.

Lastly, a variety of strategies are presented by the envisaged post-Hamas government in Gaza to advance wealth and stability in the area. It attempts to meet urgent needs while establishing the framework for long-term self-sufficiency by strongly emphasising civilian administration, regional security cooperation, and international coalition-building for reconstruction. Integrating these concepts becomes essential for establishing a durable road towards peace and prosperity when the focus turns to defining U.S. policy objectives in the post-conflict context.

3.3 U.S Policy Objectives in Post-Conflict

The Biden administration's attention has been focused on the Middle East due to the recent events. The first of these events was the 7 October 2023 conflict, followed by Iran's strikes on Israel in April 2024, which heightened the tensions between Iran and Israel more. In response, the U.S has repositioned its forces in the Middle East, making a major change in

military policy, aiming to strengthen Israel's defense, fight Iranian aggression, help ally Arab states, and prepare for a variety of potential emergencies. The geopolitical dynamics complex emerged in the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on Iran's role in the region and the Hamas-Israel war in October 2023, as well as Iran's involvement, which includes providing financial, logistical, and military support to a network of armed militias, intensifying tensions between the U.S and Iran during the Israel-Hamas conflict.

3.3.1 Israel's Security

In 2021 Biden Administration decided to focus less on the Middle East in its foreign policy agenda when it assumed office. Though the U.S. was drawn more into the area by the Hamas attack in October 2023 and Iran's missile and drone attacks on Israel in April 2024, this changed the situation which complicated the U.S. foreign planning, especially in light of the uncertain consequences of rising tensions between Iran and Israel. After that the administration established five objectives as a reaction to the Hamas attack and the ensuing conflict in the Gaza Strip which are supporting Israel's right to self-defense and its efforts to neutralize the Hamas threat; avoiding a wider conflict in the region; protecting civilians and address the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza, in order to guarantee the safe release of hostages, working with regional and international partners and develop a post-war reconstruction strategy of a two-state solution and broader regional normalization initiatives (Katulis, “The Biden Administration’s Middle East Policy at a Time of War: An assessment of US policy six months into the Israel-Hamas War”).

Despite the administration's efforts in the region, nothing has changed in these six months of the Israel-Hamas conflict, because of the tensions and the divergent methods and attitudes to policy, despite avoiding some of the worst-case situations (Katulis. “The Biden Administration’s Middle East Policy at a Time of War: An assessment of US policy six months

into the Israel-Hamas War”). The U.S.'s primary objective in supporting Israel is to deter other nations from intervening in the conflict. This strategy allows Israel to continue its operations against the Palestinians. The U.S.'s stance is rooted in a complex interplay of geopolitical interests, historical alliances, and regional dynamics. It underscores the intricate and multifaceted nature of international relations in the context of conflict resolution.

In reaction to the Hamas attack, the U.S has focused and announced publicly all its support for Israel on military posture and security aid, which involves strategically relocating the USS Gerald R Ford and other carrier strike groups in the region closer to Israel, providing air defense to long-range precision attacks. Israel aims to renew its Iron Dome interceptors, precision-guided weapons, and intelligence sharing on regional threats. While US authorities are ready at any moment to meet these needs, more financing from Congress will be necessary for long-term support (Palti and al, “The Israel-Hamas War and U.S. Policy: An update”).

The amount of U.S. defense support lately equals that of the conflicts, still, a second front may strain resources and power and maybe even bring America into direct military action (Palti and al, “The Israel-Hamas War and U.S. Policy: An update”). The substantial support provided by the U.S serves as an indication that the conflict against Gaza is likely to be protracted. This prolonged engagement has unfortunately led to significant human casualties among the Palestinian population. This situation underscores the tragic human cost of such conflicts.

3.3.2 Securing Vital Energy Resources

The machinery of Israel's military relies on importing crude oil and processed products, including fighter jets and tanks. The Guardian disclosed a study, by the non-profit organization Oil Change International examining this fuel supply chain, because of the recent conflict in Gaza. The supply chain has been mainly reliant on fossil fuels sourced from numerous countries such as Gabon, Brazil, Russia, Kazakhstan, the U.S., and Azerbaijan. The Technological Data Desk consultancy enterprise in the United Kingdom that specializes in the fossil fuel industry domain analyzed the findings suggesting that major oil corporations, including BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, and TotalEnergies, are instrumental in facilitating these fuel supplies for Israel (Lakhani, "Revealed: How the Global Oil Industry Is Fueling Israel's War on Gaza.").

The study shows that since October 2023, Israel has received American military aid containing three tankers carrying JP8 jet fuel, and the first tanker left from a Texas refinery before the recent Gaza conflict began. These vessels often disable their AIS signals before reaching Israel, for security reasons, the other two tankers left during the conflict, when the Palestinian death toll had passed 16,000. The third tanker left Texas on February 9, 2024, after the ICJ's provisional ruling suggested the possibility of Israel committing genocide against the 2.3 million Palestinians residing in occupied Gaza. A satellite image taken on March 6 depicted the tanker at Israel's Ashkelon terminal, by the time when Palestinian casualties had escalated to 30,000 (Lakhani, "Revealed: How the Global Oil Industry Is Fueling Israel's War on Gaza."). As elucidated by Lakhani, the U.S furnishes Israel with a diverse array of weaponry during the conflict against the inhabitants of Gaza. This support has resulted in substantial human and material losses that raise serious questions about the violation of international laws.

At the beginning of October 7, U.S. military forces and personnel were strategically repositioned in the Middle East. The attempt and the main goal of President Biden's administration were to enhance Israel's defensive capabilities, deter Iran and its allies from

escalating the conflict more, support Arab partners who normalized with Israel, and prepare for various possibilities, including the possibility of evacuating U.S. citizens from Israel. In the middle of December, the eastern Mediterranean continued hosting the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, and the Gulf of Oman as the new station for the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower carrier strike group. While the Red Sea welcomed the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group, The U.S. has also increased its air power in the region by deploying additional F-35, F15, and F-16 fighter aircraft, with A-10 attack aircraft. (Israel and Hamas 2023 Conflict in Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress).

The U.S. also installed a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in the region specifically in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, Patriot air and missile systems have been installed in Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE. (Israel and Hamas 2023 Conflict in Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress). This underscores the reason behind the U.S.'s efforts to facilitate the normalization of relations between Israel and the majority of Arab nations. The main objective is to discourage these countries from taking a stance against Israel's action in Palestine and the Middle East.

Over the last 15 years, Israel has launched four catastrophic military attacks on the Gaza Strip. Every time, horrific damage to houses, businesses, utility infrastructure, and educational and health facilities was completely destroyed, raising concerns about Israel's intentional breaches of the rules of war. In the first month of the military attack operation, almost 25,000 tons of incendiary munitions were launched on Gaza, including two 900-kilogram bombs on the heavily populated Jabalia refugee camp on October 31, 2023. The Israeli military hit nearly 12,000 targets, with serious human repercussions (Asi and al., “‘Nowhere and No One Is Safe’: Spatial Analysis of Damage to Critical Civilian Infrastructure in the Gaza Strip during the First Phase of the Israeli Military Campaign”).

At the end of December 2023, almost 1.9 million of the Palestinian people in Gaza and 85% of the entire population had been internally evacuated as a result of the continuous bombardment and evacuation orders by the Israeli military. (Asi and al., “‘Nowhere and No One Is Safe’: Spatial Analysis of Damage to Critical Civilian Infrastructure in the Gaza Strip during the First Phase of the Israeli Military Campaign”). Despite all these massacres, Israel remains uncondemned for actions that seem to violate international law. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to provide military support, including various weapons.

3.3.3 Deterring Iranian Influence

After the Hamas-Israel war on October 7, 2023, The American troops stationed in the Middle East have been attacked, in Iraq and Syria. The U.S. attributed the attacks to Iranian proxy militias and considered Iran as the sponsor and facilitator of militant Islamist movements. The attacks on US personnel have a connection with Iran's Revolutionary Guards. On October 23, John Kirby, director of strategic communications at the National Security Council, mentioned Iran is supporting the attacks of Hamas and Hezbollah in the region for its own benefits, like providing cash, ammunition, and training to a network of armed militias. (“U.S.-Iran Tensions Soar during Israel-Hamas War”).

On the 27th of October, American military aircraft executed airstrikes on two locations in eastern Syria of arms and ammunition storage, which are utilized by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and their associates. Lloyd Austin Defense Secretary articulated in an official statement that this strikes of self-defense were a reaction to a continuous assaults on U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria by militia groups supported by Iran, but the U.S. does not want to engage in conflict and participate in additional hostilities. However, he also conveyed a warning to Tehran, stating that these attacks on U.S. forces, by Iranian backing, are intolerable and must stop. (“U.S.-Iran Tensions Soar during Israel-Hamas War”). These ongoing conflicts between

Iran and the U.S. are making the issues worse in the Middle East, adding complexities rather than solutions, driven by their own national interests.

In the previous week, the Iranian delegation issued a warning to the U.S. that the war crimes and acts of genocide by Israel should be immediately curtailed. In the same time, Ryder noted that The prospect of a broader regional conflict is undesirable to all, yet the American forces will be protected. Despite its public support of Israel, the administration is worried about a potential escalation. Lately, it has partially shifted its focus to the complex planning needed for a sudden abrupt relocation of many people, according to three insiders. (Knox and Anders, “Israel-Gaza War Tests America’s Ability to Deter Iran.”).

The circumstances transcend the confines of Israel and Lebanon. The unexpected retaliatory measures by Israel in response to a surprise onslaught by Hamas incited widespread demonstrations across the Arab world, with a significant number occurring at American diplomatic missions. In reaction to these developments, the State Department disseminated a global advisory the previous week, exhorting Americans to remain vigilant of potential acts of violence directed towards U.S. citizens and interests. (Knox and Anders, “Israel-Gaza War Tests America’s Ability to Deter Iran.”). This discussion centers on the escalating tensions in the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on the roles and influences of Iran, Israel, and the U.S in this complex period.

The recent massive air strike by Iran marks an unprecedented direct attack on Israeli soil from Iran. This act of aggression was in response to an alleged Israeli attack that killed Major General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, an Iranian military commander, along with a group of Iranian and Syrian nationals in Damascus on the first day of April. Post these incidents, Gideon Levy, an Israeli author and journalist, indicated that if Israel were to strike back, it could potentially trigger a regional conflict but such an eventuality is improbable, particularly with

the significant support of the U.S. to Israel. At the same time, Daoud Kuttab, a journalist and analyst, underscored that the existing discord between Israel and Iran has caused apprehension in the Arab world concerning the catastrophic consequences of another regional war (Staff, “Iran Attacks Israel with over 300 Drones, Missiles: What You Need to Know.”).

Daoud Kuttab further warned that such a conflict, would have an effect on a global scale and involve the Gulf nations, as well as major countries such as the US, Russia, and China, setting the stage for a possible dangerous worldwide conflict (Staff, “Iran Attacks Israel with over 300 Drones, Missiles: What You Need to Know.”). This situation could divert public attention away from allegations of ethnic cleansing by Israel, and instead, refocus the narrative on Israel as a victim in the aftermath of such an attack.

The Biden administration's strategy in the Middle East changed in reaction to the Israel-Hamas conflict, taking into account its interests, alliances, and regional dynamics. Despite efforts to protect Israel's self-defense while eliminating Hamas' right to self-defense, the situation remains unsolved as a result of ongoing tensions and different policies. The U.S.'s significant support for military, and security aid, and the strategic relocation of carrier strike groups demonstrates its commitment to Israel. However, this support has resulted in substantial human and material losses, raising serious concerns about potential violations of international law. The U.S. efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states aim to deter these countries from opposing Israel's policies, highlighting the various obstacles to achieving regional peace. Moreover, the ongoing disagreements between Iran and the United States make it more complex for the Middle East, motivated by their national interests.

3.4. Predictions on Future Conflict and Prospects for a Resolution

When Western public opinion moves against Israel, its corrupted leaders will alter direction, if not for moral reasons, then to protect their interests in the Middle East. France shifted its policy, demanding that Israel cease killing children in Gaza, indicating future events. Israel has no decent alternatives after its disastrous war. This might be the final opportunity to avoid disaster, end the conflict, embrace US President Joe Biden's vision of a two-state solution, and accept America's conditions for Gaza of no reoccupation, no ethnic cleansing, and no reduction of its territory. But Netanyahu and his extreme alliance, who have long taken America for granted, have once again ignored and or rejected America's counsel, to the disadvantage of both parties occupation (Bishara, "This Israel Has No Future in the Middle East."). This shows Netanyahu's intentions to continue the war no matter what are the consequences of his actions and decisions.

Before the Gaza conflict, Ari Shavit, the prominent Israeli journalist, predicted the end of Israel that everyone knows, if it stayed on its current catastrophic course. Last week, Ami Ayalon, a former chief of Israel's Shin Bet secret service, warned that the government's war and territorial expansion would mean the end of Israel. Both have published books warning Israel about the gloomy destiny that the state will face if it maintains its occupation (Bishara, "This Israel Has No Future in the Middle East."). However, Israel is taking the US's support for granted and continues its massacres and apartheid against the Palestinian people, causing more complicated conflicts in the future.

Qarmout Tamer a Palestinian from Gaza, says that at this phase in the conflict, chances exist to cease the continuing genocids in Gaza, unite Palestinian groups, and create a new political road to end the occupation. Also, Initiatives should be implemented, beginning with Palestinian leaders, to achieve this and spread justice in the country, peace, and statehood. First, all Palestinian groups must commit to implementing and eventually expanding the Qatar-

brokered agreement to swap Israeli hostages in Gaza for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. Hamas should express its approval and commitment to the Fatah accord agreed in Cairo in 2017. It should urge the Palestinian Authority to take on its obligations in Gaza, as well as reaffirm the commitment of Gaza's resistance forces to all agreements made by the PLO. (Qarmout, "A Roadmap for the Future of Palestine.").

The rebuilding of Gaza should begin as soon as possible, under international and Arab management. While the international community should help fund the project, Israel should be forced to establish a payment fund for Israeli and Palestinian families who have been affected by the war, aggressions, and occupation. The siege on Gaza should be removed completely and unconditionally, with all border crossings, airports, and ports restored and inhabitants allowed full freedom of movement. Israel should be pressed to promptly and unconditionally suspend all settlement operations permanently and begin serious discussions to end its occupation under UN guidance. Finally, if this political path towards long-term peace coexistence fails, a reformed PLO held accountable by the Palestinian people through regular elections should be accepted as the sole entity capable of determining the future direction and nature of the Palestinian liberation struggle (Qarmout, "A Roadmap for the Future of Palestine.").

In conclusion, The Biden administration has a complex approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict's consequences for regional stability and US security interests. In particular, the Biden administration is determined to offer conditional assistance to Israel while simultaneously participating in diplomatic efforts and cautious geopolitical considerations. This represents a larger reevaluation of US foreign policy objectives in response to changing security concerns and maintaining regional peace and security. Furthermore, the administration's strategic orders to safeguard regional security, secure energy sources, and prevent Iranian influence suggest a multifaceted strategy to address the region's underlying issues. In addition to the current tensions and unresolved concerns, highlighted the importance of continuous commitment from

all sides and continued diplomatic efforts to find a long-term solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Overall, the Biden administration's complex strategy projects future crises while emphasizing the significance of communication, diplomacy, and a persistent commitment to attaining long-term regional settlement.

The effects of the Israel-Hamas war since 7 October 2023 made a bigger tension between Iran and Israel. The Biden administration's attempts to counter Iranian influence and apply methods to protect Israel's security requirements during the conflict. This highlights the mutual connection of regional security dynamics, as well as the administration's diverse strategy to address the region's fundamental geopolitical concerns. Additionally settlement is inextricably linked to the intricacies of regional power relations, implying that tensions and unsolved issues have the potential to escalate future wars. However, communication, diplomacy, and confidence-building measures are important steps in defusing the situation and working towards a long-term solution.

Conclusion

The goal of this study was to explore the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, following its beginnings from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire following WWI to the complexities of Palestine in the aftermath of the Cold War. This study has offered a basic background necessary for understanding contemporary tensions by examining significant historical moments including the 1948 Palestinian refugee crisis, the UN Partition Plan, and significant conflicts like the October War of 1973. It has been difficult to balance this historical context and current events, especially the Second October War of 2023, which complicates the interpretation even further.

The study has emphasised the development of US policies towards Israel in the post-Cold War era, paying special attention to the Biden administration's position after the Second October War, and focusing on the special relationship between the US and Israel. This study has attempted also to clarify the complexities of international involvement in the conflict by analysing the hypocrisies in U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, the analysis focused on the roles played by significant Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan, highlighting the regional dynamics influencing the conflict and possible resolution methods.

Through this in-depth examination, the research clarified how an alliance with multiple elements and roots in ideological, strategic, and historical aspects is embodied by the special relationship between the US and Israel. The alliance comprises heavy military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and collaborative security projects; it is strategically linked to efforts like combating terrorism and regional stability. The US was an early and committed backer of Israel's independence, officially recognising it, and this connection has historical roots dating back to 1948, when Israel was first established. Driven by the same democratic values, cultural similarities, and shared historical narratives, this relationship has endured through multiple U.S. administrations.

In terms of politics, the US consistently supports Israel, frequently using its authority on international occasions to defend Israel's interests. This political support takes the form of concrete acts like financial aid packages, weapons provision, and diplomatic initiatives, going beyond empty words. Trade, investment, and technology exchange strengthen bilateral relations even more when there is economic engagement. Common ideals including human rights activism, democratic governance, and religious liberty serve as the foundation for this relationship, generating popular support in both countries and ensuring the alliance's longevity. The U.S.-Israeli Special Relationship, which has a significant impact on both regional dynamics and global geopolitics, essentially serves as evidence of the strength and depth of the ties that bind these two countries.

Moreover, this dissertation examined the U.S.'s underlying objectives in the most recent war 2023 between Palestine and Israel. The Biden administration's actions towards this conflict have captured the attention of a lot of critics, which includes positioning its forces in the Middle East aiming to strengthen Israel's defense in the region due to the geopolitical complexities that emerged in the Middle East and the involvement of Iran. The Biden administration adjusted its Middle East strategy in response to Israel's Hamas conflict, considering its own interests, alliances, and regional dynamics. Despite striving to safeguard Israel's self-defense while curtailing Hamas' right to self-defense the situation remains unresolved due to ongoing tension and divergent policies. The U.S. has provided substantial military and security aid, as well as strategically relocated carrier strike groups, underscoring its commitment to Israel. However, this support has come at a cost, with significant human and material losses, and rising concerns about potential violations of international law.

Additionally, U.S. efforts to normalize relations between Israel and Arab states aim to dissuade opposition to Israel's policies of apartheid and massacres against Palestinian civilians. Still, the complex backdrop of ongoing Iran and U.S. disagreement further complicates matters

in the Middle East rather than solving it. During the conflict, the Biden administration provided significant military aid to Israel and positioned naval forces near the country, while also facilitating humanitarian assistance to Palestinians and hostage negotiations during temporary truces as part of its peace efforts. Despite calls for a ceasefire from some members of Congress and the administration, the majority in both houses and the white house oppose an official cessation of hostilities, aligning with Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's stance. The U.S. support for Israel's military actions highlights the complexities of foreign policy in regional crises, as policymakers face increasing pressure to address the wider ramifications, including the need for comprehensive strategies to protect civilian lives and advance humanitarian assistance, as international scrutiny grows.

Given the long-standing strategic and historical ties between the two states, it is anticipated that U.S. foreign policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian issue will prioritise strong military and financial support for Israel. In addition, persistent attempts to restore Israel's relations with Arab nations are expected to be made to reduce Iranian influence and improve regional stability. But as domestic and international calls for the defence of Palestinian rights and the alleviation of suffering increase, U.S. administrations can expect increasing pressure to strike a balance between this backing and humanitarian concerns. A more balanced strategy may become more and more supported by changing political circumstances in the US. Eventually, the long-term goal of promoting long-lasting peace accord will probably continue, possibly through resuming international mediation and a taking little measures in the direction of a two-state solution.

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